

POSTHUMOUS WORKS

REV. HENRY B. BASCOM, D.D., LL.D.,

One of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.

EDITED BY THE

REV. THOMAS N. RALSTON, A.M.

"By it, he being dead, yet speaketh."—PAUL.

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Lecture

ON

M O R A L S C I E N C E .

AUGUSTA COLLEGE,

NOVEMBER, 1833.

(vii)

Lecture on Moral Science.

YOUNG GENTLEMEN, AND MY AUDIENCE :

We propose an Introductory Lecture, somewhat general and miscellaneous, in its character, on the nature, range, and application of Moral Science; embracing comprehensively, the elements of the philosophy of mind, and the principles of moral action, as applied to the acquisition of knowledge, and the pursuit of happiness. We are aware that the task to which we address ourselves, is an important one; and we approach it, we trust, with a diffidence of pretension, becoming the dignity and delicacy of the duty: but, at the same time, we do it in the confidence of truth; and hope, in some adequate degree, to evince a title to the attention and approbation of those who may avail themselves of the instruction given.

Upon a subject which has exhausted the ingenuity and learning of ages, and the records of which lie scattered through the volumes of a thousand generations, it would be presumption in us, to aim at originality of discovery, or novelty of illustration. We can do little more, than to analyze and combine, arrange and apply. In doing this, however, we

may be permitted to state, that no individual has been our model; nor has the prescriptive authority of any sect or party, or more vaguely, that of the schools, controlled us, in any of the conclusions at which we have arrived. We have thought and examined for ourselves, and ingenuously offer you the result of our reading and reflection.

Moral Science stands intimately connected with the being, relations, duties, prospects, and destiny of man. It is not only connected with the intellectual associations of our nature, but is intended to operate the most important practical results, upon the great question of human happiness. It is designed to aid in reducing to order and disposition, the various elements which enter into the complex being of man, and so render him, what he was intended to be, by the original designations of Providence. It is the ultimate object of this science, to increase alike the dignity, the virtue, and the happiness of mankind, by directing their attention to the best possible means of accomplishing the noblest of ends. The practical issues of this sublime and ennobling study, are intimately associated with that course of conduct, which Infinite wisdom has pointed out as the first duty, and the highest wisdom of man, to pursue. In order rightly to understand the native properties, and interests of our being, it is necessary to study the powers and susceptibilities—the physiology of the mind, as well as those of the body. Moral science, moreover, is not only concerned with the attributes and phenomena of mind, but with the moral aspects in which this great source of thought and feeling, is found to exist and operate. Hence, it is not less an ethical, than an intellectual inquiry, relating to the well-being and happiness of man. Proper attention to this subject, in due subordination to the superior claims of the Christian revelation, will identify your relations to the Creator, and render intelligible, the ties that ally you to the creature. It will lead you to the study of

yourselves, as the principal subject of moral science; and all about you, as furnishing an impressive exemplification of the moral effect of the mental and ethical analysis of your being, and its contingencies, upon which we are about to enter, in the progress of this lecture. It will be seen from these remarks, that the original, abstract qualities and phenomena of our being—the moral nature and value of thought, feeling, and action,—the social and confederate relations of man—together with the moral bearing in which he stands to the God and Father of all, are topics which fall legitimately within the range and cognizance of moral science; and to omit any one of these, is, to neglect a material part of the science in question.

In the study of mental and moral philosophy, you can never want for means or resources to prosecute the study. The empire of mind is your own: each individual has his own appropriate field of action; the grand arena of thought, and the agency, instrumentality, and subject of operation, all exist within himself. In all the creations of intellectual effort, the mind is alike the architect, the instrument, and the material; and every modification of thought—all the diversity of its phenomena, must be referred to the same common origin. Mental physics, or the philosophy of the human mind, like every other science, is to be looked upon as a classification of relations; and viewed inductively, in the light just suggested, how important must a knowledge of these relations be! Especially, if we take into consideration, the joint—the infinitely varied result of their final influence!

On this subject, you will indulge us in a few general remarks, as an essential part of a preliminary lecture on moral science. We premise, then, that preservation from error, and practical illustrations of moral truth, in all the complexity of its nature and applications, rank among the advantages attendant upon the study of this science. The philosophy of

intellect and action, seems to sustain a kind of central, controlling relation to every description of science and philosophy besides; and is, in part, creatively involved in their production. For all the numerous, varied observations, achievements, and demonstrations of philosophy, in its almost infinitely diversified processes, depend essentially upon the intellectual frame, and could not exist without it. Without it, there could be neither thought nor language. To know, therefore, the resources of the intellectual constitution, lies at the foundation of all philosophical attainment. Destitute of this knowledge, we may, as many of the ancients and schoolmen have done, attempt what is impracticable, or neglect to essay the accomplishment of things, perfectly within the limits of attainment. It will, therefore, be found necessary, to ascertain the extent and limits of the human mind, that we may know what is within its reach, and what beyond the compass of its grasp. This will save much fruitless toil, and will prevent the misdirection of the energies and industry of the philosophical student. To keep philosophical inquiry within its proper bounds, is one of the first and noblest attainments of philosophy. It is the basis of the Baconian system. It is the only infallible remedy against the encroachments of conjecture and skepticism; and has contributed more than any thing else, to the success and universality of the Newtonian methods of investigation, which have, for the last century, so splendidly subserved the interests of universal science! It has been remarked by Mr. Hume, and amply illustrated by others, that "the study of human nature is the centre, and capital of all the sciences." Hence, without an intimate knowledge of the philosophy of mind, we must necessarily err, in any attempt at the proper arrangement and disposition of the other sciences, and their adaptation to the common purposes of life, utility and enjoyment.

The elements of moral science, whether in a state of

arrangement or isolation, must always constitute the centre of a system. We shall not attempt, in this lecture, any thing like a logical division,—an encyclopedian classification of the mental powers. This labor falls more properly within the range of the course of lectures, to which an introductory lecture, can be little more than a chapter of contents. The only allowable, ultimate object of all pursuit, is, the intellectual and moral improvement of man. If then, we neglect the study of the mind, in our devotion to pursuits purely physical, (or limited to the modifications and results of mere matter,) in their character and issues, we must, of necessity, fail to answer the acknowledged ends for which we have been created. But it may be remarked here, that without some knowledge of our mental operations, we can never estimate the bearings in which we stand to the physical concerns of life. That mind is the great source of energy and motivity, from whence proceed all those actions of life, that by many are deemed merely mechanical and automatic, will be admitted by all well-informed persons. Not to know its laws and mode of action, therefore, when the means of information are within our power, is, to be inexcusably delinquent to ourselves. It is demonstrably certain, that the complicated affinities of thought,—the innumerable diversities of action, are all the offspring of the human understanding. Its contemplation, therefore, leads you, at once, to the fountain of thought and action. The laws regulating the generation of thought, belong to mind. To be ignorant of these laws then, is always to remain a child, in the knowledge of what is most worthy of being known. Even the caprices and aberrations of the mind, lead to a knowledge of its peculiar powers and operations, and may facilitate its study. All philosophy is founded upon observation and consciousness; to be ignorant, therefore, of the laws and character of the observing and conscious principle within us, is an instance of neglect and self-degradation,

that must materially lessen the value, and stain the glory of all human research.

Indeed, in whatever light this science is considered, it is interesting in itself, and important in its applications. Matter is known only by its properties, and mind is known in the same way. We are as conscious of the operations of mind, as we can possibly be, of the existence of matter. I am as sensible of a principle within,—(the laws and constitution of which are essentially different from those of my body,) a principle that thinks, wills, and feels, as I am, that my arm is a substance, extended, figured, and colored. This conviction is an essential part of my intellectual being; it is independent and irresistible, and no conceivable occurrence not involving an effort of omnipotence, can either increase or diminish it. When I cease to know this, all knowledge ceases, and *I am not!*

All the phenomena of matter are known, ultimately, by their exhibition to the senses:—observation becomes the exclusive medium of knowledge. The existence of mind and its phenomena, in like manner, are known by its furniture and operations becoming the subjects of consciousness, **which** may be termed, internal observation. The laws which nature has established in the department of mind, as well as the empire of matter, can only be ascertained by an examination of *facts*. And if we confine ourselves to a knowledge of facts, for the existence and character of which we have the evidence of our own consciousness, our conclusions in moral science, will be as certain and satisfactory, as in physics. It has been seen, that moral science has the human mind for its object, and every pursuit of human life, whether it terminate in speculation or in action, bears, necessarily, a dependent relation to it; while, on the other hand, *it* is dependent on no other branch of inquiry; nor does the whole range of science throw any material light upon its study. It is a science that contains in

itself, the whole moral world, and by far, the better part of God's creation : better, in so far as mind is more valuable than matter. And it, moreover, contains in itself, the principles of all the subordinate sciences. Mental and moral philosophy is peculiarly well adapted to promote general science, by furnishing us with a proper division and classification of the objects of human knowledge.—The various fields of science are spread out before the eye of the observer, and the mind of the inquirer receives its proper direction, and is enabled to pursue its course steadily, always having the proper object in view, and finding itself conducted to a definite conclusion. We may remark, by the way, that what is now denominated philosophy, was, in the infancy of learning, as Aristotle informs us in his ethics, called *wisdom* ; and philosophers, *wise men*. Hence, in the heroic ages of Greece, Nestor and Ulysses were called wise men, by way of eminence ; and in later times, we have the *seven wise men* of Greece, and other examples to the same effect. Cicero tells us, that the term philosopher, was an invention of Pythagoras ; and signifies, as originally used, a lover of wisdom ;—disclaiming its attainment, in any thing like perfection, but always in pursuit of it. It implies an ardent, candid, persevering inquiry after truth, in search of useful knowledge.

Reason and revelation are the great sources of knowledge and instruction to man. It is the province of philosophy to have to do with the former, and not wander beyond its ascertained limits ; while it becomes the separate business of theology, to interpret and apply the latter. That division of philosophy which properly belongs to us, at this time, and which was almost exclusively attended to among the ancients, is intended to cultivate the understanding, and point out the manner in which, it can best perform its operations. It is designed to correct and improve the affections,—to regulate the conduct of man,—and thus, by a consecutive process,

form his character, in the course of constant preparation for the performance of duty, and the pursuit of happiness.

A broad, and more expansive view of moral science, is, that it embraces the philosophy of mind, morals, and government. It relates principally to man: his intellectual powers, his moral relations, and the social aspects in which we are called to contemplate him, are preparatory to this result. It ascertains and settles the limits of the human understanding; it detects the causes of its perversion; and furnishes the means of reclaiming it from its wanderings,—its vain and vicious pursuits; and also, points out how it can be most successfully employed in subservience to human happiness. The great object of logic, in connection with science, and mental accomplishment, of whatever kind, is, to regulate the intellectual processes of thought. Hence, no good system of logic can exist, without a thorough knowledge of mental philosophy, which forms the basis of all the laws and rules of ratiocination. Logic seems to be little more, than a collection of the general laws of human thought; and the best methods of reasoning, analytically considered, and thrown together in systematic form. Thus, although often overlooked, every science, virtually, has its own appropriate logic; and we may confidently look forward to the time, when we shall have separate and labored productions, on the logic of astronomy, of chemistry, of mathematics, and so of the rest. All these kindred systems of logic, which have an elementary existence in our literature even at this time, must emanate from the sublime study of the human mind, with which all the first principles of every other science, considered in the light of scientific arrangement, stand intimately connected. Apart then, from the study of moral science, what can we know of the great deep of human speculation? Will not the superficial theorist, or the mere caterer upon the surface of things, be left without anchor, soundings, or haven? Or, to change the illustration,

without the aids suggested, how can man ascend those intellectual heights, so necessary to be reached, in order that he may trace the shadows of the past, survey the present, and expatiate over the field of his future destiny! Can we be justly reputed, "in various nature wise," if we overlook the richest and most fruitful field of our being?—if we turn aside from the very Eden of science—the only paradise of wisdom—the essential heaven of invention!

The mental polity of our intellectual being is founded on laws, of which it must be unfortunate, if not criminal, for us to remain ignorant. Ignorance here, is indeed, a most fatal evil. It is, to be blind to the nature and forms of truth and excellence about us, and the lurking deformities of error and vice, with which the conclusions of the human understanding and the efforts of industry, are too apt to be abused. A man's intellectual habits, usually give birth to his moral aptitudes; and *these* are uniformly charactered and storied in life. Would you have the stream pure, then, you must ascend to the fountain, and preserve it from defilement. To effect this, you must begin with the intellectual functions. Mental and moral philosophy embrace, as we have seen, in their expansive range, all that belongs to the noble science of logic, to which we necessarily appeal, in the study of all science, and which, in effect, is nothing more than a knowledge of the human mind; inasmuch as it traces the progress of knowledge, from its first and most simple conceptions of things, through all its accumulative stages, until we arrive at the almost innumerable conclusions, derived from comparing them together. From which we infer, that no branch of science affords so fair a prospect of improvement as that which relates to the understanding, defines its powers, and shows the methods by which we gradually amass knowledge.

Whatever tends to improve the mind, may be justly regarded in the light of a discovery, and should be estimated and

cherished accordingly. The appositeness of this remark to the subject under notice, is vivid and striking. The discoveries of moral science constitute the great key of all knowledge. It is here alone we learn the secret folds, windings, and ramifications of the human heart. Without it, all the various forms of invention, taste, and sensibility, labor under a dead palsy. Without it, no man can be prepared for the deep and discriminating generalizations of scientific thought and effort. The elements of the science of mind, exhibit, in a full and forcible manner, the logic of nature and common sense. They investigate the principles of human thought and action; they discover and explain the foundations of all the other sciences; and submit to our consideration, a history of the mind of man, developing its frame and contexture, its powers and purposes. The dependence, therefore, of other topics upon this science, gives to it an increased value, and constitutes it the great staple of intellectual wealth. As all the parts of a circle are equally distant from a common centre, so the whole circle of the arts and sciences, seems to be enlightened and governed by the science of mind. It is in fact, the *materia farina* of all—of universal science!

It has been already suggested, that our plan does not study minute classification. Indeed, it rather excludes it. We have endeavored to make truth and nature the basis of our arrangement; but, in many instances, we have been met by an impossibility of systematic analysis, and verbal definition. At almost every step, we meet with facts and phenomena that must be referred to a known, generic origin, and not to any specific class. This remark is, especially, applicable to the philosophy of mind, as distinguished from that of morals. The most profound discoveries within the reach of human research, teach us, impressively, the ignorance of man, and the limits which bound the circle of his understanding.

to cultivate them, as separate fields of discovery; each tending mutually, although by dissimilar methods, to the illustration of the other; and both leading, when rightly conceived of, and properly employed, to the improvement of the creature, and the glory of the Creator.

The subject under consideration will lead us to an acquaintance with our own organic nature, as compound beings,—the matter-of-fact phenomena of the union of soul and body, and the mysterious, but independent influence of the former upon the latter. There are first principles in every science; and the evidence of their existence is intuitive and irresistible. I *know* I live, because I enjoy and suffer. I *know*, because I am conscious of it, that I think, remember, and feel. These propositions are so true, that any attempt to strengthen my conviction of their truth by demonstrative evidence, only weakens it, by dividing the force of a conviction I can never resist, without becoming a lunatic! That I am the same being to-day I was yesterday, does not admit of demonstration;—to attempt formal proof would be mockery. I know it by intuition; and the whole constitution of my mind must suffer utter derangement, before I can cease to know it. The ever-varying complexity of the mind, is but the same simple indivisible substance or agent, found in different states, and contemplated in different relations and aspects. Such is the complete verity and permanence of the thinking principle within, that no internal change of its elementary being, can possibly take place. Our consciousness of our own existence, the intuition we have that the world exists about us, and our conviction of the being of a God, are parts of our moral constitution, and inseparable from the percipient principle within, that thinks, and feels, and wills. These are first principles, and the evidence supporting them, is, the impossibility of disbelieving them. They are settled by the ultimate princi-

ples of common sense, not less than by the necessary laws of intuitive belief. The evidence is primary and independent. We believe, because we cannot doubt,—because we cannot feel uncertain; and all ambiguity is excluded. Ultimate truth is reached by ratiocination, and may be considered as the last link of a long chain, the first link of which is placed in our hands by God and nature. All reasoning assumes the existence of data. These data must exist extrinsic of the reasoning process; or, to borrow an allusion from Archimides, there must be some spot on which to place the foot, and a fulcrum on which to rest the lever!

Of the primary truths and axioms, fundamentally interwoven with the laws of our being, of which we are now speaking, man can never be deprived, without the loss of all intellection. I must always be conscious of my being, and many of its contingencies; a diversity of states, and varying aspects, do not affect the question in the least: for all these are perfectly compatible with the most absolute and permanent individuality of being. And the same is true of every atom in the universe. Common sense, although objected to by some philosophers, is perhaps the most appropriate and unexceptional expression, especially if we study simplification of *style* as well as *plan*, that we can employ, to denote that almost nameless power of the understanding, which seizes and lays bare the truth and fitness of things, without any of the processes of abstraction or ratiocination, usually involved in the idea of reason, or reasoning. It is, in part, what was meant by the *apprehensio simplex*, or simple apprehension of the schoolmen.

It must be admitted that it is a difficult task to learn the complex lesson of our intellectual existence, but still, it is a difficulty that may be adequately overcome; and no man can estimate the sublime destiny to which he may rise, even in

Hence, in order to just views in pneumatology, negative discoveries are of great importance. That is, it is important to know what may *not* be known, as well as to know what *may* be known. By this science, further, the laws of belief are ascertained and regulated. It is a kind of intellectual chemistry, where principles obstinately discordant are referred to their kindred elements, by the laws of association; and as little place as possible, is given to the guess-work of hypothesis. It is, therefore, one of the first objects of moral science, to fix and define, negatively at least, the land-marks of the human understanding. That prime knowledge, which consists in knowing how little may be known, must not be overlooked by the student of mental and moral science:—it is important to his success, at every step, in search of physical as well as moral truth.

The only substances in the universe of which we have any knowledge, are matter and spirit—body and mind. A knowledge of the material world, with its modifications and contingencies, is styled natural philosophy; and a knowledge of the intellectual world, with its established laws, and their infinitely varied evolutions, receives the denomination of mental and moral philosophy; or, in the language of general classification, including both, in all the amplitude of their range—moral science. Mental philosophy respects, principally, the abstract, mysterious constitution of intellect; and moral philosophy treats of the nature and character of its relations and accidents. The one aspires to an acquaintance with the understanding itself, and the other prescribes for, and reviews its conduct. These,—matter and mind, constitute the two grand subjects of human study; and they are not more diverse in their nature, than are, in many respects, the methods of inquiry by which we approach them. And accordingly, it has always been found necessary, in the labors of philosophy,

this life, until he has successfully essayed the toilsome achievement. Man should be viewed as a sensitive being, an intellectual being, and a moral agent. He is capable of being affected by the things around him, either beneficially or injuriously; deriving from them, not only benefit or injury, pleasure or pain, but also, the elements of useful knowledge. He is capable of discovering the relations of things, comparing, abstracting, generalizing, and forming systems, by the inductive process of thought and reasoning. He is also connected with other moral agents, by a thousand ties, and in as many different aspects; and all owing good-will and reciprocal service each to the other, and the strictest fidelity and allegiance to the God of their being and blessings. The sensations which belong to man as a sentient being, are those mental affections produced by external objects and things, coming in contact with the senses; and are either pleasurable, painful, or indifferent. All, however, owe their use and bearing to the magic, mysterious agency of mind. The senses are but its instruments; it is the mind that perceives and determines, in every instance. Take the eye, for example; when the mind so ordains, it brings before me an infinity of objects. I become, at once, a citizen, not only of earth, but of the universe. Stars, at the distance of a hundred millions of leagues, become my familiars; and the grand universality of things, seems to be comprehended in the diameter of half an inch! The senses, in our physical and intellectual organization, are filial streams, supplying, in part, the parent ocean of mind. Sensation, as we have seen, is nothing but feeling, of which the mind becomes the subject, by means of the objective relation of things external to the mind, through the medium of the senses. We can have no sensation of pain or pleasure, or any thing else, only as we *feel* it. Perception, we define to be the attention of the understanding to objects acting upon it.

This presentment of objects to the mind, unites in impressions made upon it; and these impressions we call ideas. These again are revolved and compared in the mind, and of their existence we are conscious. And these intellectual operations we denominate reflection and consciousness.

After these brief remarks upon the physical and mental constitution of our nature, we may proceed to observe, that the three great foundations of human knowledge, systematically considered, are intuition, experience, and testimony. By intuition, we understand the immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement, between two or more ideas or propositions. This faculty of intuition lies at the foundation of all science. In another place, we have given it as an essential element of what we call common sense. Experience is the result of a series of observations. It is the foundation of all natural knowledge; contributes to the increase of knowledge of every kind; and is acquired by attention, trial, and experiment. Testimony forms the basis of all historical information, as a knowledge of the past. From these sources, and by these methods, mainly, we have all the vast accumulations of knowledge, to which, in the blended mass of ages and nations, the mind of man has given birth.

In asking your attention, in a more formal way, to the consideration of the *soul* of man, we assume that there is about every human being, a conviction—a consciousness, of which he cannot rid himself, that the sentient principle within him is *one* and indivisible. There is an irresistible persuasion of absolute individuality, precluding all division,—opposed to everything like plurality—a pervading sense of unalterable oneness—a *felt* unity, utterly inconsistent with the supposition, that thought and feeling owe their existence to millions of different atoms or corpuscles, variously affected towards each other, and coëxisting in the same body. If mind be the

result of material organization, it must either exist as a portion of modified matter, or have no existence, except as a mere accident—a state of the organs. Upon either of these hypotheses, the mind is dependent upon the body for its existence; and the body is the superior part of our nature; or rather, essentially the whole of it. If the mind be material in itself, it is a compound, and must consist of parts.—It must resist compression, and be divisible.—It must, in a word, be made up of *sentient* atoms,—of *thinking* particles; and like all other bodies of matter, may be subjected to the laws and experiments of chemistry and geometry. And as all portions of matter are infinitely divisible, each particle holding an independent existence; and bodies are only formed by the coëxistence of an indefinite number of such particles, placed in a state of apposition, each existing, nevertheless, independently of the other, *any* result that may follow from such a relation, must be owing to the joint contribution of *all* the particles thus related. The whole congeries cannot possess any power or affection, that each particle does not proportionably share. Hence, thought and feeling, upon this supposition, radically inhering in the material parts of a physical whole, must be infinitely divisible;—must be tangible;—must admit of measurement; and the mind of man would thus be made up of (ludicrous as the conclusion may appear,) lines and squares, circles and triangles; and be, in fact, as readily destructible, as matter is divisible. And in the relative composition of thought, if we carry out the hypothesis, as we are coming over, and analyzing the particles that give it birth, or rather, constitute its existence, we are compelled, by the masters of this senseless theory, to stumble at every step, upon the monstrous and absurd—such as the half of a doubt—the quarter of a belief—the twentieth part of an expectation—or forsooth, a square hope—a circular feeling—the right side of

a remembrance—an angular emotion—or the south-west corner of a comparison! On the other hand, if it be affirmed that mind is the mere accident of organization, having only a relative, and no positive existence, then thought and purpose are mere organic effects of fate and form, must exist independent of the will, and all motive, and the distinctions of vice and virtue, right and wrong, are merged for ever in the atheistic doctrine of fatal necessity! Admit this hypothesis in relation to man, and you compel philosophy to study him as an animal only, and compliment him with the title of beast!

If the foregoing theory be true, and the mere accidents called vice and virtue, be punished and rewarded, man is a machine, and these accidents bear to him the same relation that the saraband, the jig, and the gavot do to the fiddle! We repeat it,—if these things are so, man is a machine; and to our conception, his Maker, a tyrant! We are aware that it has been contended, by some, that the annexation of a thinking quality to our physical organization, was possible to Omnipotence. But this is a mere assumption, carelessly admitted, as being possible, by Mr. Locke, and other respectable philosophers, but virtually negatived, by his whole reasoning on the subject of matter and mind; and directly contradicted by the established analogies and known geometrical laws of the universe. That a whole should possess essential properties, denied the parts essentially accompanying that whole, is a violation of all the laws of physical organization, as known to the human mind. This supposition assumes, that thought is either a quality of matter, or a mere accident of organization; and in either case, the preceding reasoning applies to it, and exposes the absurdity. This hypothesis supposes that God has given to a system of organs, a quality wholly distinct and variant from *any* and *all* the qualities of

all the separate parts. The supposition is absurd upon its very face; and in the absence of every thing like evidence, must be rejected. It would be as reasonable to suppose that God would confound the distinctions of mathematical truth, hitherto supposed, like the laws of matter, to be immutable by virtue of his own ordination: nor do we think it irreverent to say, that such things, with *him* are impossible;—considering his love of truth and order, the unchangeable nature of his ultimate appointments, and the approbation he must ever extend to the works of his own hands. If he cannot lie, as he himself has told us,—and the whole administration of nature assures us,—how *can* he subvert the distinctions, and confound the axioms of mathematical, moral, and physical truth, established by himself, and upon the immutability of which, he has invited a universe of intelligences to repose? In our judgment, the supposition is self-contradictory; and being nothing but mere assumption, we reject it as utterly unworthy of confidence. If the power of thought depended upon the organization of the body, (it will occur to you, that the most enlightened materialists admit the truth of revelation,) why was not Adam a “living soul,” after the creation of his body, when the organization was as perfect as it ever was? Why is it that human bodies, when dead or exanimate, cannot think and feel? For the demonstrations of anatomy show, that the organization is as entire, in many instances, as at any former period. Why is it that the beasts which perish, many of whom have almost precisely the same organization with ourselves, are not gifted with mind, in the manner we are? Must we not look, then, beyond mere organization, for the divinity of thought and feeling, with which we find our exalted being so strangely gifted!—so distinguishingly—so exclusively endowed!

If the semi-infidel—as we think—the pseudo-philosophical

position of the materialist, be correct, how does it happen, that in death, when the organic system is rapidly dissolving in ruin, the thinking principle within, is more triumphantly vigorous, than at any former stage of existence? If mind be the result of organization, how can we account for the irresistible consciousness every man has of his own mental identity; *can* such consciousness result from a body, the solids and fluids of which, including all its corpuscular atoms, are in a state of perpetual change, and necessary fluctuation.

It may be urged by the materialist, that the dependence and intimacy, known to exist between body and mind, is a fact unfriendly to the view we have taken of this subject. In reply, it is admitted, that between the great sensorial organ, that is, the brain and the nerves that exist in immediate continuity with it, and the mind, there is, in the present state of our complex being, an inexplicable intimacy of dependence; but this is no proof of their organic identity. Nature everywhere presents similar phenomena, in the sympathetic relations of different bodies. A body on the surface of the earth, for example, is rendered different from what it would naturally otherwise be, by the arrival of the moon at a particular point in the heavens. The destruction of a single planet in our system, would change the relative tendencies of gravitation, in every particle of matter belonging to our globe. The argument will also apply to the Needle and the Pole, in their reciprocal attraction; to magnetism, electricity, and galvanic gas, developing the mysterious affinities of matter; and yet, no one dreams of organic identity in any of these instances. Our reasonings, therefore, in favor of the immateriality of the sentient substance within us, are not invalidated by this specious, unphilosophical objection. Every intelligent observer must be sensible,

that no part of his body is essential to consciousness or reflection. He finds himself intuitively, and irresistibly certified of something within, over which time and death have no control; something that identifies and prolongs the consciousness of all we have ever done on earth; and that, after the mortality of the body, is the subject of the moral government of God, in a state of final recompense beyond the grave. When any two things possess no single generic property in common, they must be considered as two essentially different substances. Judging from their phenomena, body and mind have no single property in common; and must, therefore, be referred to different substances.

If mind be the result of organization, why is it not the same in all men, (I speak of natural strength of intellect,) whose organization is known to be the same? Upon this hypothesis, why an infinite diversity of intellect, without the least diversity in the producing cause? If mind result from body, its powers and volitions, must be matter of organic necessity, and all idea of responsibility is excluded. Unless the mind have a separate independent existence, it cannot be a self-determining principle; and without this essential attribute, cannot be virtuous or vicious—cannot be praiseworthy or blamable. If it be alleged, as hinted before, that thought is only a superadded quality *to* matter, it furnishes proof that it is not a quality of matter at all, but of something else; and must, necessarily, have inhered originally, before such superaddition, in some other substance, and that substance not material; and of course immaterial. A mere quality as *such*, cannot have qualities of its own:—it cannot have modes and accidents. All our conceptions, therefore, of the human soul, evince conclusively, that it cannot be a mere quality; which it must be, if it result

from material organization. It is received among natural philosophers as an axiom, that all matter resists all change. That is, it is essentially inactive. Hence, in order to motion at all, there must be an immaterial cause. Thus, the vaunting materialist is confounded by the first law of matter itself! This general law of physics, will furnish a presumption, from analogy at least, in favor of the position for which we are contending. Almighty power can, it is certain, do whatever is the object of power; but Almighty power can never contravene the laws and purposes of infinite wisdom; for such contravention can never become the object of power; and among *these*, are the established laws of matter.

An argument against the *spirituality* of the soul's existence; or rather an objection to the view of the subject we have taken, may be urged by some, founded upon the known sagacity of the brute creation. In reply, we would remark briefly, but only in part in this connection, that reason in man, and instinct in animals generally, appear to be essentially different in their source, nature, action, and end; and this law of difference, appears to be conclusively distinctive of a difference of origin. It is evident that human and animal instinct have no positive existence:—they both exist, relatively and dependently. Reason can only inhere in an intellectual entity, supporting its existence; while all that is necessary to the existence of animal instinct, is sensation. Sensitive being, is the highest order of being that can be predicated of it. Reason is founded in perception, reflection, and comparison: instinct can claim no higher source of origination, than sensitive impulse, derived from the established laws of animal life, and adventitious excitement; both of which are arbitrary and involuntary, in relation to the *subject* of instinct. Reason is guided by judgment: this

implies discrimination and contrast; it involves a reflective process; and takes in the present, the past, and the future. Instinct is always directed by impulse,—the result of pre-existing aptitudes. It is simply a strong feeling of nature—a directing energy of inclination, having no higher aims than satiety, preservation, and reproduction. Instinct consults gratification alone: reason restrains it, prevents its misdirection, and often has to overcome it, to prevent calamity. Instinct controls the animal, blindly and impulsively: reason is elective, and often foregoes gratification, to secure final good. Instinct relates to the present, and only provides for the future by a law of necessity, and in most instances, not at all; and is also confined to the surface of things. Reason is concerned in the investigation of principles, and their ultimate issues. Instinct knows no moral distinctions; but it is the glory of reason to observe and cherish them. From all that naturalists have been able to learn, instinct has nothing to do with consequences. The fruition of the brute-faculties for the moment, is all that gives rise to effort. The providence,—the prospection of interest, alluded to before, must be resolved into a law of nature—that is, the contrivance and agency of the Creator; for nature knows no law, but the *living, active* agency of the *God* of nature. Instinct is a propensity or appetite, infixed in the animal constitution for beneficial purposes, anterior to all experience, and independent of instruction. Reason is dependent upon both, for the most valuable purposes. Man, as an animal, has his instincts, as well as other animals; and were it not for the superior endowment of reason, would seek their gratification, as blindly and universally. Every man, however, feels that his instincts belong to his body, and have no common origin with his reason. Reason strikes its roots in our immaterial soil:

while instinct springs from the laws of animal conformation. The instinct of vegetables is, in most instances, as striking and as indicative of contrivance, as that of animals; and if instinct be referred to mind in *one*, it should be in *the other*; and the polypus, the oyster, the coral, and the fungus, will divide the intellectual world with men and angels! Instinct always accompanies organized life, but we know that reason accompanies it only in man. Reason is always advanced and matured by discipline: instinct disowns it, and is as perfect the first moment of existence, as ever afterward.

Thus, we see clearly, that the sensitive instinct of animal creation, the insentient instinct of the vegetable world, alike singular and mysterious, resulting from the established laws of their being, the unimpeded energy of their operation, are, in their origin, nature, operation, and results, essentially different from the lofty-minded, the half-heavenly attributes, that distinguish the immaterial, intellectual constitution of man; and furnish no proof whatever, of rational intelligence or mental endowment. We repeat, therefore, upon the basis of legitimate proof, the immateriality of the human soul. If mind be the result of material organization, and thought, a mere organic quality, then man is without a soul, and when his frame dissolves in death, the ruin of mind, and the extinction of thought ensue, necessarily:—his being is wrecked, and his hopes of immortality, until God shall unmake him, are a lie and a cheat! If this sophism of the materialist be correct, heaven, up to this date, and hereafter until immortal bodies are made, must be, so far as man is concerned, a solitary waste, and hell a useless dungeon; for God and virtue, it seems, owing to the ravages of death, are without friends or enemies, to place in one or the other! If these things are so, man never was made “in the image

of God."—He can never bear his likeness. He can claim no sympathy or alliance with his Maker, any more than the harp or the telescope; his foundation is in the dust;—earth despoils him of his glory;—and he sinks, a disorganized mass of senseless materialism, to be crushed by the clod, and devoured by the worm! But we arrest this train of thought. We will not place so poor an estimate upon your intelligence, as to suppose that any additional argumentation is necessary to prove the utter indefeasibility of the position we oppose!

We look, therefore, upon the human soul, as a separate and independent principle of existence. We mean, separate from matter, in its original nature and constitution, and independent of all the accidents of matter, in virtue of the charter of its being. It is the great immaterial source,—the immortal fountain of thought and feeling, of intelligence and emotion! We shall attempt, in this lecture, no formal proof of the immortality of the soul. In the prosecution of our appointed labor, it may be called up again. A few remarks will be proper, however, indicating our general views on the subject. Among philosophers, metaphysicians, and divines, two opinions seem to have taken the place of all others, with regard to the proper immortality of the human soul. The *first* is, that the soul of man was created, a simple, uncompounded, immaterial something or substance, which we call spirit; and in virtue of the creating act of God, received the principles of incorruptibility—an indestructible nature; and by consequence, an immortal constitution of being; and so, must live for ever. The *second* opinion is, that the soul is not immortal, in virtue of its creation, and the original purpose of God in that act, but that the soul was created, with capacity for immortality, and the perpetuity of its being depends upon the will of God. Either hypothesis will secure

the proper immortality of the soul; but in our judgment, the former is the most philosophical, and best accords with the analogy of the works of God. When God created the human soul, he either intended its immortality, or that, at some period subsequent to the date of its creation, it should cease to be. If it was the purpose of God, in its creation, that the human soul should live for ever, it is naturally, and since its creation, necessarily immortal; for the purpose of God is the law of its being, and that purpose extending to immortality, secures the indestructibility of its existence. If, on the other hand, God did not purpose its immortality, in the work of its creation, the human soul is mortal, and must cease to exist; for God can never change his purposes. The creation, the nature, the powers, the relations, and the ever-anxious aspirings of the soul of man, all seem to place before him an infinite perspective of being; and none of these, perhaps, more forcibly than his feelings. A deep persuasion of its immortality, seems to have possessed the human soul, in every variety of tribe and condition among men; even those doubly-barbarian hordes and nations, who have not been able to comprehend the proposition, when put to them by philosophy and Christianity, have nevertheless, acted upon the conviction, in some form or other; and strongly evinced that "longing after immortality" which vindicates the reality of our existence, prolonged beyond the grave. Human nature, in the wildest excesses of savage ignorance, has always offered homage to virtue, and the hopes of futurity, in the remorse felt upon the abuse of such hopes, and the commission of crime! In whatever condition, or however occupied, you may find man, in his present state of initiation, amid all the varying vicissitudes of external position, enjoyment and suffering, he feels within himself, nor can he cease to cherish them, the foster

germs of imperishable life, blending his destiny with the disclosures of an eternal hereafter!

But to return, another advantage resulting from this study, is, the assistance it affords in discovering the foundations and origin of *natural religion*;—the beautiful and impressive theology of nature,—the imperfect revelations of the Divine will,—the intimations of duty, and the manifestations of Godhead, reaching us through the medium of the works of creation, and the ever-unfolding plans of Providence! Ex-patiating over this vast field of wonder and delight, we are everywhere led to reflect upon the evidences of creating skill, and the demonstrations of unexhausted, never-failing kindness. Thus, the moral student, taking lessons from himself and his God, and drawing his illustrations from heaven and earth, looks upon nature as a boundless revelation of the infinite grandeur of Him who gave birth to nature, and upholds her in all her unmeasured amplitude! The sublime magnificence, the order, the beauty of the visible creation, all proclaim the intelligence and designing skill of an Almighty Framers. An overwhelming accumulation of evidence might be presented, if necessary, but the conviction is *felt* by all; or, if there are exceptions, they must be sought for among those who *never* think or feel, and are, therefore, entitled to no respect—the exceptions indeed from the general rule. It requires no abstract reasoning to prove, that Homer's *Iliad* and Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*, are the offspring of thought and design; and the evidence is the same, and equally irresistible with regard to the visible creation, where the phenomena of design are everywhere conspicuous, and endlessly varied. God, and his creation, are the only objects of our contemplation. Do you ask an argument then, in proof of the being of a God?—We produce the universe, and leave you to resist the evidence

if you can—if you dare! To say nothing of the nature, relations, and adaptations to specific purposes, of the larger bodies and beings that constitute the material world, the thousand mysterious organic relations that cluster in the frame of an insect, and their singular juxtaposition for given purposes, prove the existence of a designing cause, not less forcibly than the *Principia* of Newton! And he who can believe the one to exist, without design, can believe the other to have been thrown together, by the unmeaning, unguided hand of accident,—which is nothing more than the negative of design. Will we ascribe to design, a mere *description* of the world, while the system itself, combining all the wonders of thought and action, is contemplated as the result of blind, unthinking, mindless chance! The man who can read a treatise or a poem, without believing it to be the effect of a designing cause, may be an atheist amid the reigning order and speaking grandeur and regularity of the universe; but he who cannot believe, that the *Ethics* of Aristotle or Tasso's *Jerusalem*, is the effect of an earthquake, or of the fall of a house, must, everywhere, perceive the marks of designing power, the demonstrations of contriving skill, and the characters of Divinity, accumulating upon his notice, throughout universal nature! Hence revealed religion constantly assumes, in confirmation of the religion of nature, the burden of whose revelation is the being of a God, that before a man can be an atheist, he must possess, as the Bible suggests, the previous qualification of being a fool! All our original notions of virtue and vice, appear to be traceable to one simple feeling of the mind,—an indefinable tendency to moral preferences, evidently implanted by nature, and of which the mind can never be totally divested, in any state of existence. It accompanies the human soul as necessarily as the power of sensation, of

memory, or of reason; and it is evident, that the inequalities of moral sentiment, are to be considered only as exceptions to this general rule. This sense of right and wrong, does not depend upon human enactment. It is coeval with our being, and a part of the moral impress it received from God. Without it, law can have no moral efficacy. There is a deep-rooted moral sense—a moral vein—a feeling of duty in man, that is independent of all law, and upon which, law is founded. It is prior and paramount to all law, except the law of God.

After these remarks, it is perhaps time we were paying some attention to the value of our intellectual being, as displayed in all the phenomena of thought and feeling. The classification of the mental powers, is a difficult task. We have nothing to guide us but facts and phenomena, as developed in the history of the human mind; and these have been variously arranged by different schools, and different individuals. Indeed, in our judgment, much more stress has been laid upon the subject of arrangement, than it is entitled to. Provided our knowledge of the human mind be enlarged and adequate, it is not, as we conceive, very important, in what way its powers and susceptibilities are catalogued. Philosophers, ancient and modern, have made many strong attempts to resolve the mind into its simple, original elements; but laying aside the logomachies and nomenclature of metaphysics barbarously expanded into diffuse treatises, little, very little, has been learned, beyond the mere suggestions of common sense. We have had the contemplative and the active powers, the intellectual and the active, the understanding and the will, external and internal suggestion, simple and associated suggestion, images and ideas, and so of the rest; but if we except a few recent works, all that has been said on the subject, from the subtleties of Aristotle

down to the cloud-capped metaphysics of the French philosophy, and the transcendental nonsense of German dreamers, has only proved the folly of trusting to theory, in a departure from nature, experience, and fact. The attempts, however, of some of our late masters of mind in the researches of pneumatology, have been more satisfactory. Availing ourselves of the best lights we could obtain on the subject, without adopting any prescriptive theory, we have endeavored to think and decide for ourselves; and the result has been, that it is perhaps entirely impossible in the present state of moral science, to offer any classification of the mental powers, that would, in all respects, be unexceptionable; nor will it, by the judicious and discerning, be deemed necessary that it should be done.

If we say the soul of man is preëminently endued, among other things, with understanding, volition, and sensibility,—the power of thought, the power of choice, and the power of feeling, we have said substantially all that can be said, until we commence the labor of analysis in a course of critical instruction, when this generic classification, will be subjected to a more minute, analytical arrangement. In confirmation of our accuracy in this division of the powers and susceptibilities of mind, we might add, that what the mind does not think, feel, or resolve upon, does not, cannot belong to it, or be predicated of it. We shall proceed, however, to vary this classification, and offer it to you in a more philosophical shape. In doing this, it will be seen that the term *reflection*, is used in its most enlarged sense, and that its meaning merges the import of understanding and volition, as used in the classification just submitted. All then that can be affirmed, with any warrant of truth and certainty, of the human mind, is referable to impression, reflection or emotion. Impression is to be understood of all those sensations and affections, arising

directly from the contact of the mind with external objects. Reflection embraces all the intellectual states and operations of the mind, especially, its power of self-dominion, and ability to control and give direction to its own forces. Emotion is that vividness of feeling, resulting from the states and affections of the mind already noticed. The *first* class comprehends those affections of the mind, which must, in spite of the most infinitesimal classification, take the name of sensations; as the sensation of pleasure, pain, beauty, deformity, and aversion. The *second* class comprehends all the operations of the understanding; such as perception, remembrance, volition, comparison, and judgment. The *third* class takes in all the more prominent vivid feelings of our nature; such as joy, sorrow, love, hatred, sympathy, and admiration.

After all that has been said, or that can be said, on this subject, the most natural, and the most useful method of contemplating the human soul, is, to view it, by attention to the results of observation and consciousness, in all its various states and affections, as the great source of thought and feeling. In offering these remarks, we do not aspire to the formation, and putting forward of a system; but at the same time, in arriving at our conclusions, we have endeavored to decide and arrange with system and accuracy. To affect originality on this, or any other topic connected with moral science, would be, at least in the judgment of many, to proclaim our own want of merit. Hence, if we possess any valuable knowledge on this subject, our merit, if any, must consist in our having acquired it. If any are still dissatisfied with this very brief generalization of the phenomena of mind, we ask, and the question shall close the chapter, where is the mind, that cannot refer all its furniture and operations, whether active or passive, to the class of sensitive affections,

—or of intellectual comprehension, and reflective analysis,—or finally, to moral emotion?

But we must proceed to some additional views of this very interesting science. We have already stated that the sciences in general, the works of nature, and the affairs of active life, are alike indebted to the study of the human mind. It contributes to the expansion, the tact, the keenness, and manly exercise of all the intellectual and active powers. Rightly understood, it is the voice of nature and truth pointing out the path of duty and happiness to man. It lays bare to human observation, the great field of thought and passion. It acquaints us with the ties which bind man to man, and both to God; and, as we have seen, intimates with great force and distinctness, what, in the Christian religion, is rendered certain by the affirmation of Godhead;—that is, the prospect of interminable being beyond the scenes of mortality. It is in truth, the science of yourselves, and all who surround you,—of all you enjoy and suffer, hope and fear. It is so truly the science of your being, that you cannot review your life carefully, without meeting with all the phenomena that enrich and adorn it. In a word, it presents you with the elements, the order, and the interests of the moral universe; for the universe of thought and feeling within you, exhibits the elements you have to put together, and the compounds you have to analyze. The mind is its own theatre, and its phenomena, the drama. It constantly refers the incidents and details of life and action, to their central source—their proper origin. It seeks a knowledge of the very elements of our being; and studies the philosophy, as well as the materialism of man;—the deep-seated thoughts and feelings of the heart; as well as the mechanism and movements of the body. It looks upon all the visible array of nature, as only the signs and symbols of superior, invisible

Power. Facts and events are but the exponents of mind—the results of thought and emotion, of which the mind is the only birth-place. It seizes the outward manifestations, only to throw us upon the inward being of ourselves. At every step, it forces us back upon ourselves. It holds up to our contemplation, the higher principles of our existence; and thus, by placing before us the duties and the hazards of life, inspires us, not only with caution and humility, but with hope, comfort, and invigoration. It resolves knowledge into its constituent parts, by tracing it to its original source, and laying bare its first principles; and thus, the laws of the human mind, become, to a great extent, the laws of every science.

It is further valuable, as it creates within you a philosophical spirit;—a spirit, quick to discern the powers and privileges of mind, and equally ready to admit the limits that must necessarily bound all human inquiry. It will prevent you from being skeptical, on the one hand, or dogmatical or superstitious on the other. To such results as these, the inductive method of reasoning has greatly contributed. Induction is a general inference, drawn from several particular propositions. The advantages of the inductive, over the syllogistic,—or the Baconian, over the Aristotelian system, must be obvious to every one who has any knowledge of the laws of reasoning, or the axioms of logic. Induction is the first fundamental step in all correct reasoning. Syllogism cannot furnish its own truth and principles. These must be derived from axioms—from admitted truths, or syllogizing must, of necessity, lead the reasoner astray. But all axioms primarily arise, and ultimately terminate in induction. And hence, its superiority over every other system of logical inquiry.

The influence of thought upon language, is one of the

most important problems in logic; and yet, mental science can alone teach and illustrate it. A knowledge of the laws, the resources, and the limits of the human understanding, so plainly necessary in every good system of logic, can only be derived from the same source; and if we are not mistaken, these are desiderata in relation to the best systems of logic known to the literary world. While on this subject, we may remark, that intellectual education and moral instruction, must depend upon this science, for their successful cultivation in the various processes of human learning. For if the powers and faculties of the mind be not known, how are the susceptibilities and wants of our intellectual nature, to be met and supplied? If a man know not the powers of his own mind, will he not be in danger of allowing some of those powers,—perhaps the finest and most sublime, to sink into premature decay; and those that may be better understood and developed, to be perverted to an unnatural and preposterous use? The general principles of human nature, and the laws regulating their operation, reduced to something like an accurate analysis, will be found to be at the bottom of every good system of education—embracing physical, intellectual, and moral discipline. All history sustains the remark, that when moral science has had a prominent place, in the business and systems of education, then we have found, not only the best scholars, but the most enterprising and valuable members of society. A general tone of humanity has characterized those ages and nations, during which and among whom, this science has, in any adequate degree, been attended to. It is the science of all others, the best calculated for training the moral veteran. These studies not only become, as Bacon expresses it, the georgics, but also the gymnastics of the mind; preparing it, by elasticity and strength, gratefully to meet the enjoyments, and tranquilly to bear the

afflictions of life;—and although unnoticed in the obscurity of the crowd, still selecting and culling the blessings of every condition,—often called upon to toil and suffer, and yet finding himself divided and confounded amid a thousand forms of wonder and delight!

How deeply is it to be regretted, therefore, that we see so many who affect to be intellectually inclined, and generally well-informed, turning with indifference from these grander elements of thought and action, and occupying themselves with pleasure and devotion, *where* there is nothing to attract, except the trifles and puerilities of animal gratification and sensual enjoyment! What think you of the *taste*—the *soul* of him, who after fixing his eye on the mighty Indus or Ganges, rolling his broad wave through plains and cities, and forests and mountains, will turn away “from want of interest, to mark the path of some penurious rill that murmurs at his feet!” Will you withdraw your gaze from the eagle whose wing is burning in the sun, and seek to delight yourself with the bird that is sporting in the bower? These illustrations will be understood.

The same influence is likewise extended to all those arts and sciences, which have moral effect for their immediate, as well as ulterior objects;—such as painting, poetry, eloquence, and jurisprudence. The painter must be versed in the philosophy of mind, or his productions must necessarily be devoid of character. The poet must understand the phenomena of our intellectual conformation, or his illustrations and descriptions will be tasteless and unphilosophical—a mere affluence of words with, it may be, or without rhythmic measure. The speaker or writer who appeals to the judgment and passions of men, can never succeed, except with the stupid and unthinking, without a knowledge both of our mental and moral frame. He who addresses himself to the task of making and

enforcing laws, cannot fail to be defeated, unless he shall have studied the mind of man, as the great spring of human action. For want of such knowledge in the masters and rulers of the human race, from Nimrod down to the despot of Constantinople, or the lawless autocrat of the Russians, how many millions of the human family have been doomed to interminable, social wretchedness! And even where tyranny has not been intended, but the best wishes toward the governed have prevailed, how often have the fetters of a latent, nameless oppression, been riveted upon unborn generations; as a patrimonial curse, inherited from the ignorance of well-meaning, but misguided rulers! It is the expansion of mind, that gives stability to government; not lances and helmets, crowns and coronets. Government is a monumental pyramid, that must rest upon the collective mind of the people, as its base, or it will soon nod to its fall. How important then, that *that* mind should be well-informed! All the revolutions in government, from the overthrow of the Assyrian empire to the present day, have been little more than shadows upon the dial-plate of history, indicating the strong onward movement of the human mind, either in a good or bad direction. No stability or permanence can be given to any government or constitution, except in the cultivation of mind, on the part of those who govern and are governed. Fleets and armies, muniments and battle-field will not do! The pomp of a thousand banners, and the cheering of gaping millions, are all in vain! It is mind at last that must impart to government a kind of immortal, procreant existence! And all history evinces that mind is the only wealth of a nation or kingdom. Real glory, in the eye and language of correct morality, has merit for its basis—it implies self-approval, as well as applause from others; otherwise, it is only the glory of show and tumult, and is at best, a guilty distinction. True glory coexists with wisdom

and virtue; and when these are wanting, the hero is often known to others, but is unknown to himself. Madmen may sing the hateful celebrity of such heroes, and immortalize their vanity; but their glory is a bubble, whether you look for it upon the Rubicon or the Rhine—cursed be their morning, for its breath was groaning! And cursed be their evening, for its dew was blood! That which alone deserves the name of glory, is the expression of esteem and veneration, for what is truly and essentially worthy and estimable; and not the hasty, mushroom admiration that follows in the train of doubtful worth and noisy pretension! Real glory, therefore, is something more than to be surrounded by a cavalcade of splendor, and can never be derived from the shock of battle, or the shout of arms!

Intellectual resources are our principal resources. How often does the beggar by the wayside, or the lingerer in a dungeon or a hospital, enjoy that conscious repose of thought and feeling, for which kings and tyrants are fighting, and covering the earth with blood and slavery, misery and want! And as the degeneracy of our world compels us still to pay some attention to military science,—the profession of arms, there is no study more important to honorable success, than that of human nature. Hence, the illustrious military captains and heroes of antiquity, were anxious to distinguish themselves as philosophers. Scipio Africanus, a Roman chieftain of patrician rank, and Lucullus, the masterly conductor of the Mithridatic war, were both deep-read students of philosophy. The princely and warlike Persian, Hystaspes, the father of Darius, had inscribed on his tomb,—“Master of the magi.” And no man could be king of Persia, unless his philosophical attainments first allowed him to be enrolled among the magi, or wise men of the empire. It is beyond conjecture, that all the oppressive forms of government, and

false systems of religion and morality that have ever existed, owe much in their origin and support, to the long-continued neglect of moral science, in the usual range of liberal study among those who have had the control of education, government, and religion. When the genius of the human race awoke, with giant strength, from the slumber of a thousand years, how many forms of despotism sunk beneath the curse of an indignant humanity! From all which it is to be inferred, that the philosophy of law and government, depends almost entirely upon moral science, for the justness of its conclusions, and its beneficial operation upon society.

The science of mind will teach us, by directing attention to the constituent properties of human nature, the common origin, and essential equality of mankind. It will chasten into becoming moderation, the passion of inordinate veneration for those whom adventitious circumstances have elevated above our social rank, and placed beyond our familiar access. The common nature, and proper equality of mankind are truths, to the reception and admiration of which, we are invariably led by the proper study of moral science. It teaches us that all men are equal in their origin, relations, dependence, dissolution, and immortality; and the differential shades that may appear in the various formations and divisions of society, are the mere accidents of our being, and exist essentially extrinsic of its original charter. It is the dictate alike of religion and philosophy, that we have all one Father, and one God hath created us all, and bating the adventitious circumstances of our brief and fleeting term of life, before we retire to the grave,—the house of the dead, He has made us all for the same purposes. If we only look at the exterior of things,—the livery, the mien, the possessions, the office, the power, the influence, the heraldry and pomp of the great and rich, or the tattered insignia of the poor and oppressed,

we shall indeed see a great difference between man and man; and the same invidious distinction may appear upon the face of the churchyard; but the distinction between the lowly, unlettered, and the proud stone with its haughty sculpture, cannot prevent our thoughts from fixing on the dust beneath, blended in fearful, humbling, undistinguishable equality.

We are now considering *man* as the object of investigation;—*man*, without reference to external distinctions,—*man*, stripped and divested of fictitious consequence,—*man*, in the simple elements and majesty of his being, as an intelligence of heavenly formation. All minor topics of regard are merged in this sublime object of *mind*, with its faculties and feelings; and here, we see all men alike in every thing on which Heaven has stamped the seal of intellectual and moral worth. Every human being has as good a right to liberty of thought, speech, conscience, and action, as he has to life; and he who deprives him of the former becomes a tyrant, not less certainly than he who deprives him of the latter, becomes a murderer! A slave factor, for example,—a merchant in the staple of human souls, a political panderer, an ecclesiastical dictator, are epithets and characters abominated by common sense and common honesty, in every region of civilized man: and the diabolical casuistry by which the vindication of these practices has been attempted, deserves the unmingled curse of virtue, humanity, and religion! Where has science flourished, as it has in those states where freedom of conscience and action have been allowed? Look at ancient Greece and Rome,—look at Great Britain and the states of Germany,—look at our own country, and other examples found in history! The issue of the mind, like the progeny of nature, should be everywhere free and unfettered. Where the human mind has only been permitted to think by statute, and publish by imprimatur, we have always had a

nation of literary dwarfs—a community of worthless scribblers—a generation of Liliputian thinkers, and nibbling critics, where knowledge has been valuable only as it has been measured out in the bushel of government, and licensed by imperial or mitred ignorance!

In the sum of human happiness, good-will between man and man is a most important ingredient. And unless we are well acquainted with the laws and constitution of our being, how can we be prepared for mutual forbearance, and paternal intercourse? A knowledge of human nature will teach us its frailty and imperfection; and this will lead us to view with tolerant feelings and becoming forbearance, any dissent from us in opinion, or departure from our views in practice. But on the other hand, ignorance of the real condition and character of human nature, and its claims upon fellow-feeling everywhere and under all circumstances, has led to all the ill-nature, persecution, and oppression, which have so long and so disgracefully distinguished our world, as an aceldama—a field of blood! To avoid the infliction of pain is generally to confer positive happiness; but how can we exercise this negative, but important part of social benevolence, without previous knowledge of the delicate laws and susceptibilities of the human mind? Such a course of urbane, benevolent action will sometimes, we admit, result from the native tact and sensibility of the mind; but more frequently, it is founded in principles resulting from study and reflection. And it not unfrequently happens, that when benevolence would prompt to prevent pain and relieve misery, we, by the selection of improper means, inflict the one and increase the other. The same remark will apply with equal force to states and governments. The kindest feelings of generosity may prompt the projectors to the adoption of measures, which may lead finally, if attended with power, to

consequences infinitely more destructive than premeditated tyranny or intentional oppression. A knowledge of human nature, therefore, and especially of human mind, lies at the foundation of all good government.

In the social distribution of man, each individual is the centre of a sphere, and the influence of his character will reach the extremities of that circumference, and affect, more or less, the partialities and antipathies of those who know him. In the same proportion, therefore, that his mind is a moral wild, the baleful influence of his opinions and example must extend. This remark is particularly applicable to those of elevated condition. The despotism of great names need only be mentioned to be understood. How many millions, without inquiring, have taken their philosophy from Plato and the Stagirate, their creed from the bishop of Hippo, and their Machiavelian policy from the Florentine secretary! And while the human mind remains unfraught with the elementary treasures of moral science broadly considered, it is furnished with a proneness for all that is monstrous in morality, and detestable in character. The knowledge we are recommending, therefore, is plainly needful, to give direction to the mental principle, and regulate our moral estimates in the social scene around us. Or, to take a different view of this subject, without the power of abstraction, that is, the faculty by which we attend to the classification of thought, language and science would both be useless;—even religion would share their misfortune, by being disfigured and degraded. And yet, it is obvious that this noble attribute of the human mind, can only be subjected to proper and useful discipline, by the study of moral science. The philosophy of speech is an important branch of useful science, but as the mind is always the speaker, not to know its nature and functions, is to convert language into equivocal signs without

definite import; and leave the great bond of intercourse between mind and mind, man and man, an unintelligible, bewildering jargon! In distinguishing between genius in general, and philosophical genius, the latter must always be referred, in a greater or less degree, to the study of our own intellectual powers, whether this study has been direct and of set purpose, or incidental and lateral. When this subject is totally neglected, there is no real greatness. Instead of the comprehension and force necessary to greatness, we have, if any, a precocious growth—an irregular greatness of thought—a misdirected, an unguided force of intellect; and such minds must always be doomed to the fatality of creeping upon the ground! If they should succeed in distinguishing themselves at all, it will only be in the singular tact they have acquired in the perversion of language, and the distortion of thought. The correctness of these remarks will be confirmed, when we reflect how important an acquaintance with this study is, in the formation of good taste. Taste is that discriminating power of the mind, which leads and enables us to relish the beautiful, the excellent, and the sublime, in the works of nature and of art. It is a delicate and indefinable sense of the correct and beautiful;—a nameless, peculiar tact of the mind, by which we fasten upon the truth and moral beauty of a subject; and is alike necessary to the classic artist, the operative philosopher, the master of mind, and the minister of religion. Thus you perceive, the ultimate value of this science is realized in the fact, that it expounds the works of Omnipotence, and increases the happiness of man in a thousand forms. It furnishes an extended view of the vast plans of creation, wisdom, and goodness. It will teach you the value and the ends of your being; and point out many of its dangers. It will promote intellectual activity, and improve the moral sensibilities. It will control

thought and emotion, furnishing the material of the one, and giving proper direction to the other.

How infinitely diversified are the topics of this science! What is all history, but a record of the mind and passions of men? The mental phenomena as embraced in this science, in their general aspect, exhibit the sources of human action; and thus moral science becomes the standing history of man;—always applicable to the past, the present, and the future; and the student in this department of research, may, even now, become the historian of the future. The moral inquirer is not kept posing for ever over the present page of life. The *mind* of the present and past generations, is held up to the imitation and emulation, in all that is worthy and valuable, of each succeeding age. And yet, (strange to tell!) of all the doctrines relating to human entity, and the great theatre upon which it acts its part, there is none so little understood; and, on this account, so little accessible, as that of psychology,—*that* which relates to the human soul. It is the most abstruse, and the most intractable part of science. Nevertheless, in the very nature and necessity of things, the whole theory of correct morals, is based upon it; and the Christian revelation gives sanction to its importance, by assuming the truth of its principles, in the perceptive parts of the Bible, as matter of intuition and self-evidence. We might instance, for example, the book of Job. This is probably the oldest literary composition in existence; and it presents some of the finest views on the subject of mental and ethical science, ever offered to the mind of man; and shows the genius of Idumea, even in the childhood of human knowledge, to have been equal to that of Greece in its best days. For, laying aside the inspiration of the writer, the reasonings—the morality—the mental energy of the friends of Job, whose speeches are recorded, are decidedly

superior to any thing ever produced by Greece, on the subject of intellectual physics and moral invention. The region of thought we are now considering seems to have been, in all ages and in every division of enlightened humanity, the great rendezvous of mental accumulation and delight. Guided by this sublime and dignified study, the good and the gifted of other times, were enabled, in every difficulty, to remount to the first principles of thought, feeling, and action. It is a theme, enlightened by genius and hallowed by time, that has flung its radiance over the domain of every language, and linked its energies with the revelation of God, for the improvement of human kind! But on the other hand, how innumerable are the curses and the calamities, that have entailed themselves upon man for want of a knowledge of the human mind! All history is stained with the truth of this remark; and you may yet be called upon to read the lesson written in the blood of your posterity!

The value of this study is forcibly illustrated in the provision it enables us to make for the future. Insatiate *want* is the law of our being; but how often does it happen that we err in seeking the means of gratification, merely because we do not understand the real exigencies of our relative condition! The true philosophy of mind and morals, will correct this defect. The tempest and calm, the glimmer and gloom, the seeming fortuities of life, and the visible beckonings of fate and fortune, are all understood, and may be appropriated to the purposes of personal improvement, so as to place the man of virtue upon real vantage-ground, in relation to all the ills and accidents of life! How prone are we to be misled by the prevailing extravagance of the age,—the rage and vertigo of fictitious feeling,—a reckless prurient enthusiasm of character,—thousands—even whole communities

rushing to the goal of whatever is wished for, in the utter neglect of the *only* means that can possibly conduct them thither! With all this, much good feeling, lofty thought, and honorable enterprise will be found to blend; but still, the inaptitude and unfitness of the means to secure the end, stamp the whole with the characters of misjudging ardor, and impatient haste. Now, the intellectual and moral discipline we propose, will place before you the mighty impulses, the hoarded poetry, and hidden spells of nature, and her thousand wells of Castalian inspiration, *disabused* of the unhappy tendencies we have so often been called upon to deplore!

This study will introduce you into the varied creations of mind; and make you familiar with all the elaborations of thought! It will give you access to the interior temple of nature, where amid scenes of unrivalled magnificence, you shall gaze on the altars covered with light, and the curtains of the vestibule woven by the finger of God! And when you lift yourselves up from the musing and the devotion they enshrine, it will be to acknowledge, that in all this boundless scene of enchantment, *mind* is the golden urn that awes and charms! How far need you travel, in any direction, to meet with some poor, unfortunate, yet gifted genius, searching for truth, but wanting bread, while thousands around him, roll and rot in wealth! But look at the proud distinction of the one, and the worthless story of the other; —the latter, revelling a while in spendthrift glory on the spoils of Heaven's bounty, sink in death, and are no longer cared for! While he who lived for the future, and toiled for mental wealth and moral accumulation, survives in the memory of millions, awakens admiration in coming time, attracts the gaze of posterity to the lustre of his deeds and his worth; and thus erects a tribunal among after genera-

tions, before which justice shall be done his talents and his fame!

Mental and moral philosophy will contribute largely in giving advantageous direction to the active pursuits of life. Man was made for action, and unless he be physically or intellectually employed, must be wretched. It seems to have been the design of Heaven, that the active duties of life should be our recreations, and constitute our amusement. All the play and the frolic of life are only the mimicry of these duties, having been substituted as more agreeable; or rather, designed to gratify that love of action, which is essentially interwoven with the whole of our complex constitution. Now, it often happens that this restless feeling of our nature cannot be gratified by external action: how important then that the mind be able to turn in upon itself without disgust, and find *there* the very activity and objects for which, at least in part, we know we were created! Whenever man is unoccupied, his languor admonishes him that he is offering rebellion to the intentions of nature. Even the king, in the plenitude of his resources, and the magnificence of his leisure, feels and finds himself wretched, whenever he ceases to be active, and gives himself up to the unnatural sway of indolence and ease. This science will point out the path, and strengthen you for the great combat of human life. It will promote the communication between mind and mind, even independent of interest, and will prevent the union from becoming cold, sordid; and powerless. It will revive and adjust the business of much that is familiar and habitual with our thoughts and observations; valuable in itself, but still not appreciated on account of this very familiarity; for the elements of knowledge, common to all, like the common quantities in algebraic equations, are counted for nothing.

Man was made to learn and know; and without knowing,

he cannot exist, or must exist to no purpose. Nature has made it delightful for man to know, and disquieting for him not to know properly. In this state of things, moral science comes in to our aid. It serves as a horoscope to the mind. It will point out the lofty and better tendencies of your nature. It will furnish data for all the powers and susceptibilities of the soul to work upon. It will make you acquainted with the laws of right and propriety,—of evidence and duty. It will keep you back from much that is hurtful and degrading; and point out before you, the most eligible path of action and pursuit. How grateful to the philanthropist would it be to realize his vision, extensively diffused, in its practical effects, throughout the distributions of society!

Moral science will aid also, effectively, in preventing and expelling the evils of superstition and skepticism. The tendency of the human mind, whether original or adventitious, to indulge in the dreams of superstition, or yield to the impulses of skepticism, is perhaps the principal source of all errors, whether political, philosophical, or religious; and a knowledge of the powers, passions, and interests of human nature, is the best antidote that *can* be opposed to the silly legends of the one, or the senseless reveries of the other! It must be admitted by all, that while philosophical skepticism vindicates the caballing spirit of practical folly, and superstition feasts on the tears of the wretched and the blood of the slain, God and man are little known in our world, and less regarded, and its territories and habitations will be cantoned out between the, genius of the first and the friend of the last!

The correcting influence of this science will also extend to the vanity, frivolity, and dissipation of private, and professional life. How often, under a show of pretension and attainment, do we meet with the most perfect penury of

thought, and pauperism of resource! What a waste of margin has every remark; every page of thought! What a length of straw has every grain of sense! Persons of this description always prefer the decorative elegance, or mere ambrosia of language, to the rich and milky chyle of common sense, and useful knowledge. Those thoughts and productions that are deep-drawn from the unwearied travail of the mind, and the closeted toil of academic solitude, are always lost upon this class of thinkers, or rather talkers. So soon as they have possessed themselves, by little or no cost of mind, of a few of the gaudy morceaux of superficial education, you see them proudly castled in the entrenchments of pomp and show, and drawing largely on all about them for deference and admiration! And all this is, no doubt, owing in a great measure, to a misdirection of talent and effort,—an eccentricity from the proper orbit of exertion, as allotted by nature and Providence. When agriculture and the useful arts shall have recovered their fugitives from the desk, the bar, the senate, and the pulpit, we may then hope for less embryo and abortion in the intellectual world! and not until then! For it cannot be disguised, that many an obstreperous pretender in each of these departments, and many others that might be mentioned, is seen swinging about in the circles of society, hawking the common-places of his avocation, with swelling bombast, and swaggering dogmatism, who, judging from the indications of truth and reality, divested of name and office, was born to wield the destinies of the plough, and watch the incursions of the brier and the thistle!

Our remarks on these, and other kindred topics, might be enlarged, but our limits forbid. We have done little more than to present you with a detached, tabular view of the subject; and, in a single lecture, we have found it impossible

to allow the mind to *excuse* into every region which has spread its inviting phenomena for a share of our attention and admiration. Inaccessible heights of speculation, not to be scaled, and those depths of thought belonging to superior intelligence, and not to be fathomed by the plummet of mortals, we have carefully avoided. We have endeavored also to avoid all hypothesis, judging the mind only by its phenomena, and the complex development of its powers and passions. If we have failed in the attempt, the detection and exposure of such failure, and its causes, will be a real service rendered to the cause of moral science, that will more than compensate us for all our toil.

We cannot take leave of this subject, however, without urging upon your attention the priceless *value* of the noble science whose cause we have been pleading. We trust we have at least shown that in the range of the sciences,—the whole magnificent scale of human thought, it holds a pre-eminent rank; and ought to be studied as the great foundation of them all. Can we reconcile it with the dignity of intellectual distinction, that man should toil for ever in the mazes of thought and investigation, foreign to himself? Shall he bow in homage to the spectacle of a thousand worlds, peopling the regions of immensity, and not recollect that these worlds possessed, could not enrich his mind, or if destroyed, could not lessen its dignity? Will he cast the line of thought abroad over the face of creation, without adverting to the mighty energy within, that gives impulse and compass to the daring flight? Will he talk of heaven, earth, and hell, and forget, at the same time, that without mind, they are huge and shapeless desolations? Or to descend to particulars, will he exhaust the years of literary toil in learning the laws and powers of language, without learning also, that *it* is only the instrument of mind, in its

daily labor,—the mere record of its deeds,—the courier of its despatches! Will he spend his days and nights in posing among the units and infinities of calculation, and not recollect that it is the mind that fixes the agreement or disagreement, in every instance of comparison or adjustment?—The objects of numbers and geometry, it is true, might exist without, but their laws are always in the *mind*. Shall he tax his time and treasure to familiarize himself with his material organization, while the singularly sublime structure of the mind is submitted to no critical analysis? In a word, shall the masses of the quarry—the ore of the mine, the pebble of the shore, the anatomy of an insect, the fibres of a plant, the filaments of a weed, *all* become the subjects of laborious research, and analytical scrutiny, while mind, the only imperishable structure, the only ray of Divinity, the solitary beam of immortality in the visible creation, is left unaided to throw its effulgence abroad, and gleam and flicker its own radiance, amid the gloom of surrounding neglect? God forbid!

Such, then, without rhetorical exaggeration, are the abstract grandeur and relative importance of *mind*; and yet, when mind and matter meet in the same result, how natural is it to overlook mind entirely, and confine our attention exclusively to matter! And in the same proportion that this error prevails, the reign of human insignificance and folly will be extended, and the credit of mental and moral worth must decline!

We would remark further, and in *conclusion*, that the *productions* of mind are not less admirable than its essential, independent dignity. All the creations, improvements, and transformations of art are to be traced to the same definite originating source—the mind of man. The rock, the forest, the desert, the cultivated plain, and peopled city,—the

coursing wind, and traversed wave, receive their character and consequence from the same presiding intelligence. And when we turn our attention to the moral developments of mind, we find them equally surprising and still more impressive. We see ignorance, vice, and barbarism, retreating before moral experiment and intellectual effort. We see countless thousands, interminable multitudes, contravening passion and interest, inclination and bias, that they may yield obedience to the invisible, nameless force of moral restraint,—the dictate of mind in one hemisphere giving character and direction to mixed, opposed, and divided millions in another! Even the diameter of the globe interposes no obstacle to the action of mind upon mind! Thus, the mind of man, in the labor and creations of thought and feeling, is confined to no localities,—subject to no control. It rises at will into a widely-extended scene of enlargement, catches the sympathies of the universe, and opens into the visions of immensity.

One thought more, and we have done. It is the facility with which moral science will turn your attention to the subject of revealed religion; and especially, to the character of Him who lived for our example, and died for our redemption. In Him you will find all that is valuable in mental and moral science, (when applied to the final purposes of our being,) strikingly and vividly embodied. And in the illustrious gallery of biographical portraits, furnished by the sacred penmen, and held up to the emulation of all succeeding ages, you will meet with the finest, the most touching signatures of talent, taste, and feeling,—and the whole presented to the mind with unrivalled point and condensation of thought and language! Recollect, then, that in your resemblance to *these*, will consist your dignity and happiness. In every vicissitude of your earthly lot, religion is the only

anchorage of hope, the refuge of sorrow, the solace of care, and the sabbath of toil! In life, you occupy a boundless theatre of action, with men and angels for your witnesses, and God your judge. Christian virtue will ally you to the former, and fidelity to God will secure His friendship, as the inheritance of virtue, when the thrones, the altars, and the sepulchres of the world shall live only in the monuments of history, and claim immortality in the breathings of song!

Lectures
ON
M E N T A L S C I E N C E ;
ADOPTING
PAYNE'S "ELEMENTS"
AS A TEXT-BOOK.

Lectures on Mental Science.

LECTURE I.

INTRODUCTION

IN offering you a summary, tabular view of your studies in mental science, it may not be improper to submit to you a brief synopsis of what is contained in the lectures we have read to the class from time to time on this subject. Such a course will have the effect of bringing the subject before you comprehensively, and will enable you to notice the relation of its several parts; and will afford, moreover, decided advantage and facility in the business of review.

1. We set out, in our lectures on intellectual philosophy, by showing that all inquiry, and philosophical researches especially, are strictly and absolutely limited to matter and mind.

2. The importance of all just and sober inquiry relating to either was duly enlarged upon; and it was shown that a knowledge of the laws and operations of mind was necessary to a proper understanding, and especially *use* of those of matter.

3. This knowledge was shown to be intimately connected with all mental attainments, of whatever kind; and its tendency to strengthen and develop the powers and susceptibilities of intellect, was brought before you with point and distinctness.

4. Our inquiries have been limited to the phenomena of

mind. The character and duties of our department determine this. It follows of course.

5. Of mind, we have been taught that its real essence, as a substantial entity, is unknown, and that its laws and properties can be learned only by consciousness and observation.

6. The inquiry commences in relation to the elements of thought and emotion; and the order in which our thoughts and emotions occur, the nature of causation with regard to them, and the process of mental analysis, and a corresponding classification of the mental powers and susceptibilities.

7 Arrived at this point, we proceeded to explain the nature, as far as it may be done, of thoughts, ideas, and sensations, showing them to be the *mind itself*, in different particular states; and that the powers and susceptibilities of mind are its capabilities of existing in these several states.

8. And having occasionally disposed of isolated minor topics, we proceeded to a more definite analysis and arrangement; careful to show you, at the same time, that this process, that classification itself, only exists in the mind of the classifier, and not in the mental constitution.

9. Expressing but little confidence in any system, *as such*, for the sake of perspicuity and facility we selected a method we thought the least encumbered with error and difficulty.

10. The grand division of the mental states was into *internal* and *external*; and these again into those *more or less* so. The philosophy of this division is to be sought in the fact, that some of our mental states are produced by external causes, more or less obviously; and others have their origin in the mind immediately.

In the external class, we rank all our sensations; and in the other our strictly intellectual states, and all our emotions.

11. The *first* class were divided, in view of the several organs of sensation—except the less indefinite, to which we gave a separate examination. The *second* was further divided

into those mental states resulting, *first*, from the laws of simple suggestion; and the *second*, those of relative suggestion; and our emotions into those which are, in view of the causes producing them, contemplated in connection with time, as immediate, retrospective, and prospective.

12. With regard to our intellectual states, we attempted to show that the principal laws of simple suggestion by which they are produced or modified, are those of resemblance, contrast, and contiguity; into which may be resolved, besides others, the phenomena of attention, conception, memory, imagination, and habit.

13. Relative suggestion directs your attention to the conception of relations. *First*, of coëxistence—such as judging, reasoning, abstraction, etc., imply; and *secondly*, those of succession—relating to the order of events, and supplying, in some sense, the place both of history and prophecy. These are denominated the first *order* of internal affections.

14. The second, in *order*, embraces emotions. The *first* class of which are styled *immediate*, as having no direct relation to time; comprehending cheerfulness, melancholy, surprise, wonder, astonishment, languor, beauty, sublimity, conscience, or moral approbation and disapprobation, love, hatred, sympathy, pride, and humility. The *second* class are *retrospective*, having reference to the past; such as anger, gratitude, regret, gladness, remorse, and self-approbation. The *third* class, having regard to the future, are styled *prospective*, including all our desires; such as the desire of life, society, knowledge, power, reputation, influence, and superiority.

15. In the course of our inquiries, many detached questions of interest have arisen, requiring separate consideration, without seeming to connect themselves with any other portion of your studies; such as the nature of physical qualities, primary and secondary—the nature of consciousness, the

intuition we have of self, and our notions of personal identity; and they have of course been examined without any reference to classification.

16. After all, it must not be overlooked that it is by patient thought, and steady elaboration, that we can acquire competent knowledge of this subject. In the other departments of collegiate instruction, you and your teachers have guides, and are governed and aided by books, looked to as authority, and relied upon as correct; and you have only to learn what is already settled and agreed upon. Not so with us. We are virtually without book—we are often obliged to dissent from our guides, and furnish the reasons of such dissent. We are compelled to teach you, not what others have furnished to our hand, and rendered at once intelligible and available; but in a large proportion of instances, what we are obliged to produce by laborious and independent inquiry. Hence, in this department, you are not to expect the facility and even mannerism, with which you are familiar, very properly and necessarily, in the others. Here, your minds are often taught to rely upon their own force—you are obliged to essay and adventure, without confidence in any thing except your own reasoned conclusions. You will, therefore, find your studies, in this department, an admirable system of mental tactics; at least, imparting to the mind patience, vigor, and invention, even when you least expect it; and even presume the contrary. The very difficulties with which you have to contend, will become facilities, finally, in the path of learning; besides preparing you for effort and adventure, of whatever kind. The mind will return, upon each successive foil, with firmness and elasticity, surprising even yourselves. And this you will find in submitting to such discipline of the understanding, that what you had taught yourselves to look upon as a mere tithe or gleanings, has, in fact, proved to be an actual accumulation of mental wealth—a harvest, at once and abundantly.

compensative of all your impatient and tardy toil. Still, the advantages at which we glance, will depend materially upon the future, and the contingency of proper improvement and application on your part. Although you may not be able to unlearn all that has been taught you, respecting mind and its detailed philosophy, yet you may, by a course of continued and vicious neglect, render the whole confused, feeble, and ineffective. On *you*, therefore, it must depend *for ever*, whether you have studied to any final advantage or not! And believing this view of the subject to be the most rational appeal we can make to your ambition or virtue, the whole is left in your hands, to be applied or neglected as you yourselves may determine.

We adopt Payne's "Elements," as a text-book, solely on the score of convenience, as it regards size and arrangement. The PREFACE announces a summary view of the more important elements of mental and moral science—principally upon the plan of the late Dr. Brown, of Edinburgh; but carefully avoiding and correcting, ostensibly, what was deemed erroneous in Dr. Brown's system. The author, at the same time, availing himself of the standard productions of Locke, Reid, Stewart, Welsh, and others, in order to furnish a comprehensive synopsis of the whole system, without tamely adopting any author as the model of his researches. Such is Mr. Payne's PREFACE.

The INTRODUCTION proposes the subject, by limiting the range of study appropriate to the subject in hand—by remarks upon the *certainly* of the science, and illustrations of its relative importance. It is shown that *matter* and *mind* are the only subjects of science in the whole circle of human inquiry: that the material world is subjected, by experiment and observation, to the examination of what is called *physical* science; and the intellectual world is, by a perfectly similar

process, subjected to the researches and comprehension of mental science. And such a division of scientific labor is necessary to facilitate the success, both of the teacher and student, in the impartation and acquisition of physical and intellectual science

It may be objected, that the attainment of correct views, in the mental department of science, is exceedingly difficult, and often productive of but little good. The same objection, however, will apply to all physical, as well as mental inquiry; and, inasmuch as both difficulties are superable in their nature, and may be advantageously overcome, the validity of the objection cannot be admitted. And whenever it occurs to you, its only tendency should be to excite and encourage increased industry in the accumulation of what is confessedly difficult of attainment, but may be of incalculable service when obtained. The very intimate and indissoluble union between the science of mind, and all the other branches of general science, renders it absolutely essential to all eminence of attainment, of whatever kind. Without a knowledge of this science, we cannot know ourselves—we must remain ignorant of our own powers and susceptibilities—and all those arts and attainments, strictly intellectual in their character, such as education, poetry, eloquence, criticism,—and we may add others, more or less intellectual, such as painting, sculpture, and kindred arts—*these* must for ever remain a sealed book to us, and be contemplated only in chaos, if we remain in ignorance of the nature and powers of the human mind.

This subject, further, cannot fail to exert a very important and beneficial influence upon the corresponding subjects of moral philosophy and natural and revealed religion. How can we understand the fitness and extent of moral obligation, without some adequate conception of the peculiar structure, and high capabilities, of the human soul? Can we believe, what we do not understand? or enforce and practice, what

we know nothing about? Without this science, we cannot know, to purpose, what has been given man, and of course cannot judge correctly of what is required of him.

Again, it contributes largely to the vigor and discipline of the human mind. It makes us familiar with the laws of moral and probable evidence, upon the basis of which kinds of evidence, all our relations and actions, with reference both to God and man, must necessarily rest and proceed. And, finally, these advantages are denied to no situation. They are everywhere accessible, and may be effectively pressed into the service of your well-being, and human welfare in general. And hence, it is the most perfect and independent of all the sciences: for you always have about you the *subject* or *object* of inquiry, as well as the agency and necessary instrumentality to prosecute it successfully.

LECTURE II.

THE OBJECT OF INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE, AND THE MODE IN
WHICH OUR INQUIRIES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED,

AN enumeration of the original powers and laws of mind, and an explication of the various phenomena of human nature, based upon these laws, are essential parts of mental science, because it is only in this way we can arrive at any thing like an analytic survey of the powers, passions, and feelings of the human soul. The complicate phenomena of thought and feeling must be referable to a common origin, essentially distinct from matter, (which is strictly the permanent subject or source of thought and feeling;) and to which we give the denomination of mind.

We institute no inquiry into the essential constituent essence of mind. This is beyond the reach of science. We can only know mind as we do matter—by an exhibition of its properties and phenomena; but the *abstract nature* of the entity, in which we trace the *inherence* of these properties, and from which these phenomena emanate, is beyond our comprehension altogether. We are compelled to judge of mind as we do of matter, by a relative exhibition of properties. We know nothing of the *positive* nature of the one or the other. We are familiar with the solidity, figure, color, divisibility, and extension of matter, but know not what is *essentially* beyond this exhibition of properties; so, also, we know the phenomena of thought and feeling—the successive states and affections of the mind; but the real abstract nature of the thinking and feeling principle within, of whose exist-

ence and agency we are absolutely certain, we know nothing, except what we learn, relatively, by attending to its attributes and functions. If, then, we know nothing of mind, except as its phenomena become the subjects of consciousness and observation, what we know of the consecutive order of such phenomena—the manner in which they precede and succeed each other—the process of relative causation in their production and succession, must be the result of attention and experience.

If it be alleged that our knowledge of the mind and its furniture is quite sufficient to determine, *a priori*, the order and succession of its phenomena, the question recurs, how came you by this knowledge? Was it not by continued consciousness and observation? And this is what is always meant by experience; so that the objection only sustains, without otherwise affecting the position. As physical science is concerned with the composition of bodies, and their powers and susceptibilities—that is, the compounds entering into each separate aggregate of matter, and the changes effected by their contact with other masses, remarking by the way, that the tendency of one mass to affect another, we call its powers, and its liability to be affected itself by another, either in a kindred or dissimilar way, we style its susceptibilities;

Thus, by a similar process, mental science discusses the substance we call mind, by attention to its peculiar constitution, through the medium of its states and changes, with the order and association—the rise and succession of which, we become acquainted, solely by observing and attending to them. We do not wish to convey the idea that the rise and succession of mental phenomena depend, originally, upon habit and experience. They are to be traced to an original essential law of the mental constitution—to the mysterious, ultimate principle of intellectual association; but we allege they can

only be known and analyzed by attention and experience. All our mental phenomena arise and present themselves in succession of the sequence, or successive occurrence of *these*. We know nothing, except by observing and having experienced them. That each antecedent thought or feeling, is invested with a nameless aptitude, not only to precede, but to produce another, seems entirely clear; and hence, the *two* stand related in the light of cause and effect, in the intellectual chemistry we are recommending. That the first sustains to the second something more than mere antecedence, is perfectly certain. We know it and feel it continually. But the philosophy of precedence—causation, in the succession of thought, feeling, and idea, we confess ourselves unable to explain, unless by an induction of particulars, which leads us to some of the first principles and original laws of the mental frame.

ANALYSIS, as applied to the powers and operations of mind, must always be used with some latitude of meaning, and can only be understood, as philosophically correct, in general terms. It imports, simply, to mark, arrange, individualize, and class the various simple and complex phenomena of which the mind successively becomes the subject, in its various successive states and relations. It implies, *that* attention by which we distinguish the innumerable modified thoughts and emotions, to which our mental activity is incessantly giving birth. Analysis resolves intellectual phenomena into the simple, elementary laws of their production. In mental physics, analysis does not imply divisibility. It does not relate to constituent parts, as at all applicable to mind. It is more properly a classification of relations, contemplating the mind as a simple uncompounded, but ever-active entity, in its infinitely diversified states of thought and feeling.

To sum up the whole, many of our mental phenomena seem to be complex, if not in their nature, at least in the

manner of their production, and their relations. And the *only* business of analysis is, to resolve them into their first original elements; and it is in this way alone, that the complicate process of thought and feeling, admits of any satisfactory analysis whatever.

The TRUE NATURE of the powers and susceptibilities of mind explained.

The physiology of mind should be *well* understood, in order to a proper knowledge of the nature and history of its phenomena. The mind must always be considered as a simple indivisible substance, to the exclusion of every thing like parts and elementary fractions; and all its powers and susceptibilities, so called, must be considered, strictly, as so many different states of the same immutable principle of thought and feeling, variously affected at different times, and from a variety of causes. Thus, *volition* is a self-determining act of the mind. *Understanding* is the mind perceiving and discriminating. *Emotion*, of whatever kind, is the mind sensibly impressed or excited. The object of this distinction is, to detach from the phenomena of mind, all idea of independence and positive existence. They only exist relatively, and strictly speaking, constitute, and should be considered as an exhibition of the capacities and furniture of the mind.

And the same is true of all our sensations. They do not sustain to the mind the relation that the inferior members do to the body—constituent parts of a perfect whole; for a sensation is the mind affected in a particular way, or found in a given state of consciousness. That the mind has original and necessary capacity to be affected in this way, is entirely certain, but still, philosophically considered, the whole series of our sensations only exist when they are felt; that is, as the mind is variously affected by external objects and causes. The capacity of the mind to undergo given changes subjec-

tively, we denominate its susceptibilities ; and its capacity to originate or produce certain changes and results, we style its powers.

The result of all our thinking, and of all philosophizing on this subject, is simply this power and susceptibility, as applied to the mind ; more simply, its capacity to act or to be acted upon, in all the ten thousand diversities of volition, intelligence, and emotion.

Our powers and susceptibilities of mind, therefore, are in no way distinguishable from mind itself. A *thought* is the mind *thinking*. An *idea* is the mind *perceiving*. An *emotion* is the mind *feeling*. And we can have no conception of either, without the direct implication of the mind's active or receptive agency. The whole question, therefore, of the mind's powers and susceptibilities, without giving them any existence or consequence abstracted from the mind, resolves itself into the mind's energy of varied action, as an individual, indivisible entity ; and its susceptibility of emotion, in all the complexity of its possible modifications.

The MANNER in which our knowledge of the mental phenomena is obtained.

On the subject of this chapter, Locke, Reid, and Stewart are perhaps justly chargeable with unnecessary circumlocution ; and it is possible, they also erred in opinion on the subject of consciousness ; as it is far from being clear, what they really meant by the indefinite language they have employed to express their views. And we are compelled to say, in addition, that we think Mr. Payne has some tact at indirectness in the use of language, and especially, in presenting the views of other men.

To return to the subject, however, it seems, that we arrive at a knowledge of things external to ourselves, through the medium of the organs of sense, objectively coming in con-

tact with the things *without* us, and their ministry, resulting in a series of sensations, or felt, intelligible impressions upon the mind, as the source of *internal* feeling and discrimination. The things thus external to the mind, and of the existence and properties of which, the mind becomes informed through the medium of the senses, are strictly the objects of our perception; and must always be distinguished from the act or acts of perceiving them.

Nature, however, does not observe the same process, with regard to what is going on *within* us. Our sensations are not properly the objects of consciousness. Consciousness is not a separate power distinctively sundered from the other phenomena within; but our sensations are so many acts of consciousness itself. For sensation is feeling, and feeling is consciousness. What I feel, I am conscious of, and I am conscious of nothing but what I feel. Am I conscious of a sensation of pleasure, it is because I *feel* it. Am I conscious of a sensation of pain or injury, I know it only, because I *feel* it. Consciousness, strictly speaking, is the knowledge or feeling of what is passing within us at the present time. It is our conviction and perfect cognizance of the mental phenomena of the moment. We may be conscious of the existence of objects without us, because certified of it, by perception. We may be conscious of past events, being assured by the testimony of memory. But this is *indirect* consciousness, and not what is strictly understood by consciousness, in the discriminations of mental science.

Further, although consciousness be not an original power, it is unquestionably, an original susceptibility of the human mind; the mind being, originally, and always, capable of knowing and feeling the existence and processes of its own phenomena; the consciousness of the moment, being simply the feeling of the moment. Consciousness coexists with thought and feeling; and abstracted from consciousness, we

can have no conception of either. Thought must be known to the thinking principle; and feeling is a sensitive change affecting the source of sensibility; and as the term implies, must be known, *because felt*.

It follows, therefore, that to have sensations, is to be conscious of them. We know the generation of thought, because we feel the process going on. Our successive feelings constitute our successive, or continued consciousness. The whole consciousness of life, denotes the entire succession of thought and feeling through life. It would be an abuse of language, an inversion of nature's order, to talk of thought and feeling, *not felt*; and consciousness, therefore, is nothing but the *felt* intuition of their existence. And hence, consciousness becomes the principal means, by which we arrive at a knowledge of the mental phenomena of the human constitution. These views, however, will be called up, and more fully stated and illustrated, when we engage in the discussion of several kindred topics and inquiries.

The ORIGIN of the notion of SELF, and the IDENTITY of the thinking principle, amidst all the variety of its consciousness.

The very constitution of our nature—the essential laws of our mental conformation, give us a full and irresistible conception of the sentient, permanent subject or source of all the endlessly varied, and infinitely diverse phenomena of thought and emotion. This intuitive notion of *self*, is called up by every thought and every feeling of every hour of our lives. It is intimated by every sensation—asserted by the whole process of consciousness—it necessarily accompanies every instance of reflection, and is matter of direct recognition in the whole drama of the intellectual phenomena. It *requires* no proof, for no one has power to doubt it. It *ad-*

mits of no proof, for no proof whatever can be truer, or more absolutely certain, than the proposition itself.

If it be conceded, that the notion or conviction of self, or the being pronominally distinguished *I* or *myself*; is not to be referred to consciousness, *directly*, still, all the phenomena of mind, which imply consciousness, immediately and necessarily furnish this notion or conviction; and the best reason that can be assigned for its existence, is, the impossibility, under which every man labors, to divest himself of it. If I *feel*, I cannot be less sensible of the existence of the feeling *I* or *self*, than of the *emotion felt*. You may allow the sensation to prove the mind's existence, if you will, but the proof is not more infallibly certain, than the proposition.

The object of the reasonings instanced by Mr. Payne, from Reid and Stewart, seems to be the identification of *self* or *mind*, as a distinct existence from its phenomena, and the permanent subject of their inherence; while the object of Dr. Brown, is, to prove, by the testimony of memory, the proper identity, or unchanging nature of the thinking principle, notwithstanding the ever-varying nature of its phenomena. The reasoning of each, is correct and conclusive within its intended limits; and that of all taken together, will give you a very just view of the conception we have of *self*, as well as the numerous and necessary sources of this conception; and will, moreover, enable you to form a satisfactory idea of your proper identity, to the conception of which, we are led more directly by the power of memory, and its accompanying phenomena, than by intuition, by which every man is furnished with the irresistible suggestion of self, as we have seen. We add no more here, as the subject of identity will be resumed in another connection.

LECTURE III.

ANALYSIS AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA.

THE various and almost innumerable phenomena of mind, as submitted to our contemplation, exist in a state of great complexity and seeming irregularity; and to resolve these into their elementary states, and subject them, as far as possible, to some obvious and unexceptionable classification, is ranked among the uses and purposes of mental science. The only possible method by which we can classify the powers and susceptibilities of mind, is by classifying the phenomena of mind, which must always be distinguished from the powers and susceptibilities themselves, as being, strictly, their infinitely varied exhibition. It is these, *alone*, we can observe, and of these *only* we are conscious; but as all these are so many developments of the powers and susceptibilities, to classify the former is to classify the latter; and *this is all* we can do. Analysis must always respect the actual states of mind, under all possible circumstances, and from every variety of causes; and it is the business of classification to take them up, in this state of apparent disarrangement, and refer them to the corresponding powers and susceptibilities of the intellectual constitution.

It must not be overlooked, however, in conducting this inquiry, that after the utmost we can do, in the business of arrangement, our work must necessarily remain imperfect; and will, perhaps, in many respects, be found defective. The imperfection of our knowledge must render this result, to some

extent, inevitable. Classification, therefore, must be a general process; and with such generalizing method, for the present, we must be content. We would as soon undertake to give you an adequate idea of the infinitude of space, or the revolutions of eternity, as to engage to furnish you with a perfectly entire, and every way unexceptionable analysis of the innumerable, ever-successive states, in which we are called to contemplate the human mind. And the difficulty is increased, when we reflect, that all these states and affections of the mind, are, in the order of nature, distinct and individuated, and in arranging and grouping them, so as to refer them to the general laws of mind, the work is done *to our conception only*.—No change takes place in the order of the phenomena. Our classification does not reach the mind, and we *attend to it*, and *insist upon it*, merely to assist us in a better understanding of its original powers and susceptibilities, and its actual states and affections.

The process, however, seems to be suggested by the constitution of the mind itself; and is based upon one of the most important of its powers—that of *abstraction*, or the power of recognizing the laws and principles of relation, and the more or less distinct shades of resemblance. These relations and resemblances, become our guides, in the business of classification, by which the vast assemblage of mental phenomena are reduced to distinctive classes, and resolved into elementary divisions, that the whole may be advantageously contemplated, without oppressing memory, embarrassing discrimination, or overburdening the understanding. Hence, analysis is confined to the method in which we examine the mental phenomena. And we repeat, after all, the whole must be imperfect. We place those phenomena in the same class, between which we perceive and feel, there is a resemblance; and yet, many of these will be found to differ as much as many of the general classes.

Analysis does not, in any way, assimilate the objects of its arrangement. It is a relative process, and exists only in the mind of the classifier. We can only generalize, upon scientific principles, in a way perfectly similar to that in which we attend to this process in the departments of natural science.

The very different manner in which the phenomena of mind, in the light of cause and effect, originate, gives us a natural, constitutional principle of diversity, upon which to base the first grand division of the intellectual powers and susceptibilities. Some of these phenomena arise from external, and some from internal causes. Some have their source in organic relations, and others owe their origin to the mental polity itself; and hence, a division, essentially natural, and perfectly philosophical. That is to say, first, phenomena of *external* origin; and, secondly, phenomena of *internal* origin. To this division, as far as it goes, it occurs to us, no exception can be taken. The *first* class of phenomena must be considered in relation to the external senses in all their organic effects and possible bearings upon mind. And the *second* class is very naturally divided into states of the mind, purely intellectual, and those more vivid feelings, styled emotions; and beyond this, we deem it entirely unnecessary to carry the labor of analysis at present.

LECTURE IV.

EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND.

FIRST DIVISION—*The less definite, External Affections.*

OUR progress in the business of analysis has taught us, that certain states of the mind always occur subsequent to, and consequent upon given changes and states of the body; and to these we give the name of *external affections*, because the immediate efficient in their production, exist in relation to the mind, *ad extra*.

These are distinguished into the *definite*, and *less definite*. At present, we are concerned with the latter. And by this class of mental affections, we mean those which result from the many different states of any division of the material system, not including the organs of sense—sight, hearing, etc. All the mental affections not embraced by this exception, that is, all whose existence is caused by changes in the organs of sense, are properly styled *sensations*. Whereas, the excepted class, owing to their mixed character, have a less definite claim to the distinction of sensations, although, strictly speaking, they must be considered such, at least in effect. We can see no very good reason why they have been separately classed. However, for the sake of peace, and order, and that we may not too frequently dissent from our text-book, we submit to the arrangement, as it is not likely to do much harm, if it should do little good.

The affections of which we speak, are such as hunger and thirst, and such pains and pleasures as do not appear to be of strictly organic, but of general muscular origin. Every man

who is the least observant of the various states and affections of his body and mind, will have his attention arrested, not only by hunger and thirst, or a sense of insatiety, or want of animal fruition, accompanied by a desire to eat and drink—a law of the mind, thus concurring with the elementary inquietude and appetites of nature, to prevent suffering, and to prolong life. But he will be sensible of many instances of derangement in the animal functions—a kind of sympathetic discontent or murmuring in the physical system, which, as they do not appear to be literal, organic affections, we may find it convenient to convert into supernumeraries, and refer to the excepted indefinite class of external affections. And the same is true of those pleasures or gratifications of muscular sensibility, having their ultimate seat in the mind, derived from the power and use of locomotion, and other kindred exercises, which are often enjoyed with a decidedly pleasurable zest. But we have already paid as much attention to this subject as it perhaps deserves; and as in strictness all these affections belong to the general, external class, we have no more to say on the subject, other than to request your attention to the general notice here taken of them.

EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND.

SECOND DIVISION.—SENSATIONS—*all Sensation in the Mind.*

We have already defined with sufficient explicitness, what we mean by the mental affections of external origin, especially those of strictly organic causation, in connection with the senses, to which we give, more particularly, the distinctive appellation of sensations. In the complex formation of man, consisting of soul and body, the whole system of mental science, except in the hands of materialists, whose opinions have been refuted in another place, proceeds upon the assumption that the soul is the *seat*, alike of thought and feeling. It

is the great principle of life and energy, of action and sensibility; and as such, extends and diffuses its sensitive power and influence to every part of the human frame, and quickens and vitalizes the whole. And hence, the susceptibility or capacity of sensible excitement or impression belonging to every division of the body. But assume the severance of the soul or mind from the body, and its susceptibility of pain or pleasure has fled with the dissolution of the union. You may lacerate and puncture the body as you will, but there is no feeling—no sensibility to excite or wound,—all is inert and insensate.

From our remarks above, however, you will have seen that we do not admit that there is no *sensitive* power or *feeling* cognizance in the body. We are confident there is such sensibility diffused through every part of the body. But we contend, its *ultimate seat* is in the soul, and that all sensations, upon original and first principles, are in the mind. The body may feel, to be sure, and, contrary to Payne, may feel *where* it is wounded, and the mind may thus fix on the locality of the wound, without seeing it, with an intuition, quick and decisive as lightning; but all these susceptibilities, originally, belong to the mind; and thence, pervade and vitalize the body. It is the soul that imparts the principle and power of feeling.

If the mind be not the seat of sensation, how will you account for ten thousand pleasures and pains produced by external causes, when the body is not touched, and, of course, cannot feel? When you throw your eye over the grandeur of a landscape, or listen to the roar of a cataract, is the sensation of pleasure, or that of awe, in the eye or ear, or in the mind? Should A denounce B as a villain and poltroon, would the sensation and consciousness of insult rise in the *mind*, or in the *ear* of B? And so of innumerable kindred examples that might be adduced, to show that in all the mul-

tiform tribes of externally excited emotions, it is the mind, truly and philosophically, that feels, discerns, and sympathizes. If it be the eye, abstracted from the mind, that sees, and the ear that hears; and if it be the organs, and not the percipient principle within, through their medium, that taste, and smell, and feel, then mind must consist of *many* thinking principles, and *all* these of bodily origin, and in themselves, strictly, so many modifications of matter. And this position will involve all the absurdities of the hypothesis of the materialist, to which your attention has already been directed.

Again, the theory which refers sensation to the animal economy, or the principle of animal life, as distinguished from both soul and body—a *medium something*, a nameless *vinculum*, neither matter nor spirit, is unworthy of notice, as it has no foundation in physiology or pneumatics.

The doctrine of the third section has already been discussed, and we have seen fully that all sensations, on the ground of original susceptibility, have their seat in the mind, although the exciting cause, and direct occasion of their production, are found in the different states and changes of the physical system, resulting from its contact with external objects and organic instrumentality.

As further connected with the doctrine of sensation, we have to remark, that the real change undergone by the organ itself, in its contact with external objects, is as utterly unknown and inexplicable as the accompanying change or sensation produced in the mind. All that can be affirmed, with any thing like safety, is the well-attested, undoubted fact, that sensation is invariably preceded by some organic change. How the organ is first affected—how the change is conveyed, as an organic result from the external termination of the organ to its parent source in the brain, as the principal seat or pavilion of the mind in the whole organic economy—is an inquiry that belongs to anatomical physiology, and with which

mental science has nothing to do. Of the fact, however, as it exists, we cannot doubt; and with this we must rest satisfied, without attempting to explain what we do not, and cannot, in the present state of science, understand.

And this decision prepares us for another, in relation to the union of mind and matter, of which we know nothing, except the *fact*. I know, and nothing can divest me of the consciousness, that my mind, as I write, concurs with my eye and hand, in tracing the lines, and in elaborating each successive thought upon paper; but although absolutely certain of the fact, and constitutionally incapable of doubting it, the *modus existendi* of this union I know nothing about; and I am equally ignorant of the *modus operandi* of the action, further than to know, infallibly, the external exhibition of the process; and we may add, neither does the inquiry belong to the philosophy of mind, any further than it may be gratuitously resorted to for the purposes of illustration.

Mental philosophy seems to have ascertained pretty clearly, that as external causes affect the organs of sense, the change or impression is communicated to the organic nerves, which as so many elongated parts of the grand sensorial nerve, continue the change or impression, until it reaches the brain; and *here* the material process stops, and it is received by the mind, and nature appears to have invested the whole process with the decision of electric force, and the velocity of light. But the *how* of the whole concatenation of phenomena, we know nothing about; and perhaps, in our present state of existence, never shall know.

As it respects the dispute among philosophers, whether sensation results directly from a change in the state of the organ, or from the corresponding change in the nervous or sensorial system, we deem it of very little importance to decide; or rather, we think the question decides itself. What are the organs of sense? All answer, the several external

terminations of the nervous sensorial system. It follows, therefore, we should think, without doubt, that the impression, or change of state, resulting from *ad extra* causes, must take place in the organic nerves, or sensorial system, existing as parts of it, in immediate continuity with, and dependence upon the brain; and hence our preceding reasoning upon this subject.

After all, the principal part of our wisdom, in the examination of this subject, will consist in our not meddling with it, beyond what we *know* of it. Of the facts, as phenomena of mind, we are perfectly satisfied; and it remains for induction to guide us in our conclusions.

That every cause, whether in physics or pneumatics, is invested by the appointment of God in the order of nature, with a producing aptitude, a causative agency or instrumentality, relatively to its effect, is a position we are obliged to believe in spite of all reasoning on the subject. But in what this aptitude to produce, this latent power of causation consists, in the language of philosophical analysis, is a subject on which, to avow our utter ignorance, is to tell you all we know. That mere antecedence in the order of phenomena is not causation, is, with us, a truism. We feel it to be *true*, and receive it as such, without inquiry. There must be causative efficiency, or the bare anteriority of the effect or event, leaves it without the necessary attributes of a cause. A *cause* is that which produces something; and the going before, or preëxistence of one event in relation to another, must be accompanied by some efficient productive power, or the first event cannot sustain to the second, the corresponding relation of *cause*, or efficient aptitude to produce.

Mr. Payne's remarks on the subject of the knowledge of objects obtained by sensation, appear to us disconnected and unsatisfactory; at least, to a considerable extent. He seems to ascribe an opinion to common people who have not ex-

mined this subject, that, in our judgment, does not belong to them, or rather, never was entertained by them. Who is it that does not know, that we are irresistibly determined to the belief that a stone is hard, a rose fragrant, and sugar sweet? And who, except philosophers, ever supposed that our *notions* or *perceptions* of these objects and their qualities, were hard, fragrant, or sweet? Did any one ever suppose, (always excepting philosophers,) that the *idea* or *notion* we have of the substance called sugar, and its invariable sweetness, would have the same effect upon a cup of tea that the *substance* itself would when dissolved in it? Did any mistake of this kind ever originate with the common sense of mankind, however untaught in the wonders of art and science? We think not.

That our senses throw no final light on the essential composite nature of the objects with which they come in contact, is readily admitted; but that sensation, and perception to which it leads and by which it is accompanied, makes us acquainted with many of the properties and qualities of external objects, is too certain to require either proof or illustration. We all know by sensation that a stone is hard and heavy, that snow is cold, and that fire will burn; and no argument or dissuasion to the contrary, can weaken the evidence of our senses on this subject. But *what* is essentially stone, snow, or fire, we know not. We only know the properties of these substances relatively to our own sensations. We know that we *feel* the hardness, the coldness, and the heat; and this sensation in the mind is through the medium of the external, tactual senses. But we know, equally, that the hardness, cold, and heat, are in the substances quoted, and not in the mind or the nerves concerned in ascertaining these qualities.

We know also that color belongs to bodies in some sense, as certainly as any other secondary quality; but in what the

true philosophy of color consists, we may be unable to explain. We may approach something like accounting for the existence of colors, by an examination of the phenomena of attraction and repulsion, on the part of bodies, and the laws of reflection and refraction, connected with the existence of light, but when the question recurs, what is color? who can answer it without taking half the investigation for granted?

The whole of our reasoning, on this topic, goes to show, that our knowledge of external objects, through the medium of sensation, and the coëxisting perceptions of the mind, is only relative, and not absolute.—It relates to the properties of matter, and not matter itself. And this is the reasoning of Reid and Stewart, notwithstanding the criticism of Mr. Payne, when they speak of knowing the primary and secondary qualities of matter, such as extension, color, etc., only relatively. The relation they have in view, is, *that* between the mind and the properties of matter, whereas Mr. Payne disingenuously, it seems to us, intimates that the relation they make out is, between matter and its properties; and this, too, when, to us, it is perfectly certain, they meant no such thing. We can carry the inquiry relating to our sensations, as the media and inlets of knowledge, no further at present, as it will be necessary here, to take up the doctrine of perception, and examine the two in relation to each other, as they are necessarily and intimately connected; but this in the next lecture.

LECTURE V

SENSATION, PERCEPTION, ETC.

AT the close of our last lesson, it was intimated that the relation between *sensation* and *perception* was too intimate to admit a proper examination of the one, disconnected with the other; and it, therefore, becomes necessary, that we should pay some attention to the doctrine of *perception*, as immediately allied to that of *sensation*; and we would premise here, once for all, that the term perception, in this connection, is applied only to *external* perception, and has to do with objects existing without the mind. In the general use of the term, there are *internal* objects of perception, as well as *external*. We must, therefore, qualify the term, in its present use, and so discriminate, as to confine it to *outward* objects.

Sensation means, simply, the impression made upon the mind, or the change of state it undergoes, by reason of the contact of any of the organs of sense with external objects, exciting feeling or emotion, of whatever kind.

Perception, however, as we confine and graduate the term, means more than this. It refers sensation as an effect, to its legitimate, producing cause, always existing external to the mind. Hence, we *define* perception, when we say, it is that state of the mind which is immediately successive to the organic affections, occasioned by objects or causes exterior to the mind itself. *Sensation* is the mere *feeling*—*perception* connects the impression or emotion with the cause that produces it. The distinction is not essential, nevertheless, there is an obvious shade of difference, and it will be found useful

and important to present it, and give it a kind of subordinate prominence, as we proceed in the inquiry.

I feel a pain, for example; this is simple sensation. I see a tree in the garden or forest, or a ship at sea; here is something more than mere sensation; for in addition to the change of state in the organ, and the mental affection that follows, the tree or ship is taken into the account, by an ultimate law of the human constitution, as producing such change or mental affection; and this is what we call perception. It is a prompt reference of the mind's affections or changes, to the objects or causes by which they are superinduced. Sensation implies mere susceptibility of feeling—perception implies intellect.

It can hardly be necessary to remark here, that the ideal philosophy of the ancients and schoolmen, and their more modern disciples, is entirely unworthy of credit. These maintained that external objects made an impression, and left upon the brain, as a soft, impressible, medullary substance, a picture or phantasm—an image or trace, which led to a corresponding mental affection, which they called an *idea*. This very absurd and bungling hypothesis, long held its sway in the department of metaphysics, without the suffrage of a single fact, or any thing plausible to sustain it. It has, however, been justly rejected by the most enlightened modern philosophers, as every way absurd, and totally indefensible. And any attempt to explain the phenomena of perception, by the aid of such a theory, is too absurdly ridiculous, to require any further notice from us in the present connection.

Sensation, although produced by external causes, has no object to which its phenomena refer. *Perception* invariably has. Sensation is simple, primitive emotion—perception is such emotion continued, and so carried out, intuitively, by the mental laws of our being, as to embrace, objectively, the external causes of sensation. The relation between sensation

and perception, may be viewed somewhat in the light of antecedence and sequence, or cause and effect. As there can be no perception without sensation invariably preceding it, and by an incipient process, leading the mind to a perception of its causes; and using the terms sensation and perception, as we have defined them, you will be able to master a general knowledge of this subject, without any embarrassment, or confusion of thought.

The ORIGIN of Thought.—INNATE IDEAS inadmissible.

That the human mind possesses no innate, or connatural ideas, is to us entirely certain. Plato was of opinion that it did; and so of Descartes and Malebranche, Leibnitz and Shaftsbury. They maintained, that many of our ideas exist coeval with the mind, and are strictly coetaneous with its formation. This opinion was opposed by Aristotle, Buffier, Hobbes, Kant, Locke, Reid, and Stewart, and continues to be opposed by all our most distinguished intellectual philosophers. The labors and efforts of the latter have shown, we think, very conclusively, that the opinions of the former are inconsistent with the actual experience and mental history of mankind; which go to show, that the origin of our ideas, is to be sought in external sensation.

Although the mind evidently exists independently of the senses, yet the universal history of all mankind sustains the remark, that as our complex being has been organized by Heaven, we have no knowledge, originally, without the aid and mediation of the senses. That the mind thinks and elaborates, in a thousand instances, without any direct aid from the organs of sense, is too obvious to be denied, or to require proof; but all our original, or first thoughts and ideas, seem to have been furnished through the medium of these primary inlets of knowledge.

The early history of every human being furnishes proof,

that anterior to the exercise of the senses, the human mind is essentially without knowledge. And to this accredited, universal source, it is easy to trace the progressive rise, and intricate combinations of thought, from its simplest to its most difficult, and complex forms. Still, the mind has its original furniture of powers and susceptibilities; and is not to be looked upon as a perfect blank, or *tabula rosa*.

In this inquiry, we are speaking of thought or idea, not as qualities and modifications, but as acts of the human mind. And the amount of instrumentality ascribed to the nerves, in relation to the origin of knowledge, is, that they furnish the first occasions of thought, and thus lead, indirectly, to all those mental processes which come under the cognizance of pneumatology. For it is plain, that, but for the early essays of thought, the occasions of which, were furnished by the senses, we should not have been prepared for the more abstruse and weighty abstractions and generalizations of profound and accurate thinking. The first occasions upon which our various faculties are exercised, are the impressions made upon the organs of sense; consequently, without such impressions, it would have been impossible, so far as we can see, for us to have arrived at the knowledge of our own faculties, or even of our own existence. Hence, the primary elements of thought, are to be traced to sensation, as leading to perception, reflection, and all the phenomena of intellectual elaboration. And it is, in this sense, we speak of the origin of knowledge, as connected with the ministry and functions of the senses. They are the first avenues to knowledge; and thus, in some sense, seem to furnish the evidence of the mind's active furniture, and ever-changing operations.

From what we have said, you will perceive that the senses constitute the first important medium of knowledge; but not the only medium. There are many others—internal as well as external. But, as this is the first medium through which

knowledge originates in the mind,—the senses giving us our first feelings, perceptions, and thoughts, it is *here* we date the ultimate origin of all our knowledge. But if we are asked, whence all our knowledge, directly or immediately flows, we should answer, in the language of Mr. Locke, from sensation and reflection; partly of external, and partly of internal origin.

It follows, therefore, that though, but for the senses, our higher, intellectual capabilities must have remained for ever in a state of fruitless inaction, yet innumerable, and intensely interesting phenomena of the mind arise from its peculiar constitution and original powers; and exist independently of the casual causes which rendered them operative.

LECTURE VI.

EXTERNAL SENSES.

Cursory REVIEW of the ORGANS OF SENSE, viewed as the instruments of thought, and a medium of knowledge.

OUR only concern with the present lesson is, to inquire and settle, a little more determinately, the amount of knowledge derived to the mind by means of the functionary office of each organ of sense. To begin with that of smell,—we admit the anatomy of the organ—the sensations it gives, abstractly considered; and also, the properties or qualities of bodies, whose fragrant, aromatic, or otherwise exciting effluvia, variously affect this organ, and give to the mind a diversity of agreeable or disagreeable sensations; and proceed simply to ask, in what way this organ increases the knowledge of the human mind, in the progress of its development from infancy to ripened maturity? The subject is one of relative importance only, and we shall give it a very brief examination.

Independently of the other senses, the organ of *smell* gives us simple sensation, feeling, or consciousness, and nothing more. Without the other senses, and consequent perception, the mind could only know the change of state it had undergone, or be conscious of the impression received, which is mere sensation. In order, therefore, to the existence of what we call the perception of smell, the aid of the other senses must be called in. We mean, *touch* and *sight*,—and *memory* and *experience* must become our guides. I might smell a honeysuckle or geranium, but without the senses, and perception of sight and touch, I could never tell whence the odori-

ferous particles arose. The organ of smell, and the odoriferous body, give me the sensation, but the other senses are necessary, to refer the effect to its cause; and this leads us to propose an elementary definition of the properties of smell. *First*, the presence of the odoriferous body, and the affection of the appropriate organ. *Secondly*, the change or sensation produced in the mind. And *finally*, the reference of the sensation to the external body, as its proper producing cause.

What we have said on the subject of smell, in its preliminary relations to the mind, you are requested carefully to transfer to the organ of taste, as equally applicable. We propose no examination of this organ. All that has been said of its form and fitness, its nervous and membranous constitution, belongs to the physiologist, and not to us. Nor do we institute any inquiry into the peculiar and exciting qualities of those sapid bodies producing the results of taste, when found in contact with this organ. It could be of no service to us were we to attempt, with Dr. Grew and others, to enumerate the number of simple tastes, (said to be sixteen,) and the numerous combinations of each. Our business is to ascertain, in as summary a way as possible, in what manner, and to what extent, the organ of taste is calculated to enlarge the information of the human mind.

Mr. Payne is careful to guard us against supposing that there is any resemblance between the mind's sensations in smelling and tasting, and the things smelled and tasted. We are compelled to think the caution unnecessary, as we do not believe the most ignorant and uninitiated are in the habit of doing so. Smelling and tasting are acts, by means of the appropriate organs, and not qualities of the mind; and when the vulgar say, a rose smells sweet, or honey tastes so, they have not the most distant idea that the quality of sweetness, or anything resembling it, is found in the mind. They mean what they say, and their language is true to nature: that

there is some quality or virtue in the rose or honey, which, affecting their organs, gives them the sensation named.

It should not be overlooked, in examining this subject, that the information given by one of the senses is rarely given by another,—and strictly speaking, perhaps scarcely in a single instance; and hence, the seemingly inconsiderable accessions of knowledge, occasionally, ever and anon, gathered through the medium of the senses, become of much more importance than we at first imagined. And this is particularly true of the knowledge gained by smelling and tasting. We are hereby made acquainted with the qualities of external bodies, over which the other senses have no control. And but for these organs, humble as their office may appear, the mind must remain for ever ignorant of much belonging to the external world; and yet important to be known, because essential to human happiness. We reserve for another lecture some general remarks on this subject, with which to close our notice of the organs of sense, or the doctrine of sensation, embracing all the external affections of the mind.

LECTURE VII

HEARING AND TOUCH

WAIVING all remark upon the structure or constitution of the *ear*, and the phenomena of this organ in general, our notice of it must be confined to the *direct* relation it bears to the mind, as the instrument and medium of knowledge. However diverse its uses may be from those of the organs already considered, in one important particular—the only one we intend to consider—the agreement and identity of result are complete. Although, in a dissimilar way, it unites with the other organs in becoming a medium of the most valuable information. But for this organ, oral language—that is, ninety-nine one hundredths of all language, would become a perfect nullity; and its myriad signs would be worse than useless. What effect this would have upon our intellectual resources must obtrude itself upon every one. It is by this organ we are led to know and distinguish many things without us, at the knowledge of which we never could arrive, destitute of this incomparable arrangement of nature.

The senses are sources of knowledge and belief, and the constitution of our nature impels us to rely upon their evidence, without the possibility of doubt, assuming them to be in a sound state; and the relative deficiencies of one sense, are made up by the presence and suggestions of another. The senses, and among these, HEARING, hold a kind of intermediate place and office, between the mind and the things existing around, external to it. And if those philosophers should be correct, who seem to think, that no one of the senses can

credibly ascertain us of the existence of external objects, one thing is indubitable,—the mind, by the joint aid and testimony of all the senses, comes in possession of this knowledge, beyond the shadow of uncertainty.

It is the appropriate object and office of the senses, and the ordained result of their exercise, to suggest the existence of the external world, and furnish such proof of it, as no one ever yet resisted. The sensation of *hearing*, originally, might give me no idea of the nature of the cause of the sensation; but suppose a peal of thunder in the heavens, ignorant as I might be of the cause of the sensation given, it would be followed by an irresistible conviction, that it existed, every way, and absolutely, external to myself.

T O U C H

We consider Mr. Payne's effort to prove that there are no such perceptions as those of smell, taste, hearing, and touch, as perfectly frivolous and jejune. The sensations that take the above denominations, are immediately succeeded by a perception of the external causes producing them; and in the case of odors, we have the perception as truly as the sensation; the perception being nothing more than the association of the sensation and its cause. And so of flavors, sounds, and the resistance of bodies. And we must respectfully beg leave here, to differ from Mr. Payne, Dr. Brown, and Mr. Welsh, as it respects the distinction they assume between touch and muscular feeling, which they erect into a separate organ, and the only one too, by which we can ascertain the world's existence; and not even by *that*, according to Mr. Payne and Mr. Welsh.

The organ of *touch* has been understood immemorially, and, we think, very correctly, to denote all the possibilities of tactual feeling and muscular resistance—any and every contact of the human body with other bodies, whether such contact be slight

or forceful—a mere coming together, or a contact involving all that is meant by impeded, muscular force. I grasp one substance, or place my body against another, and ascertain that the one is hard and the other hot or cold; and we ask you, is it necessary to invent a new organ of sense, to account for the result? Has not the result been reached, as all such results must be, by the sense of touch? Is the sensibility involved in such an experiment, to be sought in the nervous or the muscular system, or is any additional light thrown upon the subject by their divorce? We think the criticism, therefore, a mere play upon words, or rather an abuse of terms, as touch has never been used by philosophers to denote mere contact, without force or pressure. Nor do we admit the correctness of the assumption, that none of the senses, heretofore examined, give us the idea of *outness* or *externality* of being. We consider it the intended, and concurrent office of all the senses, to accredit to the mind, the existence of things exterior to it; and it is in this way, intention exerts itself, and asserts its force and vigor.

What we here mean to affirm, more particularly, is, that by the original constitution of our nature, the sensation of touch suggests the idea, or notion of hardness, and the same sensation gives infallible conviction, that this hardness belongs to a body, essentially separate from, and no part of ourselves. And what is this, but an idea, fixed and determinate, of outness or exteriority? and yet exclusively suggested by the sensation of touch! Mr. Payne says himself, at page 131st, that sensation, (and we are only speaking of sensation,) is that power which connects us with the external world. But *how* connect us with the external world, if it cannot give, even an idea, of that world; and leaves us in doubt as to its existence? He devotes a whole chapter, a series of pages, to prove that sensation is the *source* of all knowledge to the mind. But *how* the source of all knowledge, if it denies us the element-

ary knowledge of the world about us? That the sensations of touch, or tactual feeling, indicate something external, extended, figured, hard or soft, is not a deduction of reason, but an essential principle of our common nature; and the belief, and the conception of it, are equally parts of the human constitution. And it is in this way, our sensations first introduce the material world to our acquaintance; and it seldom or never appears, except in their company, and by their agency. With these remarks we leave this topic, but subject to further enlargement.

LECTURE VIII

SIGHT

THE most distinguished organ of sense attested to man, is that of *seeing*. This organ is as curious and magnificent in its structure, as it is beneficial and necessary in its uses. Without it, we should lose much that is useful and grateful in the world about us; and should be able to form a very inadequate view of the grandeur of nature, or the glory of art. One half that now contributes to our comfort or consequence, would be shut out from our knowledge, except through the medium of language and the other senses. And not allowed to avail ourselves of the optical wonders of nature, how slow and unsatisfactory would be our progress in knowledge! How long would it take a blind man, for example, by the sense of touch, to ascertain the magnitude of the Peak of Teneriffe, or the Gothic Pile of St. Peter's at Rome? And to such a man, how feeble would be the language of description!

These reflections, however, are too familiar to be important, except as they fix your attention upon the use and value of this organ, as a great, primary source of knowledge to the mind. As Mr. Payne has only obscured and mystified all that is difficult, connected with the uses and bearings of this most important organ, we decline all comment on his tissue of doubtful remarks, which finally conducts us to no conclusion. Much, however, that has been said, in relation to the other organs of sense, will apply, with equal fitness, to the eye.

Mental affections, in the case of all the organs, sustain a direct relation, in the light of necessary sequence, to the

organic affections, as their antecedent causes. But as this subject has been fully under consideration, heretofore, we shall not resume it here;—further, than briefly to suggest, in the instance of sight, that it is certain, an impression is made by the rays of light, upon that very singular expansion of the optic nerve, which we denominate the retina, existing in immediate continuity with the great sensorial organ, to which all the organs of sense are but subordinate ones. And in this way, the intellectual principle is mysteriously, but promptly brought into that new position, which is termed the sensation of sight—or visual perception.

In the whole diversified series of sensations, one invariable law obtains—the impression made upon the organ of sense, is the antecedent, and the successive mental affection, the consequent; and the mere fact of precedence and sequence is all we know. The connection, we are utterly unable to trace: and we are compelled, ultimately, to resolve the whole into the independent power, and ever-active agency of the God and Creator of all, who veils himself alike in all his works, whether in the secondary labor of gilding the wing of an insect, or in the original, creative effort of kindling up the burning fountains of the sun! The speculations of this lesson belong properly to the science of optics, and require but a casual notice from us, as only indirectly connecting with the present inquiry; and we are done, for a time, with the external affections of the mind, and shall proceed to the examination of those of internal origin.

LECTURE IX

INTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND.

THE laws of matter and mind, as they exist in the human constitution, are equally concerned, as we have seen, in the production of those states and affections of the mind, to which your attention has been recently called. The mind was the seat of the sensations and perceptions described, but the *causes* of their existence were without the mind, and belonged to the material world about us. At present, we have to do with the mind's independent constitution and furniture, without any direct reference to the agency of matter, wherever found, or however modified. The various states and affections of the mind, of which we are now speaking, constitute a part, and the principal part, of its phenomena, by attention to which we learn its nature and attributes. Of the existence of these phenomena, we can no more doubt than we can doubt of those of external origin. The evidence is the same in both instances.—That is, the mind's consciousness of its own feelings and operations. *How* one thought or feeling succeeds another, in the ever-varying activity and sensibility of the mind, we shall not pretend to determine, but that it is so, no one can doubt, without insanity; and all inquiry must end, by resolving the fact into the appointment of infinite wisdom, as indicated in the peculiar constitution of the mind itself. The relative consequence of these states and affections, embracing the endlessly varied consciousness of all our waking hours, and ending in the almost boundless gratification of much the larger share of human life, must be matter of equal certainty.

The manner in which these high powers and ennobling susceptibilities may elevate and adorn our common nature, connected with the interests of duty and happiness here, and the hope of reward and prolonged enjoyment through all duration, is at once as inconceivable in extent, as it is certain in issue. In illustration of this position, our text-book very **ap**positely introduces the independence of the mind upon the body, by showing that although, by the death of the body, it may suffer some diminution of the sum of its sensitive affections, yet its most valuable furniture—its intellectual states and emotions, infinite in number and enlargement, are imperishable as the friendship of Heaven, and the rewards of virtue; and the temporary loss, by the death of the body, will be compensated by the ample indemnity of its revival from the grave. So truly is it, that the nature and laws of mind, strictly referable to the will of God, as well as those of matter, are destined to survive the latter, as developed in our present physical constitution; and claim immortality of life, in virtue of the appointment and legislation of the Author and Judge of all.

The superiority of the internal over the external affections of the mind, is very happily instanced in the case of brutes, which have many of the latter, without any pretensions to the former; which are to be considered as the distinguishing marks and unerring signatures of mind. We agree with our author, further, in wishing to avoid the opposite extremes, of unnecessary simplification on the one hand, and an unauthorized passion for a multiplicity of elements on the other, in relation to the business of classification and analysis. On this topic, however, as we do not intend to commit ourselves to any theory, we have nothing further to say, except that the general classification in the sequel of our lesson, is one of such obvious fitness and great utility, that for the present we may proceed in this inquiry upon the basis of its plan; more espe-

cially, as it is the same we proposed, in substance, in our introductory lecture.

We have already examined, at some length, the sensitive, or external affections of the mind; and we now proceed to take up its more purely *intellectual* states; and shall conclude with that class, more properly called *emotions*. We have some reason to hope that the remaining part of this work will be more interesting, especially on the score of perspicuity, than the preceding part; but we refer you to our subsequent lessons.

LECTURE X.

SIMPLE AND RELATIVE SUGGESTION.

THE regulation of the mental phenomena by fixed laws, in their successive development, is a first principle in the science of mind. Almost all our thoughts, if not the whole, originate *in train*—one giving birth to another, and that to a third, and so on interminably. Of the truth of this remark, an unbroken chain of consciousness, extending successively to all we ever thought or felt, is a constant and ready witness. The original susceptibilities of mind, denominated simple and relative suggestion, give birth, especially, to two different classes of intellectual states. The first comprehending those simple notions or conceptions of objects, of whatever kind, which arise under the guidance of fixed laws, out of some preceding state of mind—one simple conception regularly leading to the introduction of another. The other, involving those notions of relation which are always found in the mind, when two or more objects are present to its view at once.

All simple states of intellect seem to preclude the notion of *relation*. That is, relation between two or more objects; although the relation of cause and effect is necessarily involved. I perceive an object, for example, and immediately a conception of something *else*, connected with it, in some way follows the perception, in necessary consecutive order. I see a man with whom I have had a quarrel, for instance, and immediately the perception gives birth to the idea of our former disagreement, and so of other cases.

In the second class, two or more objects that resemble each

other, or are strikingly similar, or immediately contiguous, are likely to suggest, the one the other, by an original law of the mind. The taste of one kind of fruit suggests that of another. The inquietude of hunger is followed by a conception of the pleasure of satiety. The presence of my friend, excites the idea of his confidence and kindness. The bare mention of Egypt, leads to the conception of her tyrants and pyramids.

We would remark here, by the way, that we think Mr. Payne does injustice to those who have advocated the doctrine of an "association of ideas." They evidently did not mean, as Mr. Payne supposes, ideas associated in *fact*, but a principle of association, as an original susceptibility of mind. That is the very principle contended for by Dr. Brown and Mr. Payne—simple and relative suggestion; and the term "ideas," was used with such latitude as to embrace the appropriate emotions produced by them. Such, at least, is the doctrine of Mr. Hume and Mr. Stewart.

The principle of association or suggestion, of which we are now speaking, is to be sought in the constitution of the mind, as determined by the Creator; and not in the *order* of our thoughts, or the force of habit. It is not more inconceivable that one thought should precede, and somehow produce another, than that the rays of light falling upon the retina should be followed by an impression upon the sensorium, and a consequent mental affection. In both instances, we only know the phenomena, and the result alike depends upon the preëxisting arrangements of nature.

The value of this principle or power of suggestion, can scarcely be estimated. It is connected with the knowledge and the interests of the past, the present, and the future; and unexisting time, as well as the present moment, is pressed into the service of our happiness.—The past is recalled,—and the future anticipated, from the *history* of the past, and the

consciousness of the present,—so as to prepare and furnish man for all the duties and hopes of life.

It will be worthy of notice, that in this invariable antecedence and sequence of thought, our thoughts all successively rise from, and are succeeded by kindred ones. There is nothing irregular, indifferent, or equivocal, in their development; but all is conducted by an established, unchanging law, which is easily, and only ascertainable, by attention and experience. Truth and permanence mark the whole process, so that we are not, in any way, liable to deception. Do you inquire, *how* this principle of suggestion operates? You need only turn your attention *within*, and observe the relations subsisting among the myriad thoughts and conceptions to which the mind gives birth; and also turn to the relations of things *without*, which successively, or contemporaneously become the objects of conception, and the subjects of thought, and you will reach the same result. In this way, we shall be able to ascertain how our thoughts are connected; and by what laws their succession is regulated, in view of the original constitutional principles of the mind, which we denominate simple and relative suggestion.

LECTURE XI

LAWS OF SUGGESTION.—RESEMBLANCE.

A NATIVE, unchanging tendency belongs to the human mind, to exist in kindred, resembling states. Hence, when one object is presented, resembling another, an idea of the second is awakened by the perception of the first. And not only are objects suggested by particular relations of resemblance, but less defined, and more imperfect relations of this kind, are calculated to do it. These resembling states of the mind, are probably produced by the similarity of the impressions made upon the organs of sense; and this similarity is again owing, no doubt, to the resemblance of the external objects producing them. As the sight of a child, for example, may remind us of the scenes of our own childhood; and the residence of a friend, recall the abode of our own youth and innocence.

Analogous objects, are those, some of whose properties, or qualities, resemble. As a brave man, reminds you of a lion; (to quote Mr. Payne) and the inoffensiveness of the lamb, of the innocence of juvenile years. The resemblance resulting from the perception of merely analogous objects, relates more, perhaps, to the emotions awakened, than the notions or ideas excited. We *feel* more truly than we *see* the resemblance between the deeds of a hero and the prowess of the lion; and so of the lamb and the child. The analogy detected, naturally awakens feelings of resemblance, more or less defined.

These resembling, and analogous states of the mind, with regard to its perceptions and feelings, give birth to a large portion of the imagery found in every language; and many of the rare and higher powers of intellect, depend upon the quickness and acuteness of the mind, in the detection and recognition of these resemblances and analogies, for all their force and display—such as taste, fancy, and imagination.

This law of suggestion, and these principles of resemblance and analogy, are admirably calculated to improve and expand the mind, and enlarge, from time to time, the limits of the arts and sciences—the whole range of mental accumulation and practical attainment. One fact suggests another—one improvement a second, and this, a third, until it shall be found, that the human mind has no horizon to limit its enlargement.

The second law of suggestion is *contrast*. Objects viewed in the light of contrast, reciprocally suggest each other. The sight of a forest overthrown and defaced by a tempest, will call up the conception of its former majesty and beauty. The grave of my friend reminds me of the living companion, and virtuous sharer of my confidence. By this law of contrast, opposite conditions also suggest each other. Infancy suggests old age,—prosperity, adversity,—poverty, wealth,—grandeur, obscurity; and so, *vice versa*. This seems to be an admirable provision in the administration of nature; for unbroken continuity, and unvarying monotony, in our conceptions and emotions, for any considerable length of time, might prove hurtful to our best and dearest interests. In this way, excessive elation or depression of feeling will be held in check, and duly balanced, so as to minister to the welfare of all, and increase the sum of human happiness. It is owing to the tendency and operation of this principle in the human mind, as suggested in the lesson, that that part of the rhetorical construction of language, called *antithesis*, has obtained to such

advantage, in all ages, and among all nations, especially in the Greek language.

The third law of suggestion is *contiguity*. Contiguity of place among objects, will bring them before the mind successively; one suggesting another. The walks and scenes of childhood, remind us of the trees and streams by which they were adorned and endeared. The conception of Africa, makes us think of her tropical suns and burning sands, and the slavery of her children. Greenland and Zembla awaken conceptions of their snows and cold. So also, proximity or contiguity, in point of time and things, will have the same effect. Who can revert to the years and vicissitudes of early life, without calling up the memory of sports and feats, and youthful associates? Who among you can advert to the achievement of his country's independence, and not think of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and their associates? But the tendency of contiguous, connected, and contemporaneous events, to suggest one another, is too obvious to require further illustration.

The phenomena of recollection, the processes and results of education, and the laws of scientific classification, all depend essentially upon the principle of suggestion we are now considering. The circumstances which modify and vary this law of the human mind, are too minute an inquiry, to be introduced here. But it may be necessary to guard you against an error, into which you may fall, on the subject of suggestion, and the succession of thoughts and emotions.—You are not to suppose then, that a new thought or emotion, necessarily expels or dismisses the antecedent thought or emotion that gave it birth. This *may* be the case, and no doubt often is, but is not *necessarily* or *generally* so. For thoughts and emotions may coëxist in the mind, and each vividly exert an influence at the same time. The grave of my friend, and a great variety of other objects, may awaken in the mind, an

almost endless diversity of thoughts and emotions, of the perfect coëxistence of which, in the drama of the mind's conceptions and feelings, I cannot possibly doubt; and this, even for a considerable length of time.

ATTENTION

On the subject of *attention*, we would remark, it seems to consist of solicitude, connected with some other state or affection of the mind coëxisting with it. It is not so much an original, separate power, as the joint exercise and result of several. A conception or emotion exists in the mind, in relation to the nature and cause of which, we wish additional information; and to obtain it, the mind places itself in an attitude of inquiry, and makes use of the most probable means to attain it. And this, briefly, is what we mean by attention. We, doubtless, have many sensations, conceptions, and emotions, to which we do not attend, and of which we have no recollection. And this may be accounted for by the fact, that other stronger, and more vivid thoughts or feelings occupied the mind at the time; and the intensity of the latter, gave the former to oblivion; so far, at least, as to withdraw them from the special notice of the mind, and deny them a place among the treasures of memory.

Attention seems to be, strictly, the product of perception, or some other mental state and desire. The mind perceives an object—desire immediately arises to attain something further in relation to the perceived object; and the perception combined with this solicitude, gives the complex mental state, neither purely intellectual, nor strictly an emotion, but a blending or union of both, which we call attention.

There may also coëxist, and probably does, another mental state, in the process of attention; we mean expectation. The mind is not only wishful, but expectant, in relation to the object perceived. Desire invests the perception with in-

creased vividness; and expectation places the mind in waiting for further results. And this absorption, or occupation of the mind, by a single object—this detaching it from all others, is all that is meant by absence of mind, either in common parlance, or the language of philosophy.

It is plain to us, therefore, that attention is not a simple mental state, the result of an original, distinct power, but a combined process, in which several mental states are involved, and by which they are more or less modified. When the object of attention is external, and the ministry of the senses, or any one of them, is involved; say sight, for example, then to the process of attention, we must add the adaptation and aptitude of certain muscles, and also the voluntary command of their contraction and use, at any time, by the mind. In all cases of intense attention, where the senses are concerned, muscular effort is necessary; and the highest attention to the occurrences of every day, will place it beyond dispute. Attention is much, and variously influenced by habit—a proposition which requires no illustration. There are different degrees of attention; and these are modified and varied, either by duration in point of time, or intensity with regard to interest.

Attention then, is defined to be, a complex state of mind, involving not only thought, but an accompanying emotion of interest, which fixes the mind upon a given object or subject, and precludes the changes that would otherwise take place, and successively engross the mind. Upon the importance of attention, in the formation, and to a great extent, as the foundation of intellectual character, we can scarcely lay too much stress; and it will be found equally necessary, in every department of mental labor. Much will depend, in all efforts of attention, upon volition and purpose; nevertheless, nature, taste, or habit, may often furnish the principal bias from which attention receives its first direction. A

district of country, for example, may be traced upon a tour or excursion, by a knot of travellers; and without any direct interest or purpose, one will be attending to the picturesque scenery—another, its agricultural products—a third will be busied with its geological specimens—and a fourth, only with its roads, and the facilities of travelling.

We conclude, by remarking, that the due exercise of every mental power or process, depends greatly on attention; and the diversities and disparities of human judgment, in different individuals, is a fact in the history of our kind, more owing to attention, or the want of it, we are inclined to think, than to any other cause whatever. When Sir Isaac Newton was asked, by what peculiarity of mental power he had achieved such herculean results in philosophy, he replied, “By acquiring the power of continuous attention.” An answer every way worthy the man, and the occasion on which it was given.

LECTURE XII.

CONCEPTION AND MEMORY.

CONCEPTION is a result of the general law of suggestion. All our conceptions are modifications and developments of the great principle of association. Conception appears to be nothing more than the memory, or suggested recurrence of previous perceptions. The act or process of conception, simply recalls perception. It always sustains some relation to the past ; but the mind is not supposed to be cognizant of the relation to *time* ; and a former perception may be called up in the mind, so as to appear connected, only with the present. The same general laws that govern memory, generate and control our conceptions. The character of our conceptions, depends very much upon the original vigor and activity of the mind ; and also, upon acquired taste, and habitual pursuits. Primitive vigor of feeling, and vividness of emotion, as well as facile habits of reflection and attention, being necessary to force and energy of conception, which is usually accompanied by a corresponding talent for fine and graphic description.

Some situations are much more favorable to the exercise and development of this secondary power than others. In the absence of all external impressions, and in a state of undisturbed seclusion, it gives birth to a kind of intellectual opera in the mind, the scenes and changes of which, are almost infinite ; a fine illustration of which, may be found in Cervantes, investing Sancho with the thousand attributes of a hero.—Niebuhr, the celebrated Danish traveller, when very old, infirm, and blind, bending on his crutches, or con-

fined to his bed, was constantly occupied in vivid descriptions of the luxuriant plains, picturesque mountains, and matchless scenery of Asia, which by the power of conception, were vividly present to his mind.

Thus, conception is, to recall our mental states. Perception, in general terms, assumes the presence of the object; but in conception, the absence of the object is assumed, as a general rule, until rendered as it were present, by the play and illusions of this singular power. And hence the latter differs generally from the former; and not less generally from memory; inasmuch as, in every act of memory, the past, as it regards time, is involved; whereas, in conception, considerations of time, are not necessarily, if casually included.

MEMORY is conception modified by priority of time. It is suggestion qualified by the notion of time. It is the recalling of something antecedent to our present consciousness. It is a conception of what is past, as such. It is a conception, coëxisting with an idea of time, anterior to the present. Memory implies, not only the conception of an object, but also the consciousness that it has undergone the examination of our senses; or been some way present to the mind, at a former period. Hence, it is not a simple, but a complex state of mind, involving, simultaneously, a conception of the object, and its antecedence, in the relations of time, to the present moment. Reference to the past, is a necessary concomitant, in every act or exercise of memory. Memory involves the power of recognizing, as former objects of attention and consciousness, the events and thoughts, which, from time to time, pass in review before the mind.

This principle of suggestion—for it is suggestion, and originally, nothing else, at last, is found exerting a most important influence during the whole consciousness of our lives, by perpetuating, and recalling the events, thoughts,

and emotions of the preceding part of our history. As *remembrance* is but the recurrence of preëxisting states of the mind, all we can properly mean, by treasuring up knowledge in the mind or memory, is, that by the principle of suggestion, the mind may be furnished with its former thoughts and emotions, whenever it becomes necessary. The power of suggestion, or the great principle of association, resides in the mind, permanently, and is a constitutional part of its essential polity; and may, therefore, exert itself spontaneously, or be called upon for voluntary contributions; but as memory is only one mental state suggested by another, any idea of filing away its treasures in the mind, or of lumbering accumulation for subsequent use, is too absurd to be refuted.

As it regards the phenomena of memory—the causes of its occasional diminution, and the aids derivable to its advantageous exercise from other mental habits—these are topics that will be sufficiently illustrated in other connections, and we shall not dwell upon them here. From the preceding remarks, it will have occurred to you that the memory of former things, resolved into the original susceptibility of suggestion, is not, except indirectly, and to a very limited extent, under the government of the will. And so far as it is, the reference is, mainly to what we call *recollection*, or intentional memory; for it would seem, the mind may have a slight conception of the outline or relations of something, and may wish or resolve, further, to recover it, and in order to this, may voluntarily, and for a length of time, dwell upon it by attention, until what the mind *has*, may suggest what it *has not*.

The advantages of this reminiscent power, on the part of the mind, are innumerable, and beyond calculation. The want or loss of it debases the mind to the lowest state of idiocy. There can be no comparison of idea or emotions—no

consecutive thought—no accumulation of useful knowledge—and we should not only suffer as *intellectual*, but as *moral* beings—there could be no gratitude—no esteem—no moral retrospect or estimate, with regard to the past ; and in a word, it implies, the oblivion of nearly all our moral judgments and emotions.

LECTURE XIII.

IMAGINATION AND HABIT.

IMAGINATION is a secondary power, and admits of analysis. Much that has been said with regard to conception and memory, as results of the law of suggestion, will apply, with great fitness, to imagination;—as every exercise or production of imagination involves a union of elements, all of which are referable to the same great principle of association. Imagination is a complex exercise of intellect, by which the previous conceptions of the mind, as the materials and elements, are wrought into separate combinations, so as to form new and distinct wholes or creations, which, but for imagination, had never existed. The original power of association furnishes the conceptions, and the principle of relative suggestion gives birth to the notions and feelings of relation. And thus, the mind proceeds to *group* and *contract* its new and mysterious mental formations. Imagination, therefore, is a development of various susceptibilities and emotions; and can never exist apart from the powers of association and judgment—the *first*, being *simple*, and the second, *relative* suggestion. And in all cases of the voluntary or intentional exercise of imagination, as in composition and painting, for instance, desire must likewise be added, as exerting a permanent influence.

There is still another view connected with this subject, without which it cannot be rightly understood. When the conceptions and images, of which we have spoken, present themselves by the process of suggestion, in groups and

clusters, like courtiers at the levee of a friend, by what law or process does the mind select or reject those that are most fit, or altogether unallowable? The answer is, by its own original, intuitive discernment—by a vivid, irresistible feeling of approval or disapproval, of which no account can be given, except that the mind has been so formed by the Author of its existence, and acts conformably to a law of its creation.

It must not be forgotten, we would again suggest, that imagination never creates, except by combination. The materials must always preëxist. The component elements are selected from real scenes and events, and actual characters; and then the mind proceeds, by the magic power of imagination, to furnish compounds, that until *now* never had an existence. The influence of imagination upon mind, morals, and intellectual character in general, is indeed surprising; and especially, connected with the higher walks of genius and literature, but we are not allowed to trace it here.

HABIT, as applied to the operations of mind, is to be understood, strictly, of the frequent recurrence of those mental states leading to, or resulting in, the operations of which we speak. The successive recurrence of those states of mind, will, of course, coëxist with a great variety of events and objects; so that each recurrence of the mental state, owing to those relations of coëxistence, will suggest the objects and events referred to, and render the mind pronely habitual to the repetition. This process will require no new or original power; but resolves itself, primarily, into the same susceptibility with imagination, as well as conception and memory. That is, simple and relative suggestion; or the principle of association.

Habit, in philosophical strictness, implies ability to do, by the frequency of doing or having done; by which the ability to do, is not only relatively increased, but its exercise becomes more ready and facile. Hence, it is, to a great extent, the

result of experiment and practice; frequent repetition affording a kind of permanent readiness, and securing to the mind action and facility, of which it is otherwise deprived. We do not take up the subject of muscular, or corporeal habits, but confine ourselves to those purely, or at least, essentially intellectual.

The influence of habit is immensely diversified. The tact and fluency of the extemporaneous speaker—the arts of the juggler—the tact and skill of the engineer, and the rapidity of the arithmetical accountant, seldom have any secret, but what is, more or less, referable to habit. All our intellectual powers, and even emotions, acquire strength and vigor from habit. Such as conception, memory, abstraction, etc.; and so of benevolence, love, hatred, etc. Habit, in any given instance, creates a special, and almost impelling tendency to repetition; and also contributes, in equal degree, to the facility and finish of the action, of whatever kind it may be. And hence, it furnishes additional illustration of the nature and fundamental importance of the laws of simple and associated suggestion.

LECTURE XIV.

CONCEPTIONS OF RELATION.

By the law of relative suggestion, we are led, whenever we observe two or more objects in the position of nearness, to notice or detect mental relations existing between them. These relations may be those of agreement or disagreement, may be based upon resemblance or contrast, contiguity or the connection of cause and effect. We are not now speaking of simple conception, to the existence of which, a single object only is necessary, but of the conceptions of relations, for the existence of which, two or more objects are always required.

The great basis or law of relation, is to be sought in the mind, as a grand mental peculiarity, and not in the related objects, or objects between which, the mind discerns reciprocal relations. It would seem, the mind is incapable of contemplating any number of objects, without investing them with comparative relations. Perception, if we limit the term to the sensitive, external affections, is inapplicable to relations; for in this sense of the term, we can see, that is, perceive no relation of agreement or difference between comfort and enjoyment, or fear and terror. But we humbly conceive, it will be impossible ever to limit the use of the terms perceive and perception to so narrow a scale of application. Using the terms thus technically, however, they do not apply to the doctrine of relations, and some other law of the mind must explain the phenomena in question.

All relations are divisible into two classes—those of *coëxist-*

ence and *succession*. The principle of this division is *time*. Those of the first class involve no notion of time; while those of the second, lead to the notion or idea, both of priority and posteriority, as it regards time. The first class, not only embraces objects coëxisting without us, but also coëxisting relations within; that is, in reference to the affections of the mind. Relations of coëxistence may be almost endlessly varied, extending to proportion, degree, likeness, contrast, position, and comprehension.

In this catalogue, the relations of comprehension and resemblance, are perhaps the most important. You look at any complicate specimen of mechanical skill, and upon examination, are struck with the relation of all the parts to the whole. By this, we understand the relation of comprehension. But without the power of recognizing relations, which we call relative suggestion, the facts might have been seen, or the whole examined, without detecting the relation between the one and the other. Now, if you take two such specimens, and notice them together, their likeness, the one to the other, will irresistibly lead the mind to compare them; and we have here exemplified the relations of resemblance. In the case of resemblance, it is worthy of remark, that language, science, and art, but for a knowledge of its relations, must necessarily exist in a very disordered, chaotic state.

Without general, generic terms and designations, always based upon the relations of resemblance and comprehension, no language could be constructed, that would not be so multitudinous in its elements—unwieldy and unmanageable as a medium of communication, as to forbid ready use, and practical results. All science would be without classification; and if it existed at all, could only exist in unrelated parcels and fragments. And the same is true of art, which is strictly imitative in all its divisions and bearings; and therefore, involving the relations of resemblance and comprehension. All

general ideas, giving birth to general terms, whether of substantive or adjective bearing, are ideas of resemblance and comprehension. Indeed, we have very few adjectives of positive degree in any language, that do not involve the conceptions of relation of which we speak. To select from our own—*old, young, rich, poor, learned, ignorant*,—are all used with reference to a standard of relation fixed in the mind.

Relations of succession will be considered separately; but for the sake of perspicuity, we may instance here, the relations of cause and effect. You see an interesting specimen of statuary, and your attention is turned to the artist; but in contemplating him, you do not consider him merely as a man, but you contemplate him, in connection with what he has done. You think not of the man merely, but of the *author* of the work before you. The general subject, however, can only be touched upon, in a single lesson. You may take the case of *man*, as a solitary conception, and the relations involved, as Mr. Locke justly remarks, would fill a volume.

Without the conceptions of relations, of coëxistence and succession, there could be no abstraction, comparison, imagination, reasoning, or judgment. All language is based in its constitution, upon the relations of *things* and of *thoughts*. I think of a man who is absent—here is simple conception. This conception, however, suggests him, as my friend or enemy; as a good or bad man; as a citizen or neighbor; and *here*, we have conceptions of relation. I look at the flowers that spring at my feet—this is sensation and perception only. I feel that one is more beautiful than another; and *here*, relation is conceived—the relation of degree. I hear many voices, and one is louder than the rest,—is an example of the same relation, felt or discovered. We can have no conception of cause, without the correlative notion of effect. The antecedence of the one, suggests the subsequence of the other; and they cannot be thought of apart. And we may

add, that all the correlative terms of language, are predicable of the same invariable law ; such as citizen and country, father and son, subject and ruler. The use of concrete terms is to the same effect—as the sculptor, the painter, and poet, by which we are reminded of their business and works. These relations, however, are infinite ; and so of our corresponding conceptions. The division of them we have given, is only general, and does not approach analysis, and a hundred subdivisions would be necessary, to embrace the whole. The mental power we are illustrating, is, indeed, an important one, and must obtrude itself upon our notice, whenever we pay the slightest attention to our internal history.

LECTURE XV

JUDGMENT AND REASON

JUDGMENT is a feeling or notion of relation. It is an exercise of mental power, complex in its character, and referable to the mind, in a broad, generic sense, more strictly than perhaps to any of its individuated powers or susceptibilities. The grand, suggesting principle, in our intellectual conformation, is, doubtless, the essential, controlling law of *judgment*; and its phenomena can be much more rationally accounted for, in view of this general law, than by assuming a separate power of the mind to take the same denomination. It is simply the mind's impression, with regard to the relations of things and facts. It always has reference to relation; and any detection, or recognition of relations, direct or remote, is an act of the mind involving the power of judgment. In every act of judgment, the mind necessarily compares one thing with another; and this mental process, implying the relation of things, is resolvable into the great law of association. We are far from laying as much stress upon this view of the subject, as Mr. Payne and Dr. Brown have done; but still, it strikes us, as much freer from difficulty, than preceding theories; and, also, as having more positive evidence to support it; and for these reasons we adopt it, as, at least, essentially correct.

The general power of recognizing relations, to which we have already asked your attention at large, will, beyond doubt, philosophically account for all the phenomena of judging and reasoning; and to us there appears no good reason, why we

should not refer these facts in the mind's history, to the same general law governing conception, memory, and imagination.

That power by which we become sensible of relations in general, is truly denominated judgment or reason. It obviously differs from perception; and it may safely receive its classification as before stated. We may remark, further, that whenever we give utterance or expression to this mental process, it assumes the shape of a proposition, or a number of them. And this mental elaboration continued, is what we understand by reasoning, which always has reference to a connected series of propositions, and corresponding judgments. Reasoning is, strictly, a series of recognized or *felt* relations, or consecutive judgments, on the part of the mind. Every mental judgment, implies an antecedent and a consequential proposition; and reasoning, or ratiocination, implies the multiplication of these elements, and the extension of this process, indefinitely. You will perceive, nevertheless, that simple and independent propositions, however placed in the mind, do not constitute reasoning. The process involves the comparison and general sequence of related propositions; and in order to the integrity of the process, the last of the series must sustain as direct relation to the first, as does the second, or any other in the whole number involved. The predicate of the first, thus becoming the subject of the second, and so on, to the last of the series. The necessary relation of the propositions, therefore, constitutes the peculiar nature of the process, as performed by the mind, in the analysis and synthesis of which we are speaking; and the propositions arise in the mind consecutively, in due order and correspondence, subject to the controlling law of association, or the principle of suggestion, to which we have devoted so much attention, and of which, judging and reasoning are mere developments.

LECTURE XVI.

ABSTRACTION, AND RELATIONS OF SUCCESSION.

ABSTRACTION seems to be little more than individuated attention to a single subject, found in combination with others. It is the power of contemplating *one* property of a substance or quality of a thing or being, separate from *all others* belonging to the same substance or entity. It implies the separation of facts, qualities, or things; and an individual examination of them. We would not say that this mental operation is entirely independent of volition; but, at the same time, it may be extremely difficult to point out the degree of dependence which may, and doubtless does, occasionally exist; nor is it perhaps a matter of much importance to know. That law by which a single object in a combination becomes the subject of separate contemplation, may be, and no doubt often is, modified by the *will* in its operation; and it is quite certain that its control is often exerted independent of all volition. The solidity of a body, for example, may attract the mind's attention, apart from its color and other qualities; and this may, or may not be the result of solicitude or volition, on the part of the mind. That volition, therefore, as Mr. Payne seems to think, has nothing to do with the process and results of abstraction, is a statement unsupported by any thing like proof; although it is doubtless true in many instances; at least, so far as we are observant of our own thoughts. Abstraction disjoins things, which by nature are intrinsically associated; and which can be separated in no other

way. And thus, the mind is enabled to contemplate them asunder, and unmodified by their combinations.

On all subjects of this kind, it is exceedingly difficult to approach any thing like accuracy of definition. If we say that abstraction implies the existence of a complex idea, or state of mind, the coëxistence of interest, desire, or choice, with regard to some one of its elements, and the consequent detention in the mind, of the part, in relation to which interest is felt, together with the usual disappearance of the other parts from the mind's notice, for the time, we have perhaps said all that is necessary to be said, by way of philosophic definition.

All complex ideas owe their existence to the power of association; and it appears entirely evident, that, as increased interest is felt with regard to a single element in any complex idea, or mental operation, the principle of association ceases to exert its ordinary influence, and leaves the mind to contemplate the element *thus* abstracted, as the sole object of consideration.

Hence it appears, that as all our complex notions are held in combination by the principle of suggestion, or the law of association, so, in the process of abstraction, this principle of combination relaxes; and the complexity of the mental compound disappears, by the reduction of its parts to their elementary state, affording the mind an opportunity of examining an individual part, separate from its associates. And to us it appears unimportant, whether we say a single element of the combination attracted the mind—that it was mysteriously withdrawn from the other parts by an emotion of interest in relation to *one*—or that the mind deliberately chose to elaborate an abstraction, connected with duty, necessity, or gratification—we say *unimportant*, because all these are obviously true, with regard to mental abstractions, infinitely multiplied.

Abstraction, as an important development of the law of

suggestion, and particularly in relation to analysis and generalization, is continually blind to all the higher efforts of imagination and genius, as well as science and philosophy; thus enabling us to decompound our actual conceptions, and form them into new, successive, and more congenial, useful, and interesting emotions.

RELATIONS OF SUCCESSION.

On the relations of *successive time*, especially simple priority and posteriority, as connected with the doctrine of cause and effect, we have elsewhere said quite as much as either the nature or importance of the subject requires; and it would be entirely superfluous to add much here; particularly, as it has no intimate connection with what precedes or follows. We remark, however, that it may not be amiss to pay some additional attention to our conceptions of the *order* of events, as a knowledge of such order may be of great practical service in the business of life, by supplying, to some extent, the place both of history and prophecy.

The invariable relations of successive time, which by us can only be measured by events, not only places the *past* within the power of improvement, but enables us, in some sense, to grasp and appropriate the future, as though gifted with almost unerring foreknowledge. Upon this knowledge life itself is made to depend, as well as all the useful arts sustaining and adorning it—not to mention mental recreation, and the priceless pleasures of intellectual enjoyment thence derived. We are allowed to assume, that what is going on to-day, is not only a substantially accurate specimen of what has been going on from the foundation of the world, but also of what will be daily occurring to its close; embracing alike the changes of the physical world, and the fluctuations of human thought and feeling.

LECTURE XVII.

INTERNAL AFFECTIONS.—EMOTIONS.

MR. PAYNE is an admirable, or rather a most vexatious fault-finder. Instead of so liberally criticizing Cogan, who has never been received as a philosophical guide in mental science, and with whose speculations we have little or no concern, he would have obliged us much, had he *explained*, instead of *mystifying* his subject. But lest we fall into the same condemnation, we proceed to notice what is valuable and available in our lesson. That our emotions are *truly* and *generically* different from our purely intellectual states, is to us entirely unquestionable; and our every-day consciousness is sufficient to prove it. No man who *fears, desires, loves, or hates*, can identify these emotions with the mental processes of *remembering* and *comparing*, or give them the same generic classification. The views and conceptions of the understanding *may*, to be sure, and undoubtedly *do* exist, the antecedents of all our emotions; but preceding and producing them, will furnish no proof of identity; and we all feel, that gladness and sorrow, affection and abhorrence, are essentially different things from recognizing a relation, or recollecting an event.

The distinctive dissimilarity we are now urging, is manifest in nothing, more strikingly, than in the peculiar, and vivid impressiveness of our emotions, as distinguished from strictly intellectual states and operations. There is a felt—an appealing—a forceful vividness about our emotions, which does not

belong to the colder and less exalting elaborations of intellect. As there are no generic varieties among our emotions, it has always been found a difficult thing to classify them, so as to contemplate them to advantage. Various methods have been proposed, but none entirely satisfactory. That based upon the relations of time, is perhaps the most convenient, as well as unexceptionable. It is, at least, the most natural and comprehensive; and we see no good reason why it should not be adopted; as it embraces, within a settled range, the whole catalogue of our emotions—some regarding the present, some the past, and all the rest having reference to the future. The first class involves no relation of time—such as simple *admiration*. The second, is modified by priority of time—such as *compunction*, *remorse*; and the last, having reference to the future—such as *hope* and *fear*. It is to be hoped it will not be long, until the science will furnish a more philosophical classification; but until such time, we may make advantageous use of the present; as it will enable us to attend to our emotions, of every kind, without confusion; and thus supply the want of a better arrangement. This classification, although usually ascribed to Dr. Brown, was suggested by others, long anterior to his day, but was by him improved and thrown into form.

Although this classification gives the name of *emotions* to all the feelings, for the production of which, there exist in our nature appropriate susceptibilities, yet, it does not exclude, as improper, the long accredited use of other phraseology: such as *passions*, *affections*, etc., provided they are used with the necessary precision and exactitude of application—not to denote separate genera in this division of the intellectual economy, but modifications and developments of the one great generic class, to which we give the denomination of emotions.

It should not be overlooked by you, that the present classification regards our emotions in their complex state, and that

no attempt will be made to analyze each complex whole, until we proceed to a distinct examination, severally, of the separate affections, and their corresponding susceptibilities.

We have much to add on this subject, but cannot do so now, without anticipating our guide, except to suggest, that the term *passion* is very properly applied to an intensely excited emotion—as in the case of *anger* and *revenge*—or when a single object continues for a long time to attract the mind, and keep up a growing interest. Hence a passion for *poetry, fame, wealth*, etc. The term *affection* is variously used; but principally to denote the deep-seated permanence of feeling, in relation to the object of its engrossment.

LECTURE XVIII.

IMMEDIATE EMOTIONS.

THE present inquiry is less a *moral*, than a *philosophical* discussion. The ethical relations and bearings of the passions, are not so much the subject of study, as the peculiar nature and philosophy of our emotions.

Cheerfulness, ranking among the *immediate* emotions, as those involving no fixed relations of time, appears to be a simple feeling, uncombined with, and unmodified by other conceptions and feelings. It may be defined to be, a kind of gentle joy—a reigning gladness, of which the mind, successively, is the subject, without referring the effect to any definite cause. It is, strictly, as an elementary feeling, a modification of joy—an alacrity of feeling, which to be understood, must have been felt. It indicates a healthy frame and play of the mental constitution—a delightful consciousness of the mind's vigor and buoyancy, not unlike the gay and alacrious energy of youth, when exercise is repose to the limb and muscle, and the want of it becomes fatigue.

Melancholy is another example of this class of emotions. It is an internal sadness, unconsciously diffusing *itself* over the whole mind, and extending its sombre colorings to all surrounding objects. Melancholy is the opposite of cheerfulness—the counterpart of gladness. It may be bland and gentle, or sullen and morose, as modified by *circumstances* and general temperament. As cheerfulness is one of the numerous forms of joy, so melancholy is but a form of the

elementary feeling of grief. It is grief modified by time, or the remoteness of the cause producing it, and the effect of other coëxisting conceptions and emotions. It is original grief or sorrow, softened and varied, or perhaps sometimes aggravated and diversified, by repeated combinations with other kindred or dissimilar mental states. As it may exist, without being referred by the mind to the cause or causes of its production, we rank it among the *immediate* emotions, without involving any particular notion of time.

This brief notice of cheerfulness and melancholy, will, perhaps, be sufficient for the present. They are too familiar to require much illustration; and to secure their proper classification, is the most important part of the inquiry.

As it regards *surprise*, *wonder*, and *astonishment*, we consider *wonder* the primary emotion; as it only suggests to us the necessity of being informed as to the relations of our conceptions; whereas, the other two are produced by the abrupt precession of cause and effect; and *surprise* and *astonishment*, we regard as mere modifications of it. We cannot see any original diversity in the emotion itself; and the diversity admitted, is evidently the result of modifying circumstances. An unexpected occurrence surprises us, and this is the first stage of the emotion. We impulsively find ourselves trying to account for it, and *wonder*, or a kind of wildering indecision follows. We sum up the whole, finally, and as the mind dwells upon it, *astonishment* is the result. Still, we have developed but the one original émotion; and whether we call it *wonder*, *astonishment*, or *surprise*, we have to do with the same elementary feeling.

Novelty and unexpectedness appear necessary to produce surprise; and the feeling when produced, seems to differ from the emotion of wonder, only in view of increased, temporary vividness. That the original emotion of which we speak, may receive, with distinctive propriety, the several denomina-

tions of wonder, astonishment, and surprise, as modified by different circumstances, is readily admitted; and the very structure of language places it beyond dispute. Nevertheless, their essential identity, on the ground of original susceptibility, appears to us, to be too certain to admit of controversy.

What *hunger* is to the body, as a stimulus, *languor* becomes to the mind, by leading it to vary and multiply the results of action and experiment. The emotion itself is mental weariness. An object unvaried, and continuing to engross the mind for a long time, wearies it. In like manner, similar or resembling objects, in protracted succession, tire the observer, and produce languor. Objects originally pleasing often lose their interest, and become painful, by being kept steadily before the mind for a long time together.

Languor is not indolent content, but an uneasiness—a restless impatience of sameness, arising from a uniformity of objects and impressions. It is a susceptibility in our nature, which leads us to weary in a constant repetition of the past. The love of change is one of the strongest motives to action; and this passion for excitement and vicissitude, is negatively produced by languor. And hence, the susceptibility is one friendly to our own welfare, and often beneficial to others. Experience will always present us with diminished pleasure, fading into positive uneasiness, from the dull monotony of the past. It is to this principle in human nature, Young alludes, when he asks,—

“*Possession*, why more tasteless than *pursuit*?
Why is a *wish* far dearer than a *crown*?”

LECTURE XIX.

BEAUTY.

THE emotion of *beauty* is an exhibition of gratified sensibility—a modification of joy, viewed as an original, elementary feeling. Pleasure is always an essential part, and mainly constituent of the emotion;—for beauty is more properly an emotion than a sensation. Sometimes, in instances rare and unimportant, it is doubtless a mere sensation; but in order to understand, in any adequate way, the nature and philosophy of beauty, we must consider it as an emotion. That beauty is an affection of the mind, and without mind there is no beauty, is too certain to admit of doubt. It is an emotion, however, that although clearly felt, is very obscurely comprehended; and very few of our physical or moral inquiries have been less satisfactorily elaborated.

There are two material aspects in which beauty should always be contemplated. It is always, and necessarily, a pleasing emotion; and extends to, and is combined with the conception of the object producing it. This pleasure of the emotion, and its identification with the object exciting it, seem to be the only elements essential to its existence. For after all that can be said on the subject, the old French philosopher, La Chambre, seems to have told much truth, when he affirms, “that beauty deprives us of reason in two ways—first, when we feel the fascination of its influence; and secondly, when we attempt to account for the charm!”

The loveliest of all the forms of beauty on which we gaze

with rapture and delight, in the absence of mind, would have no beauty at all. We connect the delight we feel, to be sure, with the external object contingently producing it, and we look upon the object as beautiful, because it excites the delightful feeling; but still, the emotion of beauty belongs to the mind; and its elements and combinations are immaterial. The objects which we denominate beautiful, become, in some sense, representative of the pleasure they excite; although independently, they can have *no* beauty. Whatever excites the emotion of beauty, is *felt*, as of itself, combined with the emotion excited. And this seems true of all the infinite forms of beauty, whether natural or artificial, material or immaterial; equally applying to colors, forms, and sounds—all that is ingenious in art, or lovely in morals. And this deception—for such it appears to be, when examined by philosophy, cannot have escaped the notice of any mind, the least sentient of the various forms of beauty, or observant of its almost endlessly varied emotions. And in spite of our philosophy, we shall perhaps always be prone to conceive of beauty, as stored and existent in the object, which at any time may excite the emotion.

The material, the intellectual, and the moral world are the great provinces of *beauty*; and its empire extends alike over the worlds of mind and matter. If called upon to define the emotion of beauty, we confess ourselves unable to do it. We only know we have the original susceptibility,—that the emotion is excited by certain objects invariably; and that the mind is so constituted that the result cannot be otherwise.

Beauty, in strict propriety, is not an attribute of the object viewed—it is not a positive entity, which may exist externally to the mind contemplating it. Still, it can only exist in the mind, in relation to some object extrinsic to the mind; and all its emotions will be found connected with the phenomena of mind, having to do with objects existing without the mind.

Beauty in general seems to be but a secondary *relative* property of objects contemplated. It cannot be viewed as a *primary* property of objects, because unconnected with the percipient, or perceiving mind ; the bare assumption of its existence is a manifest absurdity.

That emotions of beauty depend much upon association, or the principle of suggestion, no one can doubt ; but we are not prepared to give association as their only origin ; at least, in the sense in which the term is technically used in mental science. For there is evidently, in relation to all matters of taste and beauty, a *native*, but greatly varied tact and sensibility belonging originally and properly to the mind of every individual.

No conceivable reason can be assigned for the assumed beauty of any object, except that it *appears so* to the mind perceiving and contemplating it. Beauty, therefore, is not exclusively inherent in the percipient or the object, but is mutually dependent upon both. We possess, it would appear, therefore, an original susceptibility of beauty—we are so constituted that objects about us, and presented to the mind's conception and contemplation, excite naturally and necessarily, emotions of this character ; and yet it is equally certain that the power of association, and the modifying effect of circumstances, often change the nature, and almost endlessly vary the effects and bearings of this class of our emotions. As it regards the various kinds of beauty, and the great diversity of corresponding emotions, we cannot consider them now ; and in our judgment, very little that has been written would throw any material light upon the subject. And to consider the connection of the question with the philosophy of mind, is all we have to do with it ; and to accomplish *this*, we have perhaps already said enough.

LECTURE XX.

SUBLIMITY AND LUDICROUSNESS.

THE constitution of our nature attaches us irresistibly to things great and elevated. Longinus says, "a sublime object or thought is that which sensibly affects and elevates the mind, even to transport." We are obliged to think there is no sublimity *a parte rei*, in the language of the schoolmen—that is, unchangeably residing in the objects exciting emotions of sublimity. Still, we doubt the philosophy which resolves all sublimity into association. A medium here, will perhaps be nearer the truth. Certain objects, whether physical, intellectual, or moral, are calculated to give birth to emotions of sublimity, viewed as mere abstractions—that is, as they separately and suddenly break upon the mind's view, independently of all trains of thought, and any associating process whatever. We may be unable to assign to original susceptibility and association their respective share in the process; and yet, we doubt not, the process involves the operation of both. And we would remark here, that we have been struck with the proneness of Mr. Payne to transfer the doctrine of association from our purely intellectual states to our emotions, when it certainly will not apply as a general law, without great limitation, and subject to many and frequent qualifying exceptions. Our emotions do not rise in train, like our thoughts, and cannot therefore be accounted for by the agency of the same laws. And hence, as we conceive, the error of Mr. Payne.

It is difficult to approach a definition of the *sublime*. Cer-

tain, distinctive traits in the emotions excited are always necessary to the character of sublimity; and *these* often arise so abruptly and spontaneously, we are inclined to think association has less to do with them than constitutional susceptibility.

It is unalterably fixed in our constitution to feel emotions of sublimity on witnessing the cataract, the lightning, the hurricane; and this too, independent of the law of association. It occurs to us, there is a natural division in our emotions of sublimity. The division is into *primary* and *secondary*. The *first* class are owing almost entirely to susceptibility—the *second* to association. The savage who has never heard of such phenomena, on witnessing the fire, the smoke, and the thunder of the volcano, has emotions of the former class. The pupil of science, who gazes on the expanded vault of heaven from his observatory, is influenced by the latter.

There is a *third* class of emotions between those of beauty and sublimity, which, in our judgment, ought long since to have had a place in our philosophy. We mean those of *GRANDEUR*. When we see the crystal brook or rivulet, washing its pebbly bed, and laving its banks enamelled with flowers—now gilded by the light of the sun, and then shaded by the overhanging foliage, beneath which it winds and serpentine on its course, our feelings are those of *beauty*. When we see the same brook expanding into, and exhibiting the dimensions of a mighty river—separating kingdoms, and dividing opposing empires—its bosom loaded with commerce, and its banks adorned with fields, and studded with cities and villages, our feelings are those of *grandeur*. But when we see the river rolling on in majesty, until it is lost in the wild amplitude and illimitable extent of ocean, heaving and tossing in all the pride of unquestioned independence, dashing the thunder of its strength against its distant shores, or burying in its depths the rival navies of the world, in their contest for the mastery

of kingdoms, then the gradation is complete, and we find ourselves rapt and agitated with emotions of the *sublime*!

The above remarks will apply equally to works of art, and the moral sublime, or the sublime in morals. Instance the cottage, the mansion, the cathedral—the simple ballad, and the more grave and lofty song—and finally the grand choral anthem. Also, the ordinary virtues—self-denial, and heroic suffering, or magnanimous sacrifice. Thus the gradation is from the beautiful to the grand, and from the grand to the sublime. Dr. Brown does not, as Mr. Payne intimates, make the emotions of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, the same; except in some, perhaps many instances, in which they appear, as regular, progressive series or events, in the rising scale of emotion. He alleges, they shadow into each other, in the greater number of instances; but readily concedes that they are generally sufficiently *diverse* to admit of antithetic arrangement in philosophical discussion.

LUDICROUSNESS.

The emotions of *ludicrousness* require very little explanation. They are those of light ridicule or gay contempt. In composition, for example, in the department of taste and fancy, the merest excess or diminution, in disposing the circumstances and parts which would render a thought sublime, renders it ludicrous, by converting it into bombast or inanity. The emotion always involves surprise, and a kind of quick and playful delight. It is a perception of something unexpected and incongruous in its relations. For example, marked vanity or pretension, with nothing to support it but great stupidity, produces emotions of the ludicrous. Again, mean or overstrained images or illustrations, to sustain a writer or speaker, when the sublime is intended, reverses the effect aimed at, and gives rise to feelings of ludicrousness. Also, when a low, contemptible thought is rendered ridiculous by the mag-

nificent trappings of rhetoric, it gives to it a kind of incongruous piebald dignity, ludicrous in the extreme ; and so of other examples.

That all actions of a strictly moral character and bearing, are regarded by us with feelings of strong and sensible approval or condemnation, is known and admitted almost universally. These feelings or emotions are phenomena, belonging, constitutently, to our mental and moral conformation. Whether our moral judgments precede our emotions of approval or disapprobation, in relation to actions involving moral responsibility, or whether such judgments and emotions arise too nearly the same time to allow the claim of precedence to either—so simultaneously as to preclude the possibility of accurate distinction, are questions to which some philosophers have perhaps attached more importance than they really deserve. It is perhaps sufficient for us to know,—and this we cannot help knowing, that our feelings of moral admiration and abhorrence, are a part of our nature ; and that we cannot divest ourselves of them, under any circumstances. These judgments and emotions—for it is not always possible, and perhaps never important, to separate them, become the securities of virtue and happiness, and their avengers also. He who made us in goodness, and will judge us in mercy, has invested the bosom of every human being with moral susceptibilities and emotions, silent and invisible, but mighty and controlling—more powerful than the strength of nations, and more fearful and alarming than the array of a thousand gibbets !

An action in itself, separate from the agent acting, cannot be considered as the subject of merit or demerit. Action is only intelligible, as it is significant of mental and moral qualities, in an accountable agent.

If the question be asked—what is a moral action ? we can only say, it is a voluntary agent acting. The action cannot

be separated from the agent. A moral action is an agent viewed in given aspects and relations, and nothing more. And the emotions of conscience in reference to such actions, are nothing more than the felt relation of the deed, to the immutable principles of right and wrong.

All the moral principles intended for the government of the universe, and which give to right and wrong, vice and virtue, their permanent distinctions, arise and terminate in God. If it be said, that moral distinctions, and the obligations to virtue, are to be sought in our susceptibility of moral emotions,—in conscience, we answer, in a *secondary* sense, this is correct. Yet we ask, whence have we this moral susceptibility? We owe it to the Author of our being; and hence, the laws of conscience, unperturbed, and undeteriorated, become the laws of God; and a recurrence to first principles, sustains our position. The authority of moral distinctions belongs to God; and conscience has mainly to do with their development and influence. That ignorance and crime often derange the functions, and even subvert the reign of conscience, is admitted; and exceptions to the general rule laid down, may result from ignorance, interest, passion, and prejudice; but these are only exceptions, and rather prove than invalidate the general law. If the murderer, as he draws his reeking blade from the bosom of his victim, were asked to give the quotient of twelve divided by four, he might not, in the moment of intense excitement, be able to do it. But would this casual inability annul the power of numbers, or discredit the value of arithmetical calculation? And if not, why should a similar inability annul the force, and destroy the fitness of moral distinctions?

The inquiry may be started by some, whether it is possible for us to be vicious and criminal, when we act conscientiously, or from the dictates of conscience? To such a question, few will hesitate returning an affirmative answer. What we call

conscience *may*, and *ought* to be enlightened; and hence, is greatly under the control of the will. It may be strengthened, and thus rendered a more effective safeguard of virtue; or it may be weakened and obscured, and thus made to approve unworthy and vicious actions. This high and exalting principle, therefore, should receive our first attention. We should seek to have a *right conscience*; for we are accountable and guilty, for having a wrong conscience, in proportion to the means of information we have neglected and abused. Inquiries of this kind, however, belong to another division of our studies, and must not be taken up here. We are not now discussing the moral difference of actions, but only those feelings or emotions distinctive of them, and viewed merely as affections, states, or phenomena of the mind. Their importance and bearings, as principles of action, must be called up more particularly in another place, and at a different time.

LECTURE XXI.

LOVE, HATRED, AND SYMPATHY.

IN the passion or emotion of *love* there are several degrees and modifications. Such as the mere preference of *esteem* and *regard*; the warmer, and more impulsive glow of *friendship*; and the increased emotion—the fond, fixed feeling of *devoted attachment*. The difference of which we speak, relates not only to the *degree* of this affection of the mind, but also to *kind*. The diversity extends to its nature and aspect. The love of mere friendship, differs from that of the love of family; and this again, from the love of country, and our kind in general. Definitions in mental philosophy are of very little use. Facts and experience are our only guides; and to attempt definition, is only to refer ourselves back to our own consciousness for its correctness.

Love is a complex emotion. It involves assumed excellence in the object loved—kindly care, and the desire of good to the object, and vivid, heart-reaching delight, in the contemplation of it. And whenever the feeling is accompanied by a persuasion, settled and permanent, that our affection is justly and worthily bestowed, the emotion becomes here, high and exalting in its character.

Much speculation has been offered, as to the *philosophy* of *love*; especially, *why* we love its producing cause. Many philosophers, contending that love is purely *selfish*; and that we only love, because the emotion is a highly pleasurable one

This, however, is a libel on human nature and common sense. The pleasure felt is the *effect* of love, and how could it be its *cause* also? The truth of the case appears to be, that we love upon the perception, and *because* of qualities in the object, (connected with mind, disposition, and character,) which it is delightful to love, and impossible not to love.

The guardianship and beneficial results of this affection, in every organization of society, taking into view the accidents of individual fortune, and the destinies of nations, are of the utmost importance, and every way worthy our consideration. The amount of happiness everywhere produced by this affection is incalculable; and its implantation in our nature, is one of the strongest arguments in favor of the beneficence of the Creator.

HATRED.—It need hardly be stated, that the passion of *hatred* is the opposite of *love*. *It* also is a complex emotion; and it will be found that opposite, although somewhat analogous elements, enter into its existence. Hatred always implies an emotion of pain, and a desire, or thirst for injury to the object or cause producing the painful feeling.

The concession of some philosophers, that the malevolent affections are necessary and commendable in the present condition of the world, appears to us premature. That society and individuals should cherish a spirit of watchfulness, and even retribution, all must admit. But this does not argue the necessity of malevolence.

If *to love* is *to enjoy*, *to hate* is *to suffer*. And whenever we see two men mutually hating each other, he who hates the most inveterately is the greatest sufferer, and by consequence, the loser; while he who hates the least, decidedly occupies the vantage ground. The indignation and resentment occasioned by crime and worthlessness, are doubtless necessary to the welfare of the world; but we would not rank these among

the malevolent affections. These emotions are given us as the defence of happiness against injustice and outrage. And by this law of our nature, with very few exceptions, the united emotions of mankind are confederated against the vicious and the vagrant; and in the case of crime and moral meanness, of whatever kind, the burning scorn and judicial curse of society, even where the customary punishment and exposure of law are excluded, are unceasingly dreaded by the delinquent, amid the security of a thousand concealments! And thus we reach the conclusion, that all our emotions, unless abused and perverted, contribute respectively to the healthy vigor and conservation of the great framework of society.

S Y M P A T H Y

Sympathy, in common language, implies interest in the welfare of others; and is to be viewed in two very different aspects—an interest in their joy, or an interest in their sorrow. It is an emotion, under the impulse of which, the heart kindles with pleasure, at the sight of happiness, or sinks sorrowfully, on beholding a spectacle of wretchedness.

But the sympathy we feel on account of the happiness of others, is but one of the many forms of love. It resembles love, in that it is combined of delight, and benevolent wishes in relation to the object; and therefore, calls for no separate place in an analysis of the passions. Sympathy for sorrow, however, will require to be a little further considered; and in doing this, our *grateful* sympathies must necessarily be included. Whenever we clearly apprehend the condition of others, we have naturally a fellow-feeling, in relation to all their joys and sorrows. We naturally congratulate happiness, and turn to misery and suffering, with strong feelings of compassionate regard, mingled with the wish to afford relief: and

this, without any view to advantage gained by us, or loss sustained.

This sympathetic feeling extends even to the brute creation; and hence the inimitable mass of poetry, in describing the merely animal enjoyment and suffering in this division of sensitive existence. And it is remarkable, that our emotions of pity are stronger than those of congratulation; and hence, the wisdom of this arrangement, since immunity from suffering is necessary to enjoyment. Thus we see the stronger emotions directed to that which is most necessary.

All our affections and passions appear contagious. We not only rejoice with the happy, and sorrow with the distressed, but surprise and admiration in others, awaken similar feelings in ourselves. Fear excites fear,—laughter moves to laughter, without even knowing the cause—love begets love; and a display of the devout affections in those about us, disposes us to devotion. And hence, we see how directly the sympathetic emotions subserve the grand determination of all things to universal happiness.

Strictly considered, sympathetic sorrow is not a modification of love; at least, not always so. For we often sympathize with the wretchedness of those we *do* not, and *cannot* love. It implies a desire of good, to the object exciting it; but it is, at the same time, a painful emotion; and we find ourselves obliged to give it a separate name and place, in our classification of the emotions.

Without dwelling upon the power of sympathy to diffuse the joy of *one* among *many*, or divide among *many* the sorrow of *one*, we proceed to some additional views on this subject. We cannot think, with Mr. Payne, that the law of suggestion accounts for all the phenomena of sympathy; and we totally dissent from the selfishness of his system,—that we joy or suffer when others do, merely because we are reminded of our own former joys and sorrows, by subsequent examples

of enjoyment and suffering. We are inclined to think, we have implanted within us, an original susceptibility of the emotions of sympathy. And although suggestion may immediately give birth to some, yet the larger share, and these the most important, are merely modified, if influenced at all, by the law of association.

moral degradation. To be proud of distinction in what is merely frivolous, argues a mind little and worthless; almost beneath contempt. And the emotion of pride is only laudable, when assured that we excel in what is really excellent—in those things obviously commended by virtue, and approved by Heaven; and these things are always limited to the mind, the heart, and morals. No one is truly noble,—no one has a right to be proud, in the eye of wisdom, and the sight of Heaven, without having done something to improve himself, and increase the general sum of human happiness. Pride, viewed as a consciousness of our own superiority, degenerates, at once, into an unworthy and degrading passion, where we are anxious to have our superiority felt by others, without any reason for it, except our own peculiar feelings. This distinction is important; for there may be circumstances, under which it should be known, which do not involve any thing reprehensible;—as, when lawless vice is to be awed, turbulence subdued, or ignorance enlightened.

The examination of this subject requires great caution, to prevent misconception. Pride is a term, to which a comprehensive variety of meaning attaches, and in all its acceptations, with the single exception we have noticed, is as degrading to man, as it must be offensive to God. A prevalent inclination to discover superiority in ourselves, and compare it with the claims of others, with insulting disdain, must always be detestable; and we may say with Seneca, “to be proud of knowledge, is to be blind in the midst of light; to be proud of virtue, is to poison ourselves with the antidote; and to be proud of authority or greatness, is to make our rise our downfall.”

Humility appears to be a feeling of modesty and regret—an emotion of deference and sadness—the result of a conviction of inferiority and humble pretensions. Like pride, it is a comparative term, and the emotion is usually excited by com-

parison; with this difference—pride looks *down* for objects of comparison; humility looks *up*; pride tests its claims, with what is confessedly inferior; and humility, only with the higher and nobler forms of excellence; pride seeks something to scorn and tread upon; humility, something to admire and imitate; pride has its eye on earth; humility, on heaven; pride thinks of what has been done; humility, what might and ought to have been done, and may yet be accomplished; pride grovels with what has been attained; and humility looks anxiously to the possibilities of what may be attained; pride looks upon the smoke and dust about and beneath; but humility desecrates the lofty heights above;—the one looks on the frail and fallible samples of partial excellence; while the other gazes on the fountain of excellence, the very conception of which, is the highest effort the human mind can make; pride exults in having *distanced* what is behind; but humility glories in the brightness and vastness of what is before. It is in this way, Christianity is the religion of the *humble in heart*. It exhibits a higher excellence than was ever before exhibited to man; and thus, gives the most exalted and illustrious, their proper level in seeking its attainments.

LECTURE XXII.

PRIDE AND HUMILITY.

PRIDE appears to be a strong, vivid feeling, resulting from an idea of the advantages we may possess over others, as it relates to person, mind, or fortune. It always, and necessarily implies comparison, and can only be felt when we look upon an inferior; or, contemplate ourselves as occupying an elevation, in relation to those, between whom and ourselves, we institute some kind of contrast. It is an emotion attendant upon an assumption of self-excellence. This is the case, at least, when we consider pride as an immediate, single emotion. This feeling, however, *may*, and often *does* give rise to others intimately connected with it; but, still, somewhat variant from it. For example, we may be anxious to impress others with a sense of our superiority; and this may be done in very different ways. It may be done by bringing our advantages prominently into view, or by an attempt directly to expose the inferiority of others. In the *first* instance, it is *vanity*; in the *second*, it is *haughtiness*. These are the offspring—the result of pride, but not pride itself, as we have seen. Pride may exist, and we may cherish a self-superiority, without either vanity or haughtiness.

The excusableness, and in some instances, praiseworthiness of this emotion, depend upon contingencies. To be proud of what may have come into our possession, without any agency of ours, is, to say the least of it, weakness. To be proud of preëminence, in vicious and criminal attainments, is deep

LECTURE XXIII.

RETROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS

First, ANGER. *Anger* involves the conception of some object, or cause of former pain. It is a complex feeling, to which the conception of evil *as past*, is essential. It is an emotion of *single, instant* displeasure, arising from a conviction of injury done or intended, or perhaps, the omission of good offices, often amounting to positive injury, and usually succeeded by the *desire* of inflicting evil upon the person injuring us; but *this* is not an essential part of the emotion, but one of its most common results. The emotions may *coëxist*, but cannot be made, by correct analysis, to *coalesce*. Still, in considering the emotion of displeasure, and the resentment,—the succeeding desire of inflicting evil, it is not necessary to aim at any special separation of them, except as above; more especially, as it relates to their intellectual bearings.

Anger does not appear to be a *selfish* passion. At least, it is not always so. It seems to have been given us, for the purpose of exciting us to vigorous self-defence in emergencies; and also, to *interest* us in the defence of others, when injured or oppressed. And in this last instance, benevolence appears to be one of its elements.

It occurs to us, that the resentment, or perhaps more properly revenge, which usually at least, but too often, follows anger, is an emotion quite distinct from it; and according to the classification of our text-book, ought to rank among the

prospective emotions, as it plainly involves the desire of retaliation. We shall only notice it, however, in connection with anger. Man was formed for every state and condition of society; from the rude and irregular fellowships of the cave and forest, to the highest possible condition of civic and legal refinement. And yet, in no organization of society, can he feel himself perfectly secure from *injury* and *wrong*; and there are a thousand evils that can only be repelled or redressed by the emotions of anger and resentment; and these, therefore, when kept within proper limit, are allowable, and even praiseworthy. But for this resentment, which it is everywhere known and felt, will always be opposed to aggression of every kind, crimes and outrages in our world would be multiplied and aggravated, a thousand to one. Hence, this defence with which Heaven has armed the bosom of man, not only corrects evil and wrong, in their myriad forms, but prevents innumerable examples of them, which, but for our retributive emotions, would every day occur, transforming earth into hell. Without it, individuals and society could have no protection; and the demon of aggression would be let loose, to deface the fairest forms of social life. Of what avail would be means and resources, without the alert and ready vigor furnished by anger and resentments for their use? Who would dread, even a thunderbolt, in the hands of a coward, without *nerve* or arm to launch it? It is in these emotions then, we are to look for the strong protection of virtue and right. It is in this way, it often happens that the wrath of a single individual, by arousing and interesting that of a whole community or nation, in view of some flagrant outrages, becomes more terrible than the cool omnipotence of a thousand arms. The anger thus excited in others, by the injury sustained by one, is more properly styled *indignation*; and is, in part, sympathetic in its character.

Anger, like all our passions and emotions, becomes evil,

when abused or misdirected. It may be sudden and unreflecting, for example. It may be excessive, in its extent and intensity. It may be blind and violent, and thus fail to detect the real offender. It may continue too long, and thus, anger degenerates into *malice*. Hence, the passionate, the fretful, the peevish, and darkly malignant, found in almost every social scene. How to correct these evils, is well known to every one of you. When you are injured, then say with the French moralist, "This man, in injuring me, is unjust—I will not be so, by injuring him in return; he, therefore, will be weaker than I, for he has been guilty of crime.—I have not; and thus, I am already *avenged*." And we may rely upon it, the nearer we approach to this magnanimity, the more effectually shall we secure our own happiness from inquietude, as well as contribute to the peace and enjoyment of those about us.

LECTURE XXIV

GRATITUDE, REGRET, GLADNESS, REMORSE, AND SELF-APPROBATION.

GRATITUDE is a delightful emotion of love, to one who has conferred kindness upon us; and the feeling itself is no small part of the benefit conferred. Gratitude is, perhaps, the most amiable of all our emotions; and if we owed Heaven no other obligation, we ought to be thankful to the Creator for making the emotion of gratitude so delightful. Cicero says of gratitude, that "it is a branch of natural justice;" and such it unquestionably is. It is a vividly pleasurable emotion of affectionate regard, arising from the contemplation of kindness shown us; whether by benefits conferred, or good-will cherished. Any affectionate interest in our welfare awakens the emotion; and deserves the return it thus receives. The vivid charm of this generous emotion, spreads itself over all the modifications of our regard and love, and diffuses additional delight in all the varieties of social intercourse. We need scarcely add, that as an element of Christian devotion, it is one of the most sublime and disinterested of which our nature is susceptible; and that it distinguishes, in a preëminent manner, the worship and happiness of the heavenly hosts.

REGRET AND GLADNESS.

Regret differs from *melancholy*, in that it always has an object.—We know *what* we regret; and in like manner, *gladness* differs from *cheerfulness*. When glad, we usually know

what has *gladdened* us ; whereas, we are often melancholy and cheerful without knowing *why*.

The emotions of regret and gladness appear to call for *division*, in order to be properly understood. In the *retrospect* of the past, we feel regret or gladness, arising from occurrences of advantage or disadvantage to ourselves or others, without involving either virtue or moral blame. And *secondly*, these emotions are often *vividly felt* where *both* are involved ; and hence, an important distinction. *Regret*, in our judgment, appears to be little more than melancholy, combined with the conception of its cause ; as, *gladness* seems to be cheerfulness connected with the contemplation of whatever has excited it. And whether we view man as an isolated intelligence, or take into the account his social and sympathetic nature, these emotions invariably diversify his lot, and constitute, in part, the prevailing lights and shadows of human life—the sunshine or shade alternately gilding or glooming his scene of earthly trial !

REMORSE AND SELF-APPROBATION.

Whenever we render ourselves unworthy the esteem of man, or the approval of Heaven, we are so constituted, morally, that the most fearful moral regret arises ; and this vivid feeling of self-condemnation we denominate *remorse*. And, on the other hand, whenever we so act, as to be conscious that, but for ourselves, there would be at least a fraction less virtue and happiness in the world—when we know our lives and exertions increase the amount of both, we are sustained by the most cheering and delightful of all convictions—that of knowing we do not live unworthy the notice and regard of the Creator ; and may challenge the good-will and confidence of our kind. Such is the accorded delight of a good conscience, that the desire of it is universal : nor is it the less *sincerely*, because hopelessly coveted by the *vicious*.

And we may add, such is the covetable character—the infinitely desirable nature of this treasure, that could it, like many other commodities, be invaded and usurped, it would be plundered and secured, not only by the thief and the robber, but even the frivolous aspirant after trifles, and trappings, and courtly distinctions, would seek its attainment, so soon as he could school off his devotion from the ribbon and the button, the wand and the garter, by which his ambition must, it would seem, for a time, be limited.

This treasure, however, is safe from fraud and violence. It is a virtuous satisfaction, that can only be bought by the practice of virtue; or, sold by the commission of crime. But how true, as Cicero says, that “guilt requires neither torches nor furies in order to its torture.” All punishment is not reserved for the future. It may require the years of earth to consummate the atrocities of a life of vice and villany; or the useless indulgence and criminal inaction, which are too often the chosen lot of man; but the present is sadly, keenly imbittered by *remorse*. And what thousands take to be a life of pleasure, is *divided* between efforts to make it *such*, and those hours of guilty retrospection, when the unwelcome future darkens upon the gloomy gaze of the vicious and the wretched. And it is one of the most fearful lessons of remorse, that the *less* of it felt by the criminal here, the more *tremendously* will it aggravate the ultimate amount hereafter. With these remarks upon the *retrospective* emotions relating to others and ourselves, we shall proceed to examine the *prospective*, with which we shall finish our first and most difficult course in “Mental Science.”

LECTURE XXV.

PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.—DESIRES AND FEARS.

THIS class of emotions comprehends all our *desires* and *fears*, of whatever kind. Our *desires*, looking forward to what is good and pleasant, or fixing upon the prospect of being relieved from what is evil and disagreeable. Our *fears*, in like manner, dreading the evil and disagreeable, and apprehending the loss of what is pleasant and beneficial.

Objects externally the same, but *philosophically* different, in their bearings upon our hopes and fears, may give place to both these emotions; as, for example, we may *desire* a post of honor, and we may *fear* we shall not obtain it;—the external object is the same, producing the emotions of hope and fear, but the *philosophic causes* of desire and fear are very different.

Success is the proper object of desire, but *failure* that of fear; and hence, a material difference. Fear implies an emotion of pain; also, the conception of an object which we apprehend will be injurious to us, together with the vivid desire of avoiding such object, or, at least, its dreaded, injurious effects. It involves two essential elements—the apprehension of evil, and the wish or desire to avoid it, or turn it away.

Desire seems scarcely to admit of definition. It is, however, always consequent upon the conception of something as its object, and is invariably preceded by an emotion, however indefinite, of pleasure or pain. These appear to be its dis-

inctive elements; so far as the feeling admits of analysis. It implies the absence of an object loved or prized; and regret on account of such absence, created by an idea of the delight which would result from the possession of it.

We frequently have an original susceptibility of the emotions of desire and fear; and as it regards our desires, we may remark, they are variously graduated and modified, by the great diversity of objects to which they relate, as well as the peculiar circumstances under which they arise. Hence, our *wishes, hopes, expectations, and confidence*. It must be conceded, that relatively to the mind, the conceived desirableness of an object, is that which awakens desire, nor does it appear to us necessary, that this desirableness should be synonymous with what is essentially good; it is sufficient, that the mind craves and asks for it, as something that will minister to its gratification and enjoyment. The mind may only pronounce it good, because under all the circumstances, its possession is preferred to the want of it. We are prone to wish *that*, and often *do* desire it, which, in the attainment, will afford satisfaction; and this doubtless, too frequently, without any moral calculation, and when the object desired has not been duly measured and approved by conscience, as really, and essentially good. What we style desirableness in objects, therefore, is nothing more than the *tendency* of such objects, as conceived by us, to be followed by some particular feeling of satisfaction and enjoyment.

It has already been suggested, that the same objects, seen in different aspects and relations, may excite both our hopes and fears; for hope is nothing but a modification of desire, combined with a certain degree of probability, as to the attainment of its object. Every thing not essentially indifferent to us, may excite both hope and fear. We may desire the object, and yet, fear defeat as to its possession; and this, because of the *contrast* of circumstances and relations, in which the

object is viewed, relatively to ourselves; thus, giving rise to the *opposite* emotions of desire and fear. Our fears, therefore, cannot be more advantageously contemplated, than in *close analytical* connection with our desires.

It strikes us as correct, that the conception of something desirable in an object, must precede, by philosophical necessity, the emotion of desire. And this is as explicitly stated by Dr. Brown, as by Mr. Payne; and it occurs to us, the latter has attempted to get up a difference, where none of any importance exists. Dr. Brown states expressly, that what creates desire, is the conceived *desirableness* of the object, as regards ourselves, and its possession. And what more, we ask, does Mr. Payne contend for? Precisely nothing, so that in opposing Dr. Brown, he beats the air. There may be some ambiguity of expression in Dr. Brown, as there certainly is in Dr. Price; but, we believe, their meaning to be substantially correct. Mr. Payne even quoted Dr. Brown, as saying, that “to *desire*, it is essential that the *object* appear to us good.” Here then the conception of goodness in the object, necessarily precedes desire. Indeed, Dr. Brown elaborates the position throughout an entire lecture, and Mr. Payne must have had some difficulty in misunderstanding him. Dr. Brown affirms expressly, and we agree with him, that in all our desires, the attraction of the object chosen, is its conceived, *immediate desirableness*; and the instant desire of possession, is represented as the consequence, *directly*, of this conception. Mr. Payne has, therefore, throughout ten or twelve pages of our lesson, metaphysicated this matter to very little purpose. These remarks on our desires and fears, have perhaps illustrated both subjects—both these sets of emotions sufficiently; and the discussion relating to the *will* is deemed of sufficient importance to form a separate lesson; it will, at least, require more time than we can devote to it at present.

LECTURE XXVI.

THE WILL.

FEW subjects in the philosophy of mind and morals, are of more importance than the one now under notice, respecting the *will*, or the power of volition. And we are quite certain, it has not received the attention it deserves, in our present lesson; nor are we prepared to dispose of the question, with the *haste* and confidence evinced by Mr. Payne. We think it likely, that the great masters in this department of study, Locke, Reid and Stewart, have erred in their views on this subject; but we think it equally certain, that Dr. Brown and Mr. Payne have erred, in refusing to consider the question at all; except briefly to assume that *desire* and *will* are identical. It is probable we shall find the truth, about equidistant between the antipodal extremes of these dissentient philosophers. It is not perhaps so purely an *intellectual act*, as supposed by the former, nor yet so exclusively a *mere emotion*, as insisted upon by the latter; and hence, neither can be relied upon as entirely correct. Each party, in this controversy, has disclosed a part of the truth; but neither seems to have succeeded in presenting the whole. It is necessary, therefore, that we examine and decide for ourselves; so far as we feel at liberty to decide upon a question, so variously settled by the wise and good of all ages, who have engaged in the inquiry, and favored us with their opinions.

We find ourselves compelled, after paying all the attention to this subject we have been able to render, to rank the power

of *choice* among the original, and most important of our intellectual and moral susceptibilities. If philosophers are disposed to speak of this original power, as a *general susceptibility*, we have no objection; for this, at last, is the only kind of susceptibility belonging to the mind, which is an absolute unity, exerting general power; and when we speak of different susceptibilities, the numerical diversity is in *language* only; and our strict philosophical meaning is, that the mind exerts and develops itself in infinitely various ways.

I would define the *will* to be the *intellectual power* of exercising *choice*. *Desire* is not power, but a mere exercise of it; and hence, it does not occur to us, that *will* and *desire* are identical. It may be said, perhaps, that the *desires* and volitions of mind, are *somewhat* identical; but *volitions* are only specific acts of the mind, in exerting the power of *choice*. They are, in part, the *effects* of this power, and not the *power itself*. And as it regards the identity of *desire* and *volition*, we might, perhaps, with equal propriety, say, that volition is synonymous with judgment, purpose, and resolve; for *desire* seems to resemble *volition* less than either. It will not do to say, that the susceptibility of desire and volition, is the same; for this is only saying, that the mind is capable of the one and the other. We assume that *volition* is an act of the mind, specifically different from *desire*, viewed as an act. Desire, we admit, is an element of every act or feeling of volition; yet, volition implies something more: desire is not volition, unless accompanied with resolve; and this implies, thirdly, a conviction or persuasion, that the end proposed is practicable, and that the object of volition, may be accomplished.

Again, the power of choice, supposes the mind to be occupied about more objects than one, and between which the mind is busied in selecting; and an act of volition, is the selection of *one*, in preference to the *other*, or the *rest*, if more than two are present to the mind. Now, desire, we conceive,

sensation is unavoidable, so all our desires and volitions are equally so. We will not say of this, what Mr. Payne intends for Dr. Reid—*Credit Judaeus Apella!* for it might be told to a Jew, without his believing one word of it; but we will say, that in our judgment, it is a beggarly species of philosophizing. Mr. Payne admits, in so many words, that our desires and volitions are modified, as good and bad, by the moral condition of the individual. And is not man, we ask, to be held accountable for the *vice* or *virtue* of his character?

If man do not possess the power of choice and self-determination, with regard to his actions, then, the voluntariness—the spontaneity of human actions is at an end; and with it ends our accountableness; and virtue and vice, so called, are as indifferent, viewed as moral developments, as would be the action of smelling Mr. Payne's favorite rose. In all this, we are obliged to think Mr. Payne sadly at fault. Granting that our volitions arise from the moral influence of motives, in the light of antecedence and sequence, or cause and effect; yet, it is evidently so as not to lay any constraint upon moral liberty. Wherein do *these very motives* arise? They are not foreign to the mind. The mind alone can furnish them; and they are as strictly a part of our mental furniture, as the volitions themselves. And can one part of our mental states or emotions, enslave the rest? Can the mind in one state, deprive itself of liberty in another? Motives may be external, as to the *occasion* of their suggestion; but, after all, a motive is the *mind* in a particular state. There are—there *can be*, then, no motives, but the natural impulses of our own intellectual economy; and it is the mind itself that gives *impulse* and *effectiveness* to all our motives. Thus, the mind furnishes the motive—*volition* is coincident with the motive; and hence, the *will* is the final judgment of the mind, in view of its own arguments and reasoning, on any given topic connected with immediate action. It follows, therefore, that the power of

choice—the self-determining independence of the mind—is not affected by the *continuous succession* of *motive*, *volition*, and *action*.

The view of the subject we have taken, is a very limited one; and some additional thoughts may vary the general aspect of the question, so as to throw some further light upon it. Volition appears to be, an ultimate determination of the mind, resulting, not so directly perhaps, from its previous desires and affections, as from a kind of intuitive survey of the previous acts of consciousness, by which it has been occupied. It is a kind of summing up, however promptly, and a preparation for action,—rapid and decisive, it may be, as any the veriest act of intuition. It holds generally, however, that to *will*, implies deliberation—an examination of the mental premises, beyond any thing implied in simple desire. A certain desire or affection is felt; and we then ask ourselves, whether the desire shall be gratified? Whether the affection shall be exercised or indulged? Reasons, perhaps, present themselves for and against the gratification. These are weighed by the mind, and there is, usually, the superinduction of a new class of moral agents, called motives or principles of action, of which mind is the only seat, as well as the sole judge; and its decision thus made up, in every instance, is an act of volition. And this power of self-determination, of which all are conscious, we denominate the *will*.

A single view of this subject will, it occurs to us, place it in a clear and irresistible light. We resolve upon a given course of action for years, say for life, but if the will be nothing more than our fluctuating desires and affections, and man the perpetual slave of their ever-shifting, never-settled caprice, it is folly to dream of continuity of uniform action; for if man be incapable of self-determination, from time to time, he must, inevitably, be led in a thousand directions, by the ever-variable, and aimless impulses and affections of which

implies no such process; and hence, we think it farfetched, if not absurd, to contend for the philosophical identity of *will* and *desire*. If we must concede essential sameness in the case of *desire* and *will*, on the score of *original* power—and to this, we do not object, the same is true as to judgment and determination; and nothing appears to be gained by assumption on the one hand, or lost by concession on the other. While, to us, it is entirely clear, that, as intellectual states or emotions, they differ sufficiently in their developments, to be intelligibly distinguished, the one from the other.

The verb *to will*, certainly means something different from—more than the verb *to desire*. We will not say, that *will* and *desire* are ever directly *opposed* to each other; but that they often *coëxist* in the mind; and are relatively opposed to each other, admits, we think, of very little doubt. May not man, for example, *desire* to act, when he cannot *will* to do so, for want of power? A man remote from home, may sigh for its comforts, and intensely *desire* ability to *fly* to the bosom of his family; but he cannot *fly*, and he *wills* to *walk* there. The crew of a vessel, on first heaving in sight of the lofty peak of Chimborazo, might, with one consent, *desire* to *sail* to it, and on the spot examine its majestic proportions, but resolving on such a sight, they *will* to *climb* its rugged and dangerous steeps.

The differential shades, therefore, are very material, when we minutely examine the nature of *will* and *desire*. Mr. Payne is so obscure—so provokingly unintelligible—as to the effect of his doctrines upon the free agency of man, we find it difficult to learn what he thought on the subject; or whether he ever thought any thing. If we understand Mr. Payne's language, he intends to convey the idea, that man is not accountable for *any* of his desires or volitions, any more than he is responsible for his sensations; and here, for the *hundred and first* time, Mr. Payne gives “a rose to smell,” and, as the

he is, from necessity, the creature, owing to the unalterable condition of humanity. If this be so, man is the victim of preordered, or fortuitous results—the mere plaything of destiny; and *to will*, is merely to wait and see *what will* move us next, and *in what direction*. To resolve on virtuous or against vicious action, is perfectly fatuous, and we can never know, until they transpire, what desires and affections may arise, to lead us captive, and make us act in contravention of our original purposes. I have no rational evidence, assuming the continuance of life and health, that I shall conclude the present lecture; and have no reason to think you will keep your seats until it is finished. All is as unsettled, as the sensitive impulses, and the conceptual ephemera of life. In order to moral action, therefore, and moral responsibility, man must possess, in the only intelligible sense of the terms, the power of ultimate choice and self-determination.

den us, or *denied* to our pursuit. "Pleasure," thus understood, "is naught but virtue's gayer name." To be *gloomy*, *morose*, and *discontented*, is no part of the duty we owe Heaven; and no evidence of qualification for its enjoyment. Not to relish and enjoy the thousand sources and forms of innocent pleasure about us, is ingratitude to Him who gave them, and rebellion offered to the benevolence which prompted their provision. The desire of *action*, is equally remarkable in our mental constitution. Man was obviously formed for action; and without it, is miserable. Owing to this love of action, occupation renders man comparatively happy. Without action, he can enjoy, at best, but a languishing kind of felicity. He soon becomes weary of indolent luxury, and tires amid the most magnificent ease. Occupation calls off his attention from a thousand inquietudes, and vexatious cares, which, otherwise, would engross him to despondency, and prevent his contributing his allotted share, either in promoting his *own* happiness, or that of others. As action, therefore, is essential to the contentment of our being, the desire of it is a beneficent provision.

THE LOVE OF SOCIETY.

The love of society is equally prevalent in the nature of man. Formed for this purpose, and designed by Heaven to live in society, man is attached to society, not barely by his wants, and kindred ties of dependence, but by his *natural*, social instincts and desires. His love of society is not the result of calculation;—is not created by a conviction of convenience and interest, but arises out of his mental and moral constitution, as a social being—a member of the great family of man. The principle of social union exists, not cold and powerless, but strong and vivid, in every bosom; and all exceptions to this rule, are monstrous and unnatural. Man is

the offspring of social ties ; and had he been created without kindred sympathies, this single circumstance would have been proof, that Heaven had not made him in mercy, and did not intend his happiness. Man, therefore, instinctively sighs for communion with man ; and to this, he is predetermined by the constitution of his nature. No probation of involuntary, or chosen solitude, can deprive him of his social predilections, and however high he may rise in virtue, or however low he may sink in crime, virtue still loves to consort with virtue, and crime to congregate with crime.

THE DESIRE OF KNOWLEDGE.

The desire of knowledge is equally natural and predominant. We were created to *know*. Without knowledge, we could not exist. Nature has given us a desire of knowledge, that nothing can abate or destroy. We are so constituted, that knowledge is not only necessary, but delightful ; it is not less essential to our pleasure, than to our being—and this irrepressible desire for knowledge, is without limit. It extends to all that *may be known*, and not only embraces the *facts* and *verities* of universal nature, but goes beyond in search of all the *fictions* and *possibilities* of fancy and imagination. And thus, in conforming to the benevolent designs of our creation, we gratify one of the strongest, and most salutary passions of our nature. And how *vast* are the stores of useful knowledge, acquired from the impulse of this desire ! We are in the habit of considering the great common mass of mankind as *extremely ignorant* ; and yet, what a comprehensive stock of valuable truths and productive information, is found with these classes. Rousseau proposes dividing the great aggregate of human sciences, into two portions—the one confined to the wise and learned ;—the other, such as is common to the undistinguished crowd ; and we utter no paradox, when with him, we agree, that the former bears no comparison to the latter.

LECTURE XXVII.

PARTICULAR DESIRES.

AMONG the different modes of our *prospective* emotions, we may rank the *love* or *desire* of existence in *perpetuity*, without any reference whatever, to the hopes or expectations of our being. This desire is *natural*, and with very few exceptions, *universal*. We consider existence, in itself, a blessing; and cling to it accordingly. But we cherish it with a much more vigorous pertinacity, in connection with the delightful illusion of hope and anticipations, gilding as they do, the limited futurity, which even the uncertainty of life, allows us to look forward to. The very precariousness of life, seems to attach us to existence, and the danger of its loss, becomes a *tie* of endearment. This love of life evidently answers many valuable purposes, connected with our physical and moral constitution—the enjoyments of this life, and the hopes of a better. This love of existence, so far from being unworthy and reprehensible, is highly commendable; except, when it degenerates *into*, or springs *from* a cowardly fear of its loss, in instances, and under circumstances, when virtue requires the sacrifice. In all *such* cases, the truly good and noble, will part with a life they never ceased to love, with a firmness and resignation, becoming their principles and their destiny.

THE LOVE OF PLEASURE.

As it regards the *love of pleasure*, we would remark, that no pleasure, not inconsistent with moral excellence, is forbid-

LOVE OF POWER.

Nature seems to have invested the bosom of every human being with the *love of power*; and while the desire of superiority is restricted, in its aspirings, to virtue and right, this ambition, by which we are all visited, is far from being hurtful or unsalutary. The developments of this emotion or passion, belong to every part of our history, from childhood to age and decrepitude. We are naturally fond of influence, and of attracting others within its circle. And this desire is equally incidental to every condition of life; and is found alike, originally, in the abject slave, and the triumphant subjugator of nations.

Upon the abuse of power, it is not necessary to dwell. Our only concern is, with the *desire* of it, as a part of our mental physiology. And its existence, as assumed, can be doubted by no one. It is found in the contests of the stripling, the boxer, the pugilist, the sportsman, the gamester, and in the graver struggles of the statesman, the philosopher, and the hero. And the Divine wisdom is vindicated, in the gift of this constitutional desire, in view of the large amount of good it secures, and the sum of delightful enjoyment it actually confers.

LOVE OF ESTEEM.

We are so constituted, that the *esteem* of others, and especially, those we love, and in whom we confide, is greatly necessary to our happiness. And hence, the implanted *desire* of such esteem has become, with us all, a kind of moral necessity—a want of the heart;—and were it impossible to be gratified, in this respect, nature would have been cruel, at least, in *one* of her gifts. It is the never-failing reaction of kindness on kindness, that transforms ordinary *respect* into *regard*, and warm esteem into the *glow* of affectionate devo-

tion. Such is our mental, and moral structure, that we instinctively, and impulsively cherish the welfare of those who command our esteem; and their misfortunes and sorrows are, in some sense, made our *own*. But if conscious, under such circumstances, of no reciprocity of endearing regard, how much *less* valuable would be the boon of life! How suddenly and certainly would it transform our *social* existence into a scene of the most desolate loneliness! The desire, therefore, which leads to the estimate we place upon the affection of others, was given to us for the most important purpose.

LOVE OF GLORY.

The desire of *glory*, distinction, or superior excellence, of whatever kind, is so nearly allied to some of our desires already noticed, that a very brief notice of it here, will be sufficient. The emotion of which we are now speaking, is strictly, the feeling of *emulation*; and may be made subservient to the most valuable purposes, connected with the duties and dignities of life; provided it be not misunderstood or abused. This principle bears no relation to *envy*, of which malevolence is the most essential element. Both, to be sure, may aim at the same results, finally—distinction and superiority; but emulation implies resort to no unallowable means, to accomplish its ends; while envy seeks the injury of another, as the means of self-aggrandizement.

It differs, also, from jealousy, which is generally understood, as according, and wishing evil to rising merit, or the promise of future eminence. The desire of just,—of merited glory, is simply a wish to excel; and by this comparative excellence, to have accorded to us, contemporary, and posthumous distinction, as the benefactors of our kind; and thus, as it were, to disdain all locality, and live among the families, and spread out along the nations of the earth, as worthy of the admiration and imitation of our fellows. So understood, and thus

defined, emulation becomes an effective auxiliary of the highest virtue. After all—it is much better to *deserve* distinction, without having it, than to have it, without deserving it. Seneca remarks, with great force, “*He feels, indeed, the heaviness of death, who known too well to all the world, dies unknown to himself.*”

Lectures
ON
MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY,
ADOPTING
PALEY'S "PHILOSOPHY"
AS A TEXT-BOOK.

(175)

Lectures on Moral and Political Philosophy.

LECTURE I.

MORAL OBLIGATION.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY is the science which teaches the nature of moral obligation; and the grounds and reasons in view of which it is enforced.

Without some knowledge of the proper principles and motives of action, we shall always be liable, even with the best intentions, to be led astray, and adopt a course of conduct injurious to ourselves, and hurtful to others. The rules and laws, comprehensively considered, furnished by moral philosophy for the regulation of human conduct, are, the leading truths and maxims of natural and revealed religion; technically denominated by Paley, but with doubtful accuracy,—“the law of honor, the law of the land, and the Scriptures.” The latter, as a rule of conduct, is admitted in every Christian country; and especially in every literary institution, based upon the interests of the Christian revelation. The *law of honor* is purely a conventional arrangement between man and man; and must, therefore, always depend upon unknown contingencies; and hence, can never be relied upon as a rule of action, except when accredited by other admitted principles of conduct. And the *law of the land*, is liable, in many instances, to the same objection, when its requirements plainly contravene the superior, paramount dictates of nature

and revelation. When this is not the case, however, the obligations of civil law are morally binding on the subjects of every country. That the law of *honor* is unworthy of confidence, is deduced, irresistibly, from the fact, that it gives license and sanction to every species of crime, even the most debased, when it does not interfere with the few unimportant items which constitute its form and essence. The law of *honor* is the law of a club; and all crimes not committed against this conventional knot of exclusives, are deemed consistent with its code. This law, therefore, has no foundation in nature or revelation, and the light of the one, and the doctrines and duties of the other, supersede it altogether.

The *law of every land* must necessarily be defective, because it can only extend to duties which may become the objects of compulsion. All voluntary duty is beyond its reach, and denies its cognizance. And beside, there are innumerable offences impossible to be anticipated by any civil code, and that elude the most diffuse of our statute-books. Hence it is, that infinite wisdom, prompted by infinite goodness, in the supply of human want, has furnished us with a summary, comprehensive declaration of the Divine will as the rule of our conduct.

Revelation does not propose the removal of every doubt, the solution of every difficulty, and the settlement of every question of casuistry, that may arise in the wide range of morals and practice; but it has by general rules, comprehensive maxims, detailed facts, and apposite illustrations, placed a thorough knowledge of duty within the reach of every inquirer; and this knowledge is all that is necessary to the happiness of man, so far as information is concerned; and his character is to receive its color from his understanding. That *revelation* does not supersede, or contravene the law of nature, or natural religion, is at once evident from the well-known fact, that all its preceptive parts, and ethical allusions and

inculcations, except such as are peculiar to the system of redemption, proceed upon the supposition, that we already know, and are familiar with the nature of the duties enforced. Christianity, therefore, is to be viewed, as a more perfect revelation of the same system of moral relations; including, also, a history of man's redemption, and the peculiar, and hitherto unknown obligations arising from its disclosures.

Those truths of which we are irresistibly persuaded, and those convictions of right and wrong, of which we cannot divest ourselves, strongly indicate the existence of a principle in the bosom of man, mysteriously interwoven with his moral constitution, which appropriately receives the denomination of *moral sense*.

The idea that we have derived our being from God—were created in his image, and hold distinguishing rank in the scale of his intelligent creation—that his mind and will are the standard of truth and right—that all moral wrong is a want of conformity to the indications of his mind and will—that we are punishable for the want of such conformity; and yet, that no bias, in the light of conviction, inclining us to such conformity,—no moral feeling in favor of the claims of right, has been given to our mental and moral frame, until derived from adventitious circumstances, and extrinsic excitement, is certainly *strange*, if not preposterous.

How far this moral sense is strictly intuitive and constitutional, in virtue of our mental and moral conformation, it is certainly impossible to say. Where this natural, involuntary bias in favor of truth and right, terminates, and the influence of habit, example, and kindred causes, commences, it is perhaps impossible to determine; but that this conviction of right and wrong is natural and involuntary, and belongs, constitutionally, to the very frame and furniture of the human soul, is to us entirely clear. If we are to attribute this bias to habit, example, etc., how can we account for its strength and

universality, when we know that, in all ages and parts of the world, the overwhelming preponderance of habit, example, etc., has been of a character, to give human nature a directly different bias,—a predilection in favor of every thing vicious and worthless. Or, if truth authorized the concession, that the conventional virtues of universal society, led all men to imbibe the persuasion, how will we account for this universality of virtuous conviction and feeling; except by referring it to the common origin for which we contend,—a native sense of moral preference between right and wrong? The case of Caius Toranius, instanced by Paley from Valerius, and submitted to the decision of the Hanoverian boy, cannot be made a case of conscience at all, and therefore, throws no light on this subject. Conscience is not concerned with the conduct of others; and further, the boy could not understand the case; for the moral casuistry of the question, turns upon the supposition, that the relations of *father and son* are understood, which supposition is negatived in the case of the boy. And hence, the illustration loses all its point. But select a million of boys, in the ordinary circumstances of our common nature, over the face of the earth, and only name the outrage, & as to satisfy them that the father of Toranius had done nothing worthy of death, and nine hundred and ninety-nine thousand of them will tell you, that the son was a villain and a murderer; and that the poniard of the officer should have been plunged to the heart of the betrayer of his father. In like manner, every other instance produced by Paley, only goes to make up a list of exceptions to a general rule, which must obtrude itself upon the notice of every one familiar with the moral history of mankind.

Did the laws of Sparta for a time connive at theft, it was a question of state policy, tolerated in view of emergencies which called off the attention of the populace from the real motive of the deed; and was no proof of the moral instincts

of that brave, but impetuous people. Does the Indian delight in the sufferings of the victim at the stake, it is only when that victim has been, at least, the assumed violator of his rights,—the invader of his home and his hunting-grounds,—and the murderer of those he loved and cherished.

If, in some countries, it has been deemed laudable to put to death the aged and disabled, it was when the misjudging few influenced the multitude to believe, that age and decrepitude were a misfortune, and death a release from calamity. If nations are found in history, among whom suicide was heroism, it was a choice of evils,—when death was preferred to disgrace or continued suffering.

The practice of duelling had its origin in an age of darkness and barbarism; when it was absurdly believed, or at least taught, that the settlement of disputes by mortal combat, declared the will of God in favor of the fortunate party. And this unmanly—more than savage practice, owes its sanction and celebrity, in more modern times, to the sham provisions of the law of honor, falsely so called, and so of the rest.

This method of reasoning, therefore, does not disprove the existence of a principle in man, planted by God and nature, which tells him, though imperfectly, to a very great extent, what is *right* and what is *wrong*. We would not attempt to build any system upon this moral voice found in man, anterior to, and independent of instruction. It is not the province of moral science to separate it from the influence of association, habit, and example; or to estimate its value, apart from the more direct and immediate illumination, which has become, to all men, a distinct, and additional dispensation of mercy. Our only object is, to bring before you, in a summary way, what the developments of our moral constitution indicate, and our feelings strongly attest. Almost universal experience proves, and the Bible distinctly reveals, that in

matters of *right and wrong*, to an extent sufficient finally to acquit or condemn, we are a law to ourselves; and have the law of moral distinction for which we contend, written in our hearts by the finger of God. Thus the laws of conscience and intuition, the force of sympathetic association, and the special provisions of the gospel, unite in effecting the recovery of man to his original, heaven-intended dignity and happiness.

The term *happiness* is a comparative term, and applied to man in any of the various relations of life, is used relatively. No explanation, limiting its meaning, is necessary; as it would require an effort, on your part, to misunderstand its ordinary application, in which sense it is now used. A very slight examination will satisfy the inquirer, that a man may command a large portion of the reputed staples of enjoyment, and yet not be happy. He may, in the possession of so much that is considered essential to happiness, be deemed by others, possessed of the boon; although within himself is the consciousness of an oppressive share of unrest and discontent. A man may have health and competency, and yet not be happy. He may have a larger share of enjoyment, than disquiet and trouble, and yet be comparatively wretched. A man may indulge, in the ordinary pleasures of life and sense, and yet be miserable. He may occupy himself amid the stir and bustle of action and enterprise, and still be consumed with care and regret. Even exemption from pain and labor, may leave him the prey of many real, or imaginary evils; and continued indulgence of the latter, will always invest them with fearful reality. He may share station, elevation of rank, and what, in the deeming of his fellows, is styled greatness, and still know not what it is that makes a man happy. He may find himself involved and busied in rivalships for superiority, and competitions for distinction, which so often, and intensely engage the attention, and task the

The lawful and temperate exercise of the social affections will contribute largely to cheerfulness and enjoyment. All excess, however, will be found fatal. It blunts the sensibilities, exhausts the ardor, and deranges all the functions of our nature, and thus prevents the joint contribution of other elements, in making up the common stock of enjoyment which we call happiness. To these reflections and discriminations, others, well worthy your attention, might be added; such as the preservation of health, as far as it becomes a contingency depending on you, moderate buoyancy of feeling, or a healthy tone of mental temperament; and also temperance and equanimity in the indulgence of all the stronger and more vivid passions,—thus subjecting the whole inner and outer man, to the restraints of law and motive. But we only intended a sketch, and this will give you some idea of what moral science means, by asking your attention to human happiness.

V I R T U E .

This chapter is a mere homily, and as such, requires but little critical attention. All the definitions of virtue given, appear to be either defective or imperfect, except the general one which resolves virtue into the performance of the duties we owe the Creator, our fellow-creatures, and ourselves. This comprehensive survey, embracing all the possibilities of moral action, will always remain a standing definition of virtue. There are other aspects, however, in which this subject may be viewed, which will do more justice to the *philosophical* meaning of the term than the preceding view.

Virtue, philosophically considered, may be denominated *propriety of conduct*, resulting from rectitude of sentiment and feeling in relation to our moral and social obligations. It implies a fixed, permanent state of mind and feeling, in which

every power and passion is confined within its proper limits, without encroaching upon those of another; and thus operates its appropriate functions with its natural strength and vigor, unimpaired by the disorder of the other powers and passions.

Virtue is the proper government and direction of all the sentiments and affections of the human soul. Plato represents the human soul as a state or republic, with three distinct orders, or kinds of powers and susceptibilities. *First*, the presiding and determining—such as the understanding and will. *Second*, the more intellectual and manly passions—such as joy, grief, pride, and resentment. And *finally*, the inferior appetites and instincts of our nature, embracing the animal division of the human economy. And he makes virtue to consist in the proper regulation of the first class of powers, and the due subjection of the other two to the first. And this was certainly one of the golden dreams of Plato.

Virtue, in an enlarged sense, is to live conformably to those directions, given us by the God of nature, for the regulation of our conduct, and the foundation of character. We should always distinguish, between virtue as a quality of action, and virtue as a personal quality. It is in the latter sense we are now using it, and it is in this sense it is always used by moral science when viewed as an attribute of character. An action may be virtuous in itself, and yet be the deed of a vicious person.

Real virtue is a personal quality, and has about it a fixedness of principle—the permanency of habit. Finally, as the will of God is the rule of right, in the morality of natural and revealed religion, real, essential virtue, must consist in the resemblance, as far as possible, of the human soul,—the character and conduct of man, to the more distinguishing moral perfections of Deity.

It is impossible, in many instances, on the subject of morals, to separate the light of revelation from that of nature.

energies of mankind, and still find himself destitute of happiness. The present life, with man, is but the morn-
ing of being. It is a preliminary, imperfect state;—a state in which man, in order to happiness, has to forego and deny, as, well as seek and enjoy, many of the seeming elements of happiness. Happiness becomes, with him, a compound; and its composite means and elements are to be sought with prudence, care, and discernment.

Among these means and elements, a conscious, and cherished sense of dependence upon a superior, invisible Power, and the wise and complicated arrangements everywhere manifest in the administration of nature, will be found indispensable. Contentment with our lot, so far as it is beyond our ordering,—an adjustment of the mind and feelings to the doings and dispensations of Providence in our own case; and an abiding, ever-present purpose to turn life and its innumerable contingencies to the best account, will be found equally necessary. The disturbing effects resulting from vice and folly, and crime and excess, of every kind, must be deprecated and watched against with the utmost care, and the most resolute vigilance. Much will depend on your control and management of your physical temperament, and your mental habitudes.

Self-discipline is a step, without taking which, the hope of happiness is a dream. A cheerful conviction that you are living and occupying yourselves, conformably to the intentions of nature, and the designs of Heaven, will render it impossible that you should be wretched, under any circumstances. You may suffer and want, but the mind will assert its own integrity and independence, and the resources of happiness, to a great extent, will be found within you. Constant activity and occupation of body and mind, except by the occasional respite suggested by nature and duty, are every way essential to the fruition and regular play of the physical and mental powers.

They are often blended, and meet in a common focus. Hence, we must be guided by their mutual illumination. The will of God is the rule of human conduct, and conformity to this will is the measure of human virtue. God wills the happiness of his creatures, and hence, man is morally bound to promote this object, and to do nothing opposed to it. Would you ascertain the will of God, then, from the light of nature, you have only to inquire and learn the tendency of any action, or course of conduct, to increase or lessen the general happiness of his creation; and we scarcely need add, here, the coincidence of revelation with the obvious indications of nature on this subject. It seems settled, therefore, without any prolonged inquiry, that those actions calculated to promote the will of God, must be agreeable to him; and those tending to thwart and contravene his will, must become the object of his resentment and displeasure.

But in order to ascertain the force of any moral or religious obligation, we must proceed farther in this inquiry.

The light and indications of nature and providence, not only furnish strong presumptive proof of the existence and moral government of God, but also of a future state of existence, in which we look for the impartial distribution of rewards and punishments. And this is rendered certain by revelation.

Here, however, we must pause, and, for the present, assume the truth of Christianity, without attempting any formal proof of its Divine original; and should any one object to this course, it will remain for him to show that the motives and sanctions of virtue, are adequate, without the weighty considerations of future rewards and punishments. That virtue is adequately rewarded in this life, is what no one will contend for. That vice is distinctively and specially punished here, we are also obliged to negative. Hence, without prospective reference to the world to come, the motives and sanc-

practice of truth becomes a moral obligation, and is enforced by all the sanctions of morality and religion.

All actions are right that consult the universal interest of all concerned. And this must always imply conformity to the will of Heaven, and the governmental arrangements of nature. —If utility be understood to apply to the *direct, apparent, and conventional* wants and interests of men, it cannot be received as a rule of conduct. It would destroy the foundation, and utterly unhinge the whole order of society. Admit this maxim, without proper qualification, and a thousand things will appear useful and desirable, that are as palpably wrong in their nature as wrong can be. Hence, to adopt the doctrine of expedience, as a rule of right, is to involve the mind in doubt, and subject it to perpetual ambiguity of thought and feeling on the subject of morals. It would be to invert the order of nature, and the consecutive laws of revelation, by investing an *effect* with what properly belongs to its *cause*; and ascribing to conclusions, what, in morals, can only be predicated of data.

It is always expedient to do what is *right*, but it does not follow, that it is always *right* to do what may appear to us expedient. The law of expedience is an unsafe and dangerous rule of action. In a very remote, extended sense, to be sure, it may be true, but to make it admissible as a rule of action, requires on our part, a perfect knowledge of *all* the remote, and almost interminable consequences of action. This knowledge, with us, is impossible; and hence, we must have some other rule of right. And it is in view of our ignorance of the future, and the paucity of our information in relation to *final* consequences, that Heaven has expressly told us, we must not “do evil that good may come.” Indeed, we see no necessity for such a rule in morals. We cannot know the consequences of an action sufficiently well to judge of its

expedience, without a competent knowledge of the action, abstractly considered, to decide whether it is right or wrong in itself. We are inclined to think, therefore, that the rule is as superfluous, as it is unsafe and ambiguous. Paley may have thought that his mode of philosophizing, in this and similar instances, was *expedient*, because it would tax your ingenuity, and check largely upon your capacity and tact, to understand things not very intelligible or interesting at best; but does it follow from this, that his method, judging him by his own rule, is right, especially when we take into account the amount of time you lose in following his method, and the bare tithe of information you have been able to glean from the effort?

Self-love prompts every man, more or less, to consult his own convenience, in all the relations of life, and we need not receive the logic by which he persuades himself, that his convenience is his interest, and that it is always expedient to consult his interest, of which, in this process, he becomes the sole judge. So that, before expedience can become a safe law of action, a special revelation will be necessary to inform us, beyond dispute, what *is*, and what *is not* really expedient, in the final issue of things.

Admitting that the utility of any moral rule, constitutes the moral obligation of it, in some sense, yet this very utility depends solely and essentially upon the original will, and pre-existing laws of God, to which the whole administration of nature, so far as he is concerned, is strictly conformed. The utility of duty or action, therefore, owes its existence to the will of God; and this will, in the great system of moral cause and effect, becomes the standard of duty, and the only rule of action.

R I G H T

Right may be defined to be a claim consistent with the will and purposes of God, in his administration of nature, and

tions of virtue must be feeble and inefficacious. And thus, you perceive, moral obligation derives its force, not only from the authority of God, but from the hope of reward and the fear of punishment.

We feel obliged, then, to perform certain duties, and practice given virtues, because we are perfectly satisfied, from the light of nature, and the assurances of revelation, of the consistency of such duties and virtues with the will of God,—their direct tendency to promote the general good, and our own, individually, also; and because we shall be rewarded for pursuing such a course, and punished for the omission of it, or the adoption of a contrary one. The doctrine of motive, therefore, broadly considered, explains the nature of moral obligation. If you resist the motives to the performance of duty here, you decline the authority of the Creator, and waive all interest in his mercy; you contravene the general good, and lessen the sum of general happiness; you deface the image of God in yourselves, and the moral taint of your depravity extends to others; you put from you all hope of reward, and challenge the retributions of the future. In so far, therefore, as you reverence Heaven, regard the general good, love yourselves, and would not with suicidal madness murder your own happiness; in so far as you hope to be rewarded, or dread the remorse and ruin appended to crime; by how much these influence you, by so much you will feel obliged to consult the voice of duty, and heed the claims of moral obligation.

Moral obligation is a unit; and the principle of obedience, in our case, will account for the generation of all our moral sentiments on this subject. And hence, *finally*, you are strictly bound, and morally obliged to honor the truth, (among other moral duties,) in all your intercourse with those with whom you may have any communication. In this way, the

government of the moral world. On the reciprocity and co-existence of *right* and *obligation*, it is not necessary to enlarge. The proposition is intelligible to all. If I have a *right* to my life, liberty, and property, it imposes a negative obligation on you, and you have no right to deprive me of either. Moral science and natural theology concur with revelation in assuming the will of God and the consequent intentions of nature, as the basis of obligation, and the measure of right and wrong; and our knowledge of these principles leads us inductively to given conclusions; and these conclusions become legitimately, the admitted rules of claim and action by which we judge of right and wrong.

The rights of which we are now speaking, are to be understood of *personal* claims, distinguished from right as applied to action or conduct. To make this distinction palpable, it will be sufficient to say, a man has a right to cultivate his own understanding, and it is right he should so cultivate it.

When in the classification of rights, we speak of those that are *natural*, we mean a man's right to life, the common benefits of air, light, and water,—liberty and the produce of his labor. When we speak of acquired rights, as *adventitious* to nature, and conventional in their character, we mean those arising from the formation of society, and the stipulations of government and compacts, where right and claim are conceded on the one hand, and responsibility invested on the other. What right, for example, has one man, calling himself king, to rule a nation of men, sustaining to Heaven and earth the same relation he does, except concession on their part shall create a claim on his? A prince can only have subjects, rightfully, by the concession of equal claims with his own, on the part of the governed; and so of other instances.

Alienable rights are such as a man may part with by voluntary concession, or be deprived of by force or fraud. *Inalienable* rights are such as a man cannot justly concede, or

be rightfully deprived of in any way. *Property* will explain the *former*;—the owner may alienate it for value received or otherwise, and transfer his right to another. The *latter* may be illustrated by *life* and natural *liberty*. These are given him by the Creator. He holds them in virtue of the charter of his being; and he cannot lawfully destroy the one, or part with the other. While on the other hand, he who deprives man of the first is a murderer, and he who despoils him of the last is a tyrant.

Perfect and *imperfect* rights are confined to civil and moral relations. The *first* means rights, or rather claims that may be coerced by legal process; and the *second* means claims of merit, character, and other kindred rights, which preclude the idea of coercion. A *perfect* right is one that may be asserted without the consent of others. An *imperfect* right is one whose assertion implies the contingency of consent by the party appealed to. For example: in the *first* instance, you owe me a given amount, I have a right to payment, and can coerce it by course of law. *Secondly*, acting so as to deserve your good-will and esteem, I am fairly entitled to the expression of them, whenever you have occasion to speak of my claims, but I am furnished with no means to coerce that expression. The same reasoning will apply to obligations; some are limited and express, in their character; as “thou shalt not steal,”—the meaning of which can be obscured by no construction. Others are general and indeterminate; as “Walk before me, and be thou perfect,”—the obligation of which is left open to constructive interpretation. Obligations are said to be *imperfect*, when addressed to human motive and volition, and *only* accompanied by moral sanctions; and *perfect*, when their sanctions may be rendered compulsory. The *first* class is mainly founded in virtue and religion; and the *second* in civil authority.

The *general* rights of mankind are those possessed in com-

mon by all men ; such as a right to the fruits and productions of the earth, and control over the animal creation,—both inferable from nature, and specifically awarded by revelation ; but in the use of which, it is the concurrent voice of both, that we are to abstain from all excess and cruelty, in relation to the one and the other. And another fair inference from the doctrine of the *general* rights of mankind, is, that it is a violation of the intentions of nature, and an outrage upon the rights of others, to make *that* exclusive property, which was evidently intended to be possessed and used by mankind in common ; such as water in general, and all that is found in it, and the spontaneous, unappropriated growth and productions of the earth.

There are other *general* rights which belong to our common nature also ; such as those arising from immediate suffering, and danger or emergency.—A right denominated by *natural* law, the right of *extreme necessity*. For example, I may use or destroy your property, if it be necessary to save my own life. If I am found in a vessel about to sink, I may throw your goods overboard to prevent it. When your house is on fire, I have a right to destroy it to prevent further danger, if such danger be actually threatened. But in all such cases, restitution should be made, when we have it in our power, limiting the amount to the value of the property at the time of its jeopardy.

The right of self-defence will also rank among the *general* or common rights of mankind ; as it belongs alike to *all*, and *every man* possesses the undoubted right of resistance, when his life is in jeopardy, or his personal safety in any way endangered. The examination of this question, however, will be resumed when we take up the subject of *natural* law, and it is unnecessary to bestow further notice upon it here.

LECTURE II.

PROPERTY

MAN's natural state is one of indigence and want.—A state of necessary, relative dependence. His native force of constitution and vigor of temperament, cannot sustain him. He needs external succor; and aids, adventitious to his being, are called in to his support. It would seem, originally all men had an equal right to the common use of whatever earth produced, for the supply of their wants. But the increase of mankind, the multiplication of interests and wants, somewhat diverse in their character, and the conventional arrangements of society, gradually formed and perfected, led to a modification of original right with regard to the goods and productions of the earth; and hence it would appear, that the right of property had its immediate origin in the consent of society—of mankind, and that such an arrangement was necessary, in view of the general, as well as of private, individual good. It is in this way that many of the natural primitive rights of man are modified by voluntary stipulation, in the arbitrary formation and adventitious states of society—and among others, the right of property. The term *property*, as used in this connection, and generally in the philosophy of law, means literally and simply the right we have to the goods or things properly belonging to us—or the goods we hold by such right.

Man, by the constitution of his nature, cannot subsist (we give it as a general rule) without labor, industry, and calcula-

tion. It seemed natural, therefore, when the increase of mankind threw them together in large masses, that some conventional arrangement with regard to property, as the product of individual calculation and labor, should be established by common consent, and be thus invested with the authority and consequence of a *rule* or *law*.—And this for many and obvious reasons,—such as furnishing additional motives to industry and labor,—preventing conflicting claims between man and man, on the ground of priority of discovery or possession,—encouraging the invention and improvement of the arts of industry and ingenuity, so necessary to increase and secure the accommodations of life,—ministering to the convenience and comfort of living,—promoting the virtues of home, and the interests of domestic economy,—more adequately providing for the future,—gathering of the productions of nature without fear or haste in their proper season,—giving to each man a proper dividend of toil, and thus increasing by necessary cultivation and care, the aggregate produce of the earth,—giving locality to man,—attaching him to the soil, and cherishing the charms and interests of society and neighborhood associations, and so of the rest. That evils do, and always will attend the property system is entirely certain; but it appears equally plain, that much greater and more serious evils would attend a community of right to the productions of the earth and fruits of industry. As a choice of evils, therefore, it may better accord with the Divine will, and the claims of natural right, than a state of society without any such adventitious property arrangement.

The assumption, that it was the original design of Heaven, that the earth's produce should be applied to the wants of man, and subject to his use, will be denied by none; and we shall be obliged to assume further, that this intention of Heaven can only be fulfilled, so far as we can see, by the laws and distinctions of property; and these again, must be regu-

lated by the legislative provisions and legal adjudications of communities composed of the individual claimants of property. And in this way, the right of property, or ownership over the soil and productions of the earth, may be traceable to the original intentions of Deity.

But it may be available to all the purposes of this inquiry, to say, the right of property has its origin in the law of the community in which it is found. The history of property throws but little light upon this subject, and leaves us as much to conjecture as our own experience. That it early obtained in the history of the world, and has influenced the movements and interests of all civilized society ever since, is unquestionable; but how far it accords with the will of God, and original right, is a question of casuistry we shall not take it upon ourselves to settle, in any absolute form. The subject, however, will be resumed elsewhere in the course of our studies.

LECTURE III

PROMISES AND CONTRACTS.

OUR reasoning, at a former lesson, on the nature and obligation of *truth*, will apply, in the main, to the question of *promises*, now under notice. That we are under obligation, in general terms, to perform promises, is, we believe, a natural conviction of the human understanding,—an instinctive, irresistible persuasion of the human heart, in all the affairs and relations of life. When a man makes a promise within the limits of right and propriety, he feels morally bound to conform to it, even without regard to consequences. His not doing so, may injure no one; his doing so, may be of no service to himself;—still an indefinable dictate of propriety within—a moral voice whose promptings are always felt, assures him of self-approbation, should he keep his word, and of conscious wrong, should he omit to do it.

The obligation of promises is often, it is certain, modified by circumstances, and contingencies will often occur to destroy the obligation, in given instances, altogether; this does not affect the main proposition,—that man is morally bound, in all consistently practicable cases, to keep his word.—The abstract question of obligation remains unimpaired. The obligation, as felt by man in this case, arises from the strong discriminating impulses of moral sense, always shown in the discernment, and approval or reprobation of right and wrong. This native sense of moral propriety of action, is further confirmed, enlightened, and guided by reason and reflection, and effectively sanctioned by the laws of nature and the revelations of Heaven.

That self-love, self-esteem, pride of character, a sense of security, hope of advantage, facility of intercourse, and a conviction of general utility, largely contribute to strengthen and enforce the obligation, is too obvious to require proof; but still, the deep-seated feeling of duty now under review, owes its origin, primarily, to the more permanent and constitutional feelings of our nature.

In reference to the nature and fitness of moral relations generally, we need scarcely reävert to the fact, that promises may be made under circumstances which may forbid their fulfilment, or contingencies may arise, subsequently to the date of a promise, which may place the whole affair in a very different point of light, and thus annul the duty of compliance; but these are plainly exceptions to a general rule, the duty and importance of which, require no illustration.

It is unquestionably and irresistibly clear, that a man is bound to keep his word *as given*, and as he believes himself to be understood by the party to whom it is given, unless strong and convincing circumstances, of which he was not apprised when his word was pledged, should arise, which by changing the relation of things, will amount to indemnity in the event of defalcation. It is the business of moral science, however, to discuss the general laws of action, and not settle cases of conscience. No man can have association in good society, broadly and permanently, without deserving it; and fidelity in your intercourse with all with whom you have to do—a strict and high-minded regard for *truth*, in all the transactions of life, is a moral accomplishment, without which, no man is a safe friend, or a worthy associate. Those who study convertible terms, and ambiguity of style, in giving assurances by which others are influenced, and then play off, and waive fulfilment, by pleading malconstruction of language and meaning, will always be set down, and justly too, as cold-blooded deceivers, and practical liars, by the abused honor and out-

raged feeling of all those who have had the misfortune of suffering by their base dissimulation. Every point of light, therefore, in which we can view this subject, seems to furnish additional motive, why we should be punctual and unswerving in keeping our word, and in honoring the truth and the confidence of society in the fulfilment of our promises.

CONTRACTS.

What we have said in the preceding chapter, will apply to *contracts*, with very little qualification. A *contract* is a mutual agreement between parties; and the mutuality of the promise renders it reciprocally binding. The equity of contracts must always depend, more or less, upon circumstances, an enumeration of which, is next to impossible. An attempt to rid this subject of all difficulty, and make it, in its details, a plain question of morality, is impracticable, and little less than quibbling. The principles and considerations, however, by which we are to be governed in all contracts, are certain in their character, and easy of access. The ordinary laws of obligation and morality, regulating the intercourse of mankind, will be found applicable to the subject of contracts, without any very sensible variation, so far as the motives and effects of rectitude of action are involved.

The most striking aspect in which a contract presents itself, is that of a plain obligation, civil in its character, but subject to the control of moral motives, and often leading to moral results. The obligation of contracts, therefore, seems to be created by a confluence of reasons and motives. A man is *reasonably* bound, because the fitness of things dictates it. He is *authoritatively* bound, for nature and the ascertained laws of God require it. He is *justly* bound, (we except extreme possible cases,) for he voluntarily created the claim, and his veracity is pledged to meet it. In view of all which,

therefore, he is *morally* bound, because, as we have seen, it is right to do it, and wrong to omit or fail to do it; and in the event of failure, he is *ipso facto* criminal.

In addition to the preceding motives to fidelity in the observance of contracts, we may add, that all contracts, as voluntary transactions, are self-obligatory, and hence additionally binding on the score of principle and consistency. Justice and equity constitute, by right, the basis of contracts. Assume, for illustration, universal infidelity, in relation to the faith of contracts, and what would be the result? It would produce utter unhingement in all the relations, sympathies, and business of society; and we might again look for the cynic Diogenes, walking the streets of Athens with a lighted lantern at noon-day, in search of an honest man!

We do not consider that it belongs to moral science, to make this a legal or jurisprudential inquiry; and hence, we shall not follow Paley through his long list of cases and illustrations. We think the subject, as to every thing material, can be better understood without them, especially, as many of them are local, and would not apply to the forms of government, and constitution of society in this country. Universal consent among mankind, whether civilized or savage, has placed an estimate upon fidelity in contracts, which makes it a question of self-interest with all to conform to the terms and standard of this mercenary exchange, without any sense of honor or duty.

In contracts of sale and barter—an exchange of commodities for mutual convenience and advantage, whatever the one party has valid reason to expect, and this expectation has been created with the knowledge and consent of the other, becomes one of the terms, or in the light of a condition, a *part* of the contract. Whenever a commodity passes by sale from one owner to another, if the seller exaggerate its value,

it is a cheat; if he conceal its defects, it is a virtual fraud, always assuming the ignorance of the buyer.

In contracts relating to insurances and hazards, of whatever kind, all advantages taken without the privity and consent of the other party, and not resulting merely from superior sagacity and more practiced skill, are necessarily fraudulent in their nature and tendency.

In contracts relating to loans, where the same identical articles contracted for are to be returned, a general maxim is, that unavoidable accidents or contingencies injuring the property loaned, form no part of the contract. These changes unforeseen by the parties, could not be provided against, and occurring without any improper use or abuse by the borrower, the loss naturally devolves upon the owner.

In the case of money borrowed, it seems reasonable that the lender should be paid a reasonable amount for the use of his money, of which he is deprived during the loan, whether you call this compensation, interest, or usury. Exorbitant interest, or excessive usury, seems to be alone reprehended as criminal in the Scriptures. A man is as fairly entitled to pay for the use of his money, as for the use of his horse or coach.

We would suggest further as connected with this subject, that to our conception, it is alike repugnant to the laws of God and humanity, to imprison a debtor, when there is no evidence of fraud, or intentional malpractice. To deprive an honest man of personal liberty for no other crime but that of misfortune or poverty, is a species of despotic cruelty unworthy a civilized country, and shocking to the feelings of even a barbarian!

Contracts respecting labor and servitude, will be understood by all as binding the employer or master to good and equitable usage, and the laborer and servant to corresponding attention

to the interests of the man he serves, and the estate to which, for the time, he finds himself attached.

In contracts relating to partnership, offices, etc., it will be sufficient to insist upon the observance of the great law of equitable reciprocity of service and interest, without further minutiae.

LECTURE IV.

LYING, OATHS, AND WILLS.

BETWEEN actions and words, as to all moral purposes, in relation to truth and falsehood, the difference is not material. A man may tell the truth or practice falsehood by the one and the other. Both in morality and law, the use of language is always merged in action, as constituting it in part or in whole. Language, whenever it is used with determinate import, is a mode of action, and becomes an element of conduct. A man may deceive by either; and whenever he acts from *motive* to this effect, or with *intention* to deceive, he is guilty of the sin, and society will award him the shame of *lying*.

The distinction between lying and falsehood, is, in our judgment, too trivial to be noticed. A *lie* is a *falsehood*—a *falsehood* is a *lie*; and place them in opposition as you will, either will do for the text, and both will answer, convertibly, for the commentary. If it be alleged that there may be false statements, owing to ignorance, error, and other causes, without lying on the part of the person furnishing the statements, so also, all this may be done without the personal implication of falsehood. The statements may be incorrect—may be untrue, and yet the imputation of falsehood not lie against the author, where the act cannot be predicated of an *intention* to deceive. The *motive* to deceive seems necessary to authenticate the charge of lying, as a personal imputation. Falsehood is often a quality of the words or actions of a man who has no intention to deceive, and in such instances, we must

distinguish between the *quality* of the statement or action, and the real intention of the speaker, writer, or actor. Words or actions used with intent to deceive, or designed to make a false impression, finally, without correction, seem to constitute the essential nature of lying or falsehood.

All men equally have a universal right to expect the truth from one another in all the business and intercourse of life. Hence, every man is tacitly and fairly bound to conform to this reasonable expectation ; and he who fails to do so, is not only guilty of a breach of *trust*, but of *promise*. In the first instance, he violates his honor, in the second, falsifies his word, which to all fair and moral purposes, has been given to tell the truth. Lying by prevarication of manner or studied ambiguity of style, does not lessen the sin, or extenuate the shame and disgrace of this hateful practice. The jesuitical maxim, that the good of the Church indemnifies its members and ministers in the use of *pious frauds*—that is, lying and deceiving in the name of God, need only be mentioned, to be abhorred. It may be the only way in which a *villain* can serve God and the Church, but an *honest man* will never try it. A man who is capable of lying in small matters, press him by interest and temptation, and he will bear watching in greater ones.

In the case of fables, parables, good tales, etc., there seems to be no lying, as no false impression is made by their use. It is merely supposing a case to illustrate the real or possible events or interests of life, for the purposes of improvement. The obligation to veracity is enforced by self-interest, the welfare of society, the voice of nature, and the will and laws of Heaven.

OATHS.

An *oath* is a solemn affirmation, in which we appeal to God as a witness of the truth of what we say—imprecating his

vengeance, and renouncing his favor, if what we affirm be false, or what we promise, so far as may depend on us, be not performed.

The *forms* of oaths vary in different countries, as they have done in different ages of the world, and are of very little importance in this inquiry, beyond their proper meaning.

The Scriptures evidently distinguish between profane, common swearing, and a legal, judicial oath. They reprobate the former in a manner the most fearful and explicit, but evidently tolerate the latter. The few notices that are found on this subject in the Bible, seem to vindicate the authority and obligation of juridical oaths by the most fearful sanctions. Hence, a man who does not believe in the existence of God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, cannot take a juridical oath, nor be bound by one, in the sense in which such oaths are administered in every civilized country under heaven. For not believing in the sanctions of an oath, he cannot possibly feel its obligation. Should he swear truly, it is but telling the truth without the additional solemnity of an oath; and if falsely, his perjury is nothing but simple lying. The oath of such a man is good for nothing beyond his reputation for veracity. Such persons should not be excluded from our courts of justice, but their evidence cannot, consistently, be received, as *upon oath*. It should be received, collaterally, for what it is worth; as in the eye of English and American jurisprudence, it cannot be received as competent, independent testimony.

An oath contemplates the immediate presence and notice of Deity, and directly challenges the infliction of his vengeance in the event of infidelity to the nature and terms of the oath. Hence, an oath is intended to excite, and generally does inspire superior confidence to that created by a mere promise or pledge. If, then, a man do not believe the premises constituting the nature and bearing of an oath, he cannot be

benefited by the conclusion, and his oath is good for nothing beyond the known value of his word.

The state, in every instance, imposes the oath. The oath is, therefore, to be explained and understood in accordance with the usages of the tribunal before which it is administered. An oath, in evidence when a man is sworn *in chief* to make statements, binds him to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Should he either magnify or diminish, in relation to the facts, he is perjured, except that no man is bound to make a statement that would implicate himself, in a legal offence cognizable at law. If simply sworn to be inquired of, he is bound to answer questions truly. An oath of allegiance binds a man to support the constitution, and conform to the laws of his country, always assuming that the one is just, and the other equitable, to an extent that will justify such oath. All oaths administered by clubs and associations unknown in law, are of doubtful character, if at all admissible.

The remaining classes of oaths, noticed by Paley, do not apply to the interests of this country, and require no further comment. We may, however, as connected with this subject, and allied to the discussion respecting oaths, devote a moment's attention to the policy or practice of special subscription to articles of religion; as for example, the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. That such subscription means something more than a mere declaration of assent, which is always implied in becoming or being a member of the Church in question, is evident, from the speciality with which the practice has been gotten up, and continues to be attended to. If it be nothing more than a mere declaration of assent, why are the laity excluded, and the clergy only embraced? And why is non-subscription attended with penalties and privations? The act of Elizabeth 13 disfranchises every clergyman in the Establishment who does not swear his belief in all

and every part of the Thirty-nine Articles. The same is true in the Kirk of Scotland, and in many Roman Catholic countries; particularly in Spain, the Brazils, and the South American States. To us, the policy and propriety of such a measure, admit of serious doubt. It must be productive of much hypocrisy and insincerity; and emolument, in many instances, must furnish the *only* motive of subscription. It may answer, where the practice exists as a test of loyalty, or political fealty; but viewed as a *religious* act, its authority is too precarious and apocryphal to command our respect.

WILLS.

The right of a man to dispose of his property by *will*, which testamentary disposition is to be binding after his death, is partly of natural, and partly of adventitious origin; and we think his *natural* right greatly transcends, in weight and importance, the adventitious or acquired. His *natural* right to dispose of his personal property, the immediate and undoubted proceeds of his labor and industry, is not questioned. And we are further of opinion, that his *natural* right goes far to authorize the alienation and transfer by will, of his real, landed estate.

The earth originally belongs, by right, to all men. He, therefore, who has not a portion of it, is deprived of his *natural* right. And he who *has*, holds it not only in virtue of civil title, if he have such, but also in virtue of his own *natural* right, as one of the original claimants and proprietors of the soil, by a Divine and indefeasible grant. Has not the occupant and owner, therefore, a right to say to whom his estate shall descend; and more especially, when he directs its descent to his own family, or those nearest akin to him? To this rule there will always be exceptions. The *natural* heirs may be worthless—may be the enemies of the testator—may have sought to destroy his life to get his property. In all

such cases, we would say, the testator has a right to give his estate to those to whom he may feel the most obliged and indebted, or in whose welfare he may feel the deepest interest.

Assume, for example, that the father of Nero was living, and influenced by the feelings of a husband at the time *that* monster murdered his mother, who would expect—who would consent that Nero's father as a testator should make *him* the devisee of his estate? Suppose David had been about to dispose of his estate and kingdom by will at the time his son Absalom, as a murderer and traitor, was seeking the life and throne of his father, would any one be prepared to say that the *son* could naturally, and under such circumstances, come in as a rightful claimant? Or rather would it not be the conviction of all, that the son had disinherited himself by violating all the laws of nature; and that whatever might be the feelings of the father, it would be wrong to place the means of crime in the hands of one so evidently bent upon mischief and overthrow.

That a man may have a right to select an individual, or a number of them, by will, to succeed immediately to the want and use of his property, without equal right to dispose of it for millions of ages to come, is to us clear, from the fact that he can only have the necessary knowledge—the essential information to make a just transfer to his immediate successor or successors; and the want of such knowledge respecting the future, would bar his right in justice to any perpetual descent of his property by his direction. The right of entail, therefore, beyond the life of his immediate devisees, becomes a separate question entirely.

The right of wills, however, has, in most countries, been created by municipal law; and this fact is to be received as evidence that it has been the general conviction that man had some natural right to this effect. The *civil* right seems to be based upon, and is to be received as a modification of *natural* right.

We cannot conceive, further, that any slight informality in the testamentary instrument ought to invalidate the will of the testator. The law of wills obviously intends the descent of property agreeably to the wish of the testator; and where such wish is clearly in evidence, say by *two* witnesses, the want of a *third* should not invalidate the will; for this would be to array the law against itself, and make its administration contravene its intentions. The reason of the law should always govern in such cases, in order to secure the justice at which it aims. The object of the law in requiring *three* witnesses, was doubtless to secure competent testimony. This end is equally well secured, in many instances, by *two*, and where a *third* cannot be had, as might often happen, the will, on that account, should not be made void, as such invalidation would be to mock the intention of the law, and outrage the rights of the dead.

One word with regard to the morality of wills. The testator then is fairly bound, we conceive, in the first place, to provide for his just creditors, should he be in debt and able to pay. To enrich others by will at the expense of those to whom he is justly indebted, is to leave the world with fraud in his heart, and play the villain in his grave!

And finally, testamentary rights, as apparently dictated by nature, and secured by law, are productive of much good. It has a tendency, to some extent at least, to promote fidelity, and a sense of dependence among children and other claimants upon the bounty of proprietors. It incites to industry. It prevents unnecessary adventure and visionary speculation. It encourages marriage, and tends directly to the promotion of domestic enterprise, family confidence, and the relative virtues of home and fireside. On which account, it is best for every man possessing property, to fix its disposition by will, as a part of his preparation for death.

LECTURE V.

CHARITY. — SLAVERY.

WITHOUT being strictly guided by our text-book, we use the term *charity*, to denote becoming solicitude and efforts of whatever kind, to lessen the misery and promote the happiness of those whose condition in society is less eligible than our own. We use this term to denote general kindness and enlarged humanity, in relation to all those we have it in our power to assist or succor. We would not say our inferiors only, for it often happens that we have it in our power to do acts of kindness and beneficence to those who are greatly and decidedly our superiors, and in relation to whom, we have no advantage that is not purely local and adventitious, without reference to mind, worth or character.

As some classification, however, is necessary, we conform in part to Paley, and would remark, briefly, that in the case of domestics and dependents, we severally owe them a much larger amount of obligation than they do us. We are generally in arrears to them, and on many accounts greatly their debtors. As human beings—as members of the common family of man, we should treat them as equals; and should only consider them as inferiors and dependents in point of condition. We are, therefore, as much bound to respect their feelings and claims on the score of conscience, honor, propriety, and delicacy, as those of any other class with whom

we have to do. We are to abstain from the infliction of all unnecessary pain, and secure their comfort and pleasure, as far as we consistently can. We are especially bound to supply their reasonable wants, and secure to them as large a share of enjoyment, as their condition and our means will allow; and this should be done without harshness, ill-nature, or the upbraidings of dissatisfaction.

The foregoing remarks will apply to slaves, as well as to indentured, apprenticed, or hired servants or domestics. Writers on ethics and political law, have derived the right of slavery from either of several sources—crimes,—captivity,—or debt. We have some doubt whether the validity of the right can be made out consistently with the law of nature, in *any* of these cases, except as a concern of *state*, and viewed expressly in the light of punishment, and then, only with clear and sufficient right in the case of crimes. In the case of captivity and debt, we are compelled to doubt. If it be alleged that the right was expressly allowed the Jews, in relation to the seven Canaanitish nations, we reply—these nations, for their idolatry and moral degradation, were under the curse and ban of Heaven, and it is clear that the grant of slavery to the Jews, in case of captivity and debt, was a special grant given in view of the purpose of God to destroy these nations, and effect their extirpation altogether. And the other cases not covered by this general view of the subject, were evidently local and temporary arrangements, peculiar to the Jewish polity as a distinguishing and extraordinary constitution, and are, therefore, not to be received as an exposition of the law of nature.

Were we, therefore, to define slavery, we would say, it is—not an obligation justly founded in natural law, but a state of things, the result of misfortune and social degradation on the one hand, and oppressive claim on the other—creating com-

pulsion to labor for the benefit of the master without the consent or contract of the servant.

The right of slavery, as derived from the causes enumerated, will not apply, in any way, or to any extent, to the African slave-trade. Crimes, captivity, and debt, have nothing to do with the question. It can only be resolved into the needless avaricious cupidity of man, disowned by nature, disowned by Heaven, and negatived by all the laws of morality, and every feeling of humanity. It exists, at once, the curse and disgrace of every land and every nation, in which it has ever been tolerated. As a system, it originated in murder, plunder, and blood. It has been perpetuated by means equally detestable, and its probable catastrophe promises nothing more inviting. The system has already resulted in the murder of not less than two hundred and forty millions of human beings, beside the millions more, who, less fortunate than these, have only survived to be more wretched than they, in the service of those they are compelled to hate, in many instances, by a law of necessity, unalterable as the constitution of their being. Were a horde of the descendants of Ham from the banks of the Niger, or the Mountains of the Moon, to present themselves *here*, as thousands from this country have presented themselves *there*, and by the law of force, convey *us* to *that* country, *there* to wear out life in hated servitude, and hopeless captivity, we might perhaps reason more correctly on this subject. As it is, with these general remarks, we leave you to form your own opinions on this much-contested question of state policy. Our remarks have been confined to the slave-trade as a system, without entering into the merits and details of domestic slavery, as a consequence of this system.

As it respects professional charity, so called, it admits of no doubt, that the legislature—the magistracy—the medical and legal departments—the masters of education, and the Chris-

tian ministry, have it in their power to do much for the various classes of the needy and dependent; and where they fail to do it, they show themselves to be uninfluenced by the higher and nobler virtues of the human heart; and especially, destitute of Christian virtue. An unfeeling, withholding hard-heartedness, in relation to the poor and unfortunate, will deprive any man of the affection, and ought to withhold from him the confidence of society. Such a man, living for himself and to himself, ought always to be left to himself. Compassion for the destitute and wretched, is one of the original impulses of our nature; and its gift and implantation within us, indicate with sufficient clearness, the intention of Heaven on this subject.

The distress and want consequent upon the great inequality in the distribution of property, most plainly commend the poor and depressed to a share of the bounty of those who *have* to give. This plea for the relief of the indigent, is founded in the law of nature, and is definitively enforced by the Christian religion. Earth was intended for the sustentation and comfort of man. The original right of each man to such support is equal. When, therefore, in the providential dividend of the common stock, untoward circumstances have reduced to indigence, any member of the common family, it is plainly the duty of the *rest* to correct the evil. It is, as Homer says, "What the happy to the unhappy owe." Besides, it is reasonable to suppose that God, as the supreme and rightful proprietor of all, looks upon the fortunate, in relation to these claimants upon their beneficence, as the stewards and almoners of his bounty. Hence, the motive and duty to *give*, preclude all doubt, and must always influence the virtuous and well-disposed.

In selecting the objects of pecuniary bounty, no better guide can be given, perhaps, than to leave the choice of bene-

ficiaries, and charitable institutions and enterprises, to the good sense, tact, and discriminating sensibility of the human heart. Real want is entitled to succor, whatever may be the character or history of its cause. And real charity consists in the extension of such succor, whenever the appeal is founded in suffering, and while ever the power to do good remains with us, as one of the most cherished enjoyments of life.

LECTURE VI.

RESENTMENT, ANGER, AND REVENGE.

PALEY, on these related topics, forming the text of the present lesson, gives us less a philosophical, than a religious, scriptural view of the subject. Many of his reflections, however, are sensible and useful. Resentment, in a strictly philosophical sense, seems to be compounded of regret and displeasure—a union of sorrow and anger—an indefinable blending of mortified and indignant feeling. It is a consciousness of injury unjustly sustained, and hence, a natural feeling of regret. Also, a conviction of inconsideration and want of wisdom in the infliction of the injury; and hence, the rising impulse of displeasure. Unless the term *resentment* be used in an entirely bad sense, we are not prepared to see how *revenge* can constitute a part of it; nor do we believe the doctrine to be correct.

Resentment is unquestionably one of the original, involuntary susceptibilities of the human constitution; and in itself, therefore, when not indulged in to abuses—to an unlawful extent, cannot be sinful. I may resent an injury, so far as to assert my own claims, and vindicate myself against the injustice of an imputation or injury, without any disposition to inflict pain, or seek even the humiliation of the person who has wronged me. No revenge is implied, without perverting the meaning of the term, the strict philosophical import of which, is, a disposition to assert and vindicate injured right, without any implication of unlawful means in doing so. The

criminality of this passion, therefore, must always depend upon contingencies not essential to its being. As the passions of love, joy, and admiration, may become vicious by a perversion of their intended, legitimate range and fruition, so resentment is only sinful when subjected to similar perversion.

I would define *anger* to be a simple sensation of displeasure, without due reference to cause or consequences at the time. It also is one of the original susceptibilities of human nature, and in itself, cannot be sinful. The God of nature has given us the passions or susceptibilities of anger and resentment, for wise and beneficent purposes; and when properly controlled, they are, as already suggested, no more sinful than any of the original passions, such as love, joy, admiration, and grief. The idea of sinfulness, in relation to any of these passions, carries with it the implication of misdirection and abuse.

Again, these passions are misrepresented, when spoken of as always selfish,—relating to injuries received ourselves. They are as often excited by injuries received by *others* as by *our own* injuries. The emotion of displeasure is involuntary and irresistible, when I hear my friend unjustly abused. I instinctively resist the outrage, or denial of his rights. Hence, anger and resentment often concur, under proper discipline, with the best feelings of the heart, in doing good and preventing evil. The morality of the passions will always be found to depend upon their direction, moderation, and the uses to which they are subjected. If we indulge them, from unlawful or inadequate causes,—if this indulgence be excessive, or if it be continued too long, the whole process is sinful. But reverse the supposition, and there is nothing criminal.

Whatever is necessary to accomplish the designs, must be conformable to the will of Heaven. And as it is quite certain that the passions under notice were given for wise and benevolent purposes, they are, to a great extent, necessary to the defence and preservation of society in the present lapsed and

disordered state of man ; and they can only be considered vicious, when subject to a wrong impulse and maldirection.

Moralists seem for ages to have entered into a conspiracy to err on the subject of the passions. Some, like the Stoics, decry them altogether ; and others, like the Epicureans, make them the only instruments of good. These extremes must be avoided, as the Scylla and Charybdis of morals. There is a golden mean, and in its observance will be found the innocence and usefulness of the passions. Anger and resentment may be just and natural—may be the offspring of self-respect, and regard for others—may result from high-mindedness and magnanimity, and comport with candor and generosity. But all excess in their indulgence is unpleasant and revolting. A fretful tenacity—a bilious instability—a captious, splenetic feeling, that takes offence and fires at every thing, and often at nothing, will always render a man little and contemptible ; and when these feelings degenerate into hatred and revenge, and the malevolent subject of them begins to devise the means of retaliation, and pant for vengeance, then we can no longer withhold our unmingled reprobation ! With such feelings, nothing but depravity can sympathize.

Revenge is a disposition to inflict pain and evil, for a *real* or *supposed* injury, beyond just and lawful punishment. It seems to be an abuse—a perversion of the passions we have been considering, and not an original primary passion. It is a modification of anger, in which it degenerates into hate. It is resentment cherished until it ripens into cool, and calculating malevolence. It results from unrestrained anger and resentment, in mutiny against all the nobler passions of the soul. It belongs not to our nature properly, but to a corruption of it. It is disallowed by reason, and forbidden by revelation. It is as hurtful as it is detestable—as dishonorable to God, as it is disgraceful to man ; and ought only to be found in the bosom of a fiend.

While, therefore, the original susceptibilities of anger and resentment are not evil in themselves, they are capable of becoming so in their relations and bearings. But this sinful development of these passions depends upon our own agency, and is always avoidable. Hatred and revenge, however, whenever they contemplate the infliction of injury beyond the purposes of discipline and reformation, are decidedly criminal; and we know of no principle in human nature, or the moral government of God, on which it is possible to base their vindication.

LECTURE VII.

DUELLING.

OUR remarks, some time since, on the law of honor, compelled us to anticipate, to a great extent, the contents of this chapter. It was there shown that the law so called, in which the practice of duelling avowedly originates, has no foundation in nature, and is totally discountenanced by the whole system and analogy of morals. I know of but one single reason that can be offered as furnishing any thing like an excuse for this practice.—It is the inadequacy of the laws of most countries to secure and protect the rights of feeling and reputation. This evil ought certainly to be remedied, as far as possible; but yet it furnishes a very questionable pretext for resort to single, and deadly combat, for an adjustment of differences. All law decides that the redress demanded and sought by the duellist, is every way disproportionate to the offence. The offence is a question of character, and the reparation, to be at all consistent or apposite, should be of the same kind. Were we to apply the same description of redress to the correction of defective law in all cases, what would be the result? When law was found inadequate to the encouragement of industry, and the protection of property, the reason or rationale of the system of the duellist would lead to an appeal to plunder and robbery for redress; and the same is true of all those evils, the correction of which must, from the nature of things, be extrajudicial.

Public authority alone, by the universal law of nature and

nations, has cognizance of the question of life and death. It is an invested incommunicable right of the state. It is a sacred and sworn deposit in the hands of the body politic. All these claims, consecrated for ages, by conviction and usage, are recklessly violated by the duellist. And what for? To preserve or purchase what he calls honor. The man who fights for character may, in the ordinary intercourse of life, know himself to be reputed, by society in general, guilty of the sin and shame of lying, treachery, fraud, and oppression; but provided he be not denounced or placarded as such, he is content to be thought a villain, without any attempt to white-wash himself, by the murder of those who may happen to know him, or not think precisely as he would have them; yet, in some single instance of affront which is daily offered him by the whole conduct of society, his sense of honor, or rather of shame, is roused, and he must fight to prove himself worthy of confidence! We are aware that this reasoning does not apply to all, but it applies to cases innumerable, recognized by the law of honor; and is, therefore, one argument, among others, against the lawfulness and utility of this practice. The wholesale tyrant—the petty oppressor—the betrayer of trust—the dishonest debtor—the adulterer—the rake and the debauchee—the drunkard, the seducer and the prodigal, are all within the pale of honor—all have access to its altar, and may avail themselves of its bloody libations! What then has a sense of real honor to do with all this, as a system of redress, yeilded the law of honor? Just nothing at all, says the common sense of all mankind, divested of the slavery of custom and the force of example.

Again, the judgment of society, founded upon the basis of our moral and civic duties contrasted with our conduct, is the only allowable—the only legitimate test of honor. The duellist, however, disowns this tribunal. He appeals from its judgment. He exiles himself from the pale of law—he

wrests the sceptre of opinion from his fellows, and shoots or thrusts, to prove to others what he thinks of himself. We are not prepared to assault, as base and unworthy, the motives of all who have felt themselves obliged to observe the law of honor, now that it is established.

Respecting duelling, the great object of our remarks is, to show the unreasonableness of the law itself. We assume that it is a system founded in a perversion of the rights of man, the provisions of law, and the claims of society. Viewed as a punishment, it is perfectly preposterous—the alleged, or really innocent, are as likely to suffer as the guilty. And besides, it is an evasion of law, human and Divine, by assigning death, as the punishment of a comparatively trivial offence. Viewed as a reparation, it is silly, as it is only a reassertion of the charge, finally sealed perhaps by blood. It is no satisfaction—for the mischief, if any, is not undone: nor has any indemnity been offered or received to counterbalance the damage supposed to be sustained by the plaintiff, in this revengeful murderous action. If it be pleaded, finally, as a kind of dernier resort, in search of some apology for the practice, that it wipes away the otherwise imputed stain of meanness and cowardice, it is only necessary to say, that had the offender been throttled and drubbed by the challenger, or handsomely oudgelled, by way of adjustment, his courage would have been as fairly tested, and the whole affair settled quite as respectably and advantageously to both parties.

LECTURE VIII.

LITIGATION, GRATITUDE, SLANDER.

LEGAL *litigation* is a subject that must be subjected to a few general rules. All prosecutions from private enmity, and in view of unjust gain, are disallowed by the laws of morality. All aggression of right originating in ignorance, inconsideration, or inadvertency, ought, if possible, to be settled, and amicably waived, without legal process; especially if the public good be not involved. All offences, however, the punishment of which would obviously promote the welfare of the community, and the omission to punish, endanger that welfare, require prosecution; and such prosecutions should always be conducted, solely, in view of the public good. An appeal to law for trivial causes, or from revengeful and vindictive motives, is entirely inconsistent with the duties we owe one another and the Creator. Good-will, shown by acts of kindness and forbearance between man and man, is the dictate of the light of nature; and revelation teaches us, that our forgiveness of injuries done to us, shall constitute the *measure*, and is in part the *condition*, of the forgiveness we are allowed to hope from Heaven. Nevertheless, this forgiveness of injuries is not to be carried so far as to prevent the maintenance of good order; and thus subject the virtuous part of society to the dominion and outrage of the vicious and abandoned.

When wrong is resisted by a resort to law for the purpose of preventing future probable injury, for the purpose of ob-

taining reparation, for loss or damage sustained by the evil conduct of the prosecuted, or in view of the proof and establishment of weighty and important rights or claims, morality suggests no objection to the movement. In such cases, the law must become the arbiter, and the parties abide its decision.

The legitimate province of civil process, in cases of litigation, is to make law a peaceable expedient by which to obtain our rights. We need scarcely add, that any attempt to evade the conclusions of law, by prolonging the controversy,—by an accumulation of expense,—by taking the advantage of the poverty, time or circumstances of the litigant or party,—by an effort to bias evidence, or by the suppression of facts and testimony important to a proper adjudication of the case, are all so many examples of moral dishonesty, and a violation of some of the most important relative duties of life. All criminal offences, because connected with the general good, should be prosecuted with firmness and fairness.

Gratitude is a modification of love. It is a retrospective passion, and has reference to kindness intended or received. It is a strong and lively emotion, kindled by the kindness or benevolence shown us by another. It does not always imply bounty bestowed, or service rendered. It is often created by mere good-will, and its exercise prompted by kindly feeling alone. Most generally, however, it flows from the knowledge or memory of benevolent intentions or benefits received.

In relation to benefits, gratitude respects the giver, not the bounty. A large share of bounty may be bestowed, and yet the supercilious, or otherwise unkind manner of bestowing it, may prevent our hearts from being touched with grateful emotion altogether. While on the other hand, any unequivocal manifestation of a benevolent disposition in relation to us, and affectionate interest in our welfare, cannot fail to awaken the liveliest feelings of gratitude. Gratitude seems, there-

fore, to be compounded of affection inspired by benevolence and worth, and a vivid sense of obligation. It is one of the most amiable of all the virtues, and he who is habitually ungrateful for the friendly wishes of others, and kindness received from them, may be safely set down as destitute of virtue. Hence, Cicero makes gratitude to be a branch of natural justice,—one of the primitive, cardinal virtues.

The moral distinctions established in society, render the vice of *Slander*, as contemptible as it is mischievous. In strictness of philosophical inquiry, what is true in itself, and truly related, cannot be slander, but it is possible to tell the truth, in the main, and yet accompany the relation with hint, emphasis, and manner, so as that the truth shall necessarily make a false impression, and disparage the party spoken of, beyond the license of social justice, and the relative duties; and this, to all moral purposes as well as results, becomes slander, in the eye, not less of morality, than of the law. Every variety and modification of social intercourse, calculated to lessen and depreciate the claims of another, and reduce them in the estimation of society, beneath their real or relative value, is a species of slander; because it conveys a language intelligible to all, and the effect of which is, the gratuitous production of unnecessary mischief, and injury uncalled for by public or private good.

The means and resources of slander, and even its generic multiplication into various kinds, will be found to be infinite; and no classification is possible. The essence—the venomous soul of slander, consists in making, however it may be done, a false impression in relation to another. It may be done by charges of *fact* which are false—by terms of vilification equally false—by an impeachment of motive without reason—by a misconstruction of language or action—by partial and defective representation, suppressing parts of the truth, and exaggerating others—by sly suggestion and double-entendre—by

deducing false conclusions from another's premises—by ascribing to conduct, results not justly attributable to it; and so of other cases.

Slander is generally the offspring of envy, combined with a leaven of malice; and the mean and the little, the contracted and the unmagnanimous, show themselves unable to endure the splendor of thoughts and deeds of which they are not capable. Hence, they usually engage in the work of blight and death; and actuated by the ambition of infernals, they address themselves to the task, and glory only in the destruction of excellence. Wherever they are found, they exist, a curse and a nuisance, exuding their venom on all they dislike, slaving their bile and bitterness as the only means of distinction, and thus holding themselves up to the execration of society, as hateful to God as they are odious to man!

LECTURE IX.

MARRIAGE.—FORNICATION.

THE origin of *marriage*, must be sought in the constitutional nature and essential relations of man and woman, whose *oneness*, and yet *sexual difference* of nature, will be understood by all. The distinctive and peculiar rights of the marriage state, seem to be the dictate of nature; she having furnished the instincts and inclinations of which these rights are predicated, and having beside, intimated the will of Heaven with great clearness, in favor of the institution of marriage, by the infliction of innumerable evils and curses upon every possible system of sexual intercourse, disowning the duties, and contravening the sanction and purity of the marriage tie. The reasoning that conducts to this conclusion, need only to be hinted at, to be comprehended and admitted.

The marriage relation is calculated to produce a fund—a dividend of private happiness, and social domestic comfort, not otherwise attainable. It subserves the intention of nature in the regular and healthy reproduction of the human family, by successive generations; and leads to their provisional security and support, as well as final settlement and security in life. It ministers to the peace and well-being of society, by the removal of a thousand causes and excitements to contention, whose very existence is precluded by the authority and observance of this right. It contributes largely to the order and stability of government, by giving habits of obedience and respectful subordination to every human being in early life, under the admitted, undisputed control of the master of

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a family. It gives permanence to local residence; and promotes the interests and duties of citizenship. It gives the sanction of law and morality to the reciprocal rights and claims of the sexes; and furnishes the only possible safeguard to the high and sacred claims of exclusive affection—the purity and permanence of devoted love. Hence, the inference from nature, in the light of induction, is, that what so directly promotes the happiness of all, must be reasonably binding upon all; if not in the light of a moral obligation, at least, as matter of propriety, convenience, and utility; and in this view of the subject, revelation concurs.

Marriage, as a social rite and private concern, is of Divine institution; but viewed as a legal transaction, under the various forms of organized society, it is a civil regulation. And in both these points of view, its relations and vows create many peculiar and important duties. The marriage relation, when properly entered into, implies the reciprocal affection and confidence of the parties; and whenever the enterprise is essayed without such affection, it argues derelict motive, and a direct violation of all honorable principle; and whatever conduct, by either party, subsequent to marriage, is in contravention of such affection and confidence, is a manifest breach of fidelity, solemnly plighted and pledged by a public appeal to Heaven and earth; and in its moral bearings, is stamped with the essential infamy of perjury.

It is probable that no arrangement of nature or institution of Heaven, was ever more abused than that of marriage; and principally, because it is plunged into from impulse and passion, without due calculation or inquiry respecting fitness or consequences, or any reasonable probability of happiness.

FORNICATION.

Fornication is the illicit intercourse of unmarried persons. If either party be married, the commerce becomes adultery.

Every gratification of passion or appetite that militates against our own interests, or those of others, must be wrong, and its indulgence criminal. To satisfy you that fornication is both unreasonable and unlawful, it is only necessary to judge the practice by its fruits. It is a practice that must always be considered a mere brutal commerce; for its very existence implies the abandonment of all the tender and sacred—the generous and ennobling ties, that constitute honorable devotion and intercourse between man and woman.

The whole science of prostitution, shows that woman has forfeited the dignity and delicacy of her sex. Her place and pliancy prove the extinction of all moral principle—of all honorable feeling. An outcast from the delicacy and the virtue of her kind, she can only be sought by those no better than herself, and whose feelings and morals blend with her own; and so far as this feature is concerned, the only object of contemplation, is *one* beast in the embrace, and sharing the infamy of *another*!

Fornication is the parent of desertion, pauperism, and endless want and misery among children. It furnishes mothers with strong temptation to infanticide—the murder of their own offspring, before or after birth, and sometimes to compass their own death. It totally disqualifies them for becoming wives and mothers in decent society. It entails upon them perpetual disgrace—damns the memory of family ties to enduring infamy—often terminates in premature death to both parties. It even deprives man of the most select satisfactions of life,—those of honor, truth, and nature. He shrinks from the shrine of virtue with a cowardly consciousness of his own meanness, and feels himself as a moral being, so much abased, debilitated, and embruted by worthless crime, that he is incapable of the tender and delicate relations and enjoyments of married life. And add to all this, the fearful contingency of disease, transforming the criminal fair into living

masses of putrefaction, beside handing down constitutional debility to the sixth and seventh generations. And when we add to the shameful and calamitous list the moral catastrophe of the whole—that such persons shall never see the kingdom of God, we have perhaps said enough to ascertain what are the character and claims of this very prevalent, but ruinous and disgraceful vice.

LECTURE X.

SEDUCTION, ADULTERY, AND INCEST.

MANY of our reflections on the item of fornication will apply to the subject of *seduction*, which differs from the former, in that it may be confined to a single instance of unlawful intercourse, and may be indifferently practiced by married or single persons. Seduction is an achievement dishonorable in itself, and is usually compassed by a combination of falsehood and fraud. The deed, where it is not the result of mutual, and highly excited passion, without any previous purpose or intention to this effect, should always be looked upon as evidence of calculating depravity, and cold-blooded villany; and in any event, no indemnifying apology can be offered for so base a dereliction of relative duty.

Where a resort is made by the seducer to the artifices of address, intrigue, and sworn fidelity, to accomplish his object, we know of no punishment, short of death, not deserved by him; and were it not certain that it often happens, that the seduced are quite as much to blame as the other party, and that it is difficult to decide when it is not so, it is likely the laws of every Christian country would punish the crime with much greater severity than at present, on account merely of the great uncertainty as to the degree of guilt attaching to the respective parties. For, although it is pretty certain, that in nine cases out of ten, the man alone originally is to blame,

yet in some instances, it is equally certain, the woman is essentially the seducer. Hence, the Levitical law assumed, in every case of seduction, the equal guilt of the parties, and punished them accordingly, and both with death.

ADULTERY.

Adultery has already been defined, as infidelity to the marriage vow. This introduces an accumulation of private wrong and family wretchedness, not resulting, except in rare instances, from either of the examples of sexual pollution before noticed. It is impossible to conceive of the interminable train of evils attendant upon the *known* commission of this offence. It snaps and withers at once the moral force and vigor of the nuptial tie. It is the ruin and end of mutual confidence. All hope of congenial happiness and matrimonial harmony, is at once and for ever extinct. A single divergence destroys the pleasure of retrospection, and spreads curse over the whole face of the future. All *within* is disappointment, and *without* desolation. The family confederacy becomes embroiled, and the domestic circle an intolerable hell. The effects of this vice, therefore, demonstrate its nonconformity to the arrangements of nature, and consequent violation of the will of God.

INCEST

Incest is the commerce of the sexes between near relations, whether allied on the ground of affinity or consanguinity ; and the term is usually confined to such commerce, within three degrees of kindred, from the common ancestor. A prohibition of such intercourse is found in the Levitical law ; also in the Roman code, but extended to lineal kindred without limit ; and the same interdict is found in the laws of England and this country. To illustrate this prohibition familiarly, a

man may not marry his sister—he may not marry *her* daughter; but her daughter's daughter, at a remove of three degrees of kindred, he may marry. The law of incest is a good one, in view of the peace and purity of families; and beyond this, the subject belongs more properly to political law than moral philosophy.

LECTURE XI.

POLYGAMY AND DIVORCE.

POLYGAMY is the having of more wives than one at the same time. The practice of polygamy has already been banished from every Christian and highly civilized country under heaven; embracing the ancient Greeks and Romans. All our arguments in favor of marriage, are so many reasons against polygamy. No conceivable advantage can be derived from it. So far from promoting, it retards population; and this is the evidence of all history.

Should the apologist for a plurality of wives allege, that a man with *ten* of them will be likely to have more children than with *one*, we reply, this does not always follow. But this is not the question. The question is, will these *ten* women constituting the harem of one man, and he perhaps a valetudinarian, be likely to have as many children, as if separately married to *one* man? Scatter these elements of Mahomet's heaven, in the shape of houries, and give *each* a husband, and then count the brood, and the result will be, an argument against polygamy. Beside, the poor cannot support many wives, and the rich and great will have only the most beautiful and attractive, and the rest are left to starve and suffer. For it generally happens that when it is the prevailing and popular custom to have many wives, those who are unable to support a plurality, refuse to have any, deeming it disgraceful to have but one. Look also at the inquietude, the jealousies and heart-burnings—competition and rivalry, of

these unfortunate candidates for a husband's love, dividing the affection and tithing the heart of the miserable tyrant who owns them, and who, by a law of his nature, will always have his favorite, and keep the rest only to use. Look at the probable, premature superannuation of the husband, and if he have a multitude of children, the impossibility of duly providing for them.

But beside all this, polygamy is evidently a violation of the constitution of nature and the plainly intimated designs of Deity. A tabular view of the laws and principles of population will convince you, that there are twenty females born into the world for every twenty-one males. Allow then a fraction over the twentieth part of men to be liable to premature death, by the casualties of war, seafaring enterprise, and dangerous and life-destroying occupations, and you have a woman for every man, and only one man left for each woman. Assume that one man has a right to seven wives, and you are obliged to assume additionally, that six men, in consequence, have no right to a wife at all.

Finally, when God made man, and placed him in the garden of his innocence, he gave to the first man, the common father of us all, but one wife, created for the purpose and occasion; and had his will been otherwise, we have reason to believe, the Divine conduct would have expressed it in the gift of a plurality of wives; and we may add, the Scriptures of the New Testament are to the same effect. Hence, infinite Wisdom, in nature, providence, and revelation, has visibly fixed the seal of reprobation upon the practice of polygamy.

DIVORCE.

Divorce disannuls the marriage covenant, at the instance and by the deed of one or both of the parties; for it seems that the wife may become the appellant, in this case, as well as the husband. As for example, should some natural, invincible

impediment cleave to the husband, of such a character as to destroy the reasons of marriage, the woman has an undoubted right to seek and obtain repudiation from her husband, should she choose to do so. This seems to have been allowed among the Jews, and in every country where the claims of woman have been duly estimated by the laws. Christianity has, to be sure, promulged a somewhat different law;—alleging that the law of divorce shall be confined to the single offence of adultery, in order to give the right of marrying a second time without adulterous connection. But the New Testament expressly authorizes the separation or divorce of man and wife for other causes; withholding, however, at the same time, the right of remarriage.

On the ground of safety and utility, it is certainly fortunate that the law of nature and language of the Bible, meet in confining the right of divorce to a few extreme causes and well-defined provocations; as the general practice, for trivial or frivolous reasons, would soon undermine the stability, and destroy the foundations of society. On the other hand, it is equally fortunate for many unhappy sufferers, that some definite and stable provision has been made to lessen, if not to terminate their wretchedness. It occurs to us that any further examination of this subject becomes a profitless inquiry, with which we have little or nothing to do.

LECTURE XII.

PARENTS AND CHILDREN

THE duties owed by parents to their children, constitute a plain question of morality, and cannot require amplification. The relation of parent and child, imposes upon the former the duty of supplying the wants of the latter, on the score both of security and maintenance; and it is equally binding upon the parent to provide the child with the means of instruction, education, and mental and moral discipline, as far as may reasonably comport with his means. It is equally incumbent on the parent to make what suitable provision may be in his power, for the future welfare of the child, viewed in connection with his settlement in life, and the prevailing disposition and inclinations of the child. And such a course of treatment will render it necessary, that the virtues and conduct of parents be such as will consort with the proper instruction and bringing up of children; as the example of parents must, of necessity, be more or less productive of good or evil to their children.

The *rights* of parents arise from their relations and duties, in reference to their children. If their duties arise from their relations, as argued by Paley, their rights must necessarily arise from both, notwithstanding his exception to the reference; nor does this assumption militate against the conclusion, that parents have no right over the lives and happiness of their children—no right to enslave them—to treat them ill by rigorous severity—or compel them to the commission of crime,—all these pretensions are unnatural, and inconsistent with the rela-

tions and duties of parents. All attempts to influence the correct taste and honest convictions of children, in relation to life, morals, and religion, for the purpose of gratifying the unreasonable wishes of parents, or promoting their own selfish interests, is inconsistent with parental duty. The authority of a parent ceases with a child, whenever obedience becomes criminal.

A reciprocity of duty devolves on children during childhood. Ready and implicit obedience, not involving cruelty, dishonor, or crime, is the duty of children. After maturity, assuming that they continue in the family, they are reasonably expected, and filial duty requires, that they submit cheerfully to the established laws of the domestic rule,—that they consult the inclinations and happiness of all, and duly contribute their reasonable quota of labor and support to effect this. After separation from their paternal home, the duty of gratitude, kindness, and attention, remains in full force. The wishes, and even weakness and prejudices of parents, should be consulted, as much as possible, and all accessible means resorted to, for the purpose of rendering the decline of life grateful, and gilding with peace and quiet the last hours of human toil. The duty of children to support their parents, whenever it is necessary, is an obligation, to argue which, would be to insult your understanding, not less than your feelings. He who neglects this, having it in his power to do it, is an outcast from the pale of humanity, and unworthy of any trust whatever.

LECTURE XIII.

SELF-DEFENCE, DRUNKENNESS, AND SUICIDE.

THE proper care and cultivation of the mind, and the preservation and comfort of the body, are duties we may be said to owe ourselves. Hence, *self-defence* becomes a duty as well as a right. Any man who allows his life to be taken away without resistance, unless required by the public welfare, or risked in defence of another, becomes accessory to his own death, and must be blamable. It seems the law of nature would allow a man, in the assertion of an undoubted right of the perfect and determinate kind, to resist aggression to any extremity required by the nature of the assault. For example, if a man shall attempt to strip and divest me of my clothes, and will not desist, nature gives me the right of killing him, as the only alternative of preserving my *own*, and preventing outrage upon my person.

These rights, however, may often, with great propriety, be waived, for what is right is not always expedient. And the rights themselves become modified when we enter ourselves as members of civil society; in which relation it becomes our duty, in all, except a few extreme cases, to leave the life of the offender in the hand of the law. There are some cases, however, in which this is impracticable. Should a man assault my life, it is my right, and becomes my duty to kill him, if I cannot prevent his murderous intention without doing it. If a man assault, further, the chastity of a female, and she cannot prevent the accomplishment of his ruffian wishes, without it,

it is her right, and she owes it to heaven and earth, to kill him if she can. And to our conception, in all such cases, the persons thus, by necessity, taking the life of those guilty of these outrages, ought to be considered, as being in some sense, the executioners of the law, and the conservators of the peace and order of society.

DRUNKENNESS.

Whether viewed as casual or habitual, drunkenness is an instance of the basest possible degradation of the dignity and decency of our common nature. It is a practice which transforms man into a beast, without temptation or apology. No man naturally, and at first, is fond of ardent spirits, or even of wines, cordials, and liquors, unless the latter be so exceedingly mild as not to intoxicate, and be rendered tolerable by other compounds and mixtures. Hence, taste or natural appetite furnishes no temptation or pre-desire to drink; so far from it, nature loathes every cup of the kind, that has power to inebriate; and this loathing shows that drunkenness is an unnatural, violent excitement—a forced, preposterous abuse of the human constitution. Hence, every child of intemperance, in the early stages of his brutal training, drinks, not because he loves the vile lotion—the hated beverage, but in doing so, he lies in wait for effect. It is the rising swell of intemperate impulse;—it is the impetuous rush of unnatural exhilaration—the mad confusion of excited feeling, that leads the drinker to his bowl, and reconciles him to his draught. He thirsts, not for ardent spirits, but for the wildering dream, and drunken revel of passion produced by them. He is like the opium drug-eater, who loves not the drug, but the balmy oblivion, diffused over his faculties and feelings by it.

If we look at the effects of drunkenness, we shall see, that as there is no original, reasonable temptation to it, so there is no apology for it. Unless we can conceive that man was

made for infamy here, and hell hereafter, there is no conceivable end for which God would have created him, that is not defeated by habitual intemperance. The habitual thorough-hand drunkard is of no service to himself, and a nuisance to society. He is a curse to his family, and a disgrace to his kind. He lives only to rot, and dies to be hated. While, to borrow the language of a prophet, his memorial shall come up as a stink in the nostrils of those who survive him.

Whatever follies, crimes, or misfortunes, may result from the derangement, or incapacity, superinduced by this habit, no one is prepared to commiserate or sympathize with the perpetual bibber in strong drink; because he sins without reason, and remains debased without shame.

You will not expect us to enter into a catalogue of the evils consequent upon drunkenness. Tears and sighs, blighted hopes and bereavements, rags and misery—all the insignia of pauperism and premature death, are among its fruits. It has ruined the peace, and desolated the hopes and joys of the palace and the cottage—it constitutes a large portion of the nation's history, and has spread its ruinous blight from the senate chamber and the legislative hall, down to the hotel, the coffee-house, and the still more frequented groggery.

SUICIDE.

If we assume that the power and sovereignty of the state, are legitimately derived from the original consent of the people, by mutual concession and compact, it does not follow, as alleged by Paley, that a man must have a right over his own life. Every man, by becoming a member of a well-ordered community, virtually and essentially concedes, that when, from crime, his life becomes dangerous to the public welfare, and his death shall be required by law, in order to that welfare, the question of his life or death, shall rest with

the community of which he was, until such forfeiture, an equal member.

It is conceded, that nothing but the public good can authorize his death by violence; but it does not follow from this concession, that he, originally, had a right to compass his own death by violence, whenever he should become tired of life. If we say, when a man becomes tired of life, he may terminate it, it is saying, when a man becomes weary of duty, he has a right to decline his post and retire. Every man owes it to himself and society, to live and be useful as long as he can. Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and it is equally the dictate of that law, that a man should cherish life in view of usefulness. If a man may rightfully decline the gift of life, he has a right to decline all the bounties of Deity. But who will assume that a man has a moral right to do what is evidently wrong. All right is founded in the relations and fitness of things, as established by the will of God.

A man's life is the workmanship of God; and how came he by a right to destroy it? Life is the gift of God, and the only right of control that can be claimed by the recipient must depend upon the terms and conditions of the gift. God and man are the high contracting parties, and how can the suicide dispose of God's right of property in his life and person? He, therefore, who destroys his own life, is guilty of a direct invasion of Heaven's rights, and essentially violates the charter of his being. The case of war instanced by Paley, is not in point. All aggressive war not necessary to self-defence, and essential to the assertion of well-defined rights, is a murderous invasion of the life of man, and can only be looked upon as a species of national suicide.

If *power* were *right*, as Paley assumes, in behalf of sovereigns, then a man would have a right to take his own life, simply, because he could do it. But *power*, in itself, is neither *right* nor *wrong*: it only implies the capability of

either—capacity to do *right* or *wrong*. What man cannot produce he has no right to destroy. No conceivable right is given him to destroy his own life, and hence, he cannot do it, without infidelity to the law of his being.

Every man owes ~~many~~ duties to society; and every man in one way or another, actively or passively can perform them. The suicide, therefore, defrauds society of its just claims, and enters eternity as one who preferred all hazards and consequences to the performance of duty. Say that, as a man's life is no longer of service, he may terminate it, and what will it not lead to? A large portion of mankind are unhappy, depressed, and despondent; and all these, so soon as they may choose to render themselves useless, have a right to kill themselves.

Beside, the violent destruction of life, except for crime, and on account of danger accruing to the general good of society, is murder. Every suicide, therefore, is, *bona fide*, a murderer. He has declined life, because its duties are irksome, and he has become impatient of its misfortunes; and thus, throwing the gauntlet of indifference at his Maker, he enters his presence with no other preparation for death, than that of a cowardly desertion of duty, and a reckless defiance of destiny.

LECTURE XIV.

PRAYER.

THE final basis of all duty is the will of God. Its obligation is ultimately referable to him. In the division of duties some relate to him directly, others sustain this relation through ourselves, or our fellow-creatures. To the former class belongs the duty of prayer. It holds correct throughout universal being, so far as our information extends, that when one intelligence wants any thing of another, it is asked for. This is especially a known law of intercourse among men, and we see no reason why it may not apply to all intercourse between God and his rational creation.—The constitution of nature, as intimating the will of God, seems to authorize the presumption as reasonable.

The efficacy of prayer must depend upon the will of God, it being, so far as we can discover from the light of nature, and as we learn explicitly from revelation, a part of the Divine constitution, that we shall respectfully, reverently, and sincerely ask Heaven for many of the blessings we need, in order that we may obtain them. And this, for many and obvious practical purposes. It preserves and diffuses the knowledge of God, and the recognition of his goodness and providence. It inspires a sense of dependence upon him, and becoming gratitude toward him. It prevents forgetfulness of him, and indifference to his plans and purposes. It gives power and vigor to the motives of piety, and has a direct tendency to strengthen all our virtuous resolutions. In a word, it pro-

motes resemblance to him, which resemblance constitutes the perfection of our moral being. If, therefore, nothing further should appear on this subject from the light of nature, it is thence deducible, that it is every way a reasonable service, and promotes the interests of piety among men, and the benevolent intentions of Deity in relation to them. Accordingly, nature has, everywhere, in all ages, and during all time, taught man to look by prayer and dependence to an invisible, superior Power, whose benevolence is the great source of human happiness; and leads to the supply of all our wants; and this itself is a strong presumption in favor of the doctrine of prayer, and its contingent efficacy in the moral government of God, in the promotion of the present and final happiness of man.

The duty and efficacy of prayer, thus rendered probable by nature, common consent, and universal experience, but left doubtful in detail, are placed beyond dispute in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, as an authentic communication from God to man. Here, prayer of almost every form and bearing is expressly enjoined, both by precept and example. It is represented as the bond and term of intercourse with Heaven, and the great and established vehicle for the transmission of the blessings peculiarly needful in order to our happiness. It is presumed this subject is so familiar with you we need not here enlarge upon it.

Among the *modes* of prayer inculcated by revelation, is that of *secret* or *private* devotion, when the soul's fulness can be poured into the bosom of its God, without any thing to interrupt or distract. It is a silent, heartfelt appeal to Heaven, in view of personal, immediate want, and that goodness which is ever ready to supply our wants.

But *social* prayer is equally necessary, and no one of these modes of prayer can supersede the necessity of the other. *Family* devotion at the regular periods of night and morning

seems admirably calculated to impress the interests of piety deeply and lastingly upon the minds of all present, and especially the young and inconsiderate, who cannot witness the private devotions of the heads of families, and who might attribute their attendance in public places of worship to the influence of custom, as a thing of course. Here, however, in the family circle, no such motives can be presumed to operate, and the careless and uninterested are furnished with practical, periodical lessons relating to the nature and claims of Christian piety.

Public devotion also will be found to exercise a very distinctive influence upon the general interests of piety. It diffuses various knowledge on the subjects of natural and revealed religion—all the interests of morality that could not otherwise be so successfully diffused. It promotes and refines the generous and redeeming sympathies of our nature. Scores, hundreds, and thousands,—not less than three millions of distinct, separate assemblies, every Sabbath, thus crowded together in the temples of piety, must have a grateful effect upon the perverse notions and passions of men, all claiming the same common extraction, equally dependent, and mutually infirm—alike mortal, and hastening to the close of all earthly bustle and distinction—seeking support and supplies from the same common bounty—asking forgiveness for similar offences at the hands of the same God and Father of all—looking forward to the same judgment—fearing the same punishment, and seeking the same reward. Can men be enemies, rivals, and competitors, amid such scenes? Can any man witness them, without being made better? He who, amid these hallowed scenes and associations of devotion and purity, is not conscious of a refinement of feeling, and elevation of principle within, leading him to the love of the Creator, and the practice of virtue, is, either something more than man, or does not deserve the name.

FORMS OF PRAYER.

The question respecting prescribed forms of prayer is one of very little interest, and at any rate, properly belongs to the theologian. The silence of the Scriptures is sufficient proof that forms are not required; and the innumerable instances they record of extemporaneous, unpremeditated prayer and praise, seem to furnish a strong presumption against their use. It is certain they did not obtain, in apostolic times, nor for several centuries subsequently; and it is equally certain they had their origin during the dark ages of the Church, and its prevailing corruptions. Some evils may result from the want of such forms, such as occasional inappropriate, incorrect expressions, but these seem to be entirely counterbalanced by the large amount of practical good resulting from their disuse, and the opposite practice. From ten to twenty thousand extemporaneous prayers have been offered to Heaven every Sabbath for the last two hundred years, from which five hundred, or more, might be selected,—the heartfelt effusions of the hour and scene, equal in power of composition, force and meaning, to any of the most finished found in the Roman Abbreviary or the Liturgy of the Church of England.

Our Lord's Prayer is rather a model of *matter* than *manner*. At any rate, it is but a single prayer, and can only be viewed as the great model of devotion. The Scriptures teach us to pray, but prescribe no forms. Prayer, in strictness, is the language of the heart, and it seems highly problematical whether reading, or reciting memoriter, is, in the sense of the Scripture, praying at all, it being an office of devotion in which both the understanding and the heart should unite in the performance of the act.

Prayer should be the dictate of our immediate wants and feelings, and how far prescribed forms allow this to be the case, we leave you all to judge for yourselves. It will always

be worthy of inquiry, however, which mode more effectively promotes the devotion of a majority of all the hearers, by touching and enlisting the passions and feelings of the audience;—and further, in which of our churches the larger share of real devotion and practical piety obtains,—whether in those where prayer is the spontaneous, impulsive language of the heart, or where it is the dictate and prescription of preceding centuries, read by previous appointment, for the convenience, and previously stipulated response of the congregation!

LECTURE XV

THE SABBATH.

THE *Sabbath* was proclaimed and sanctified at the close of creation. Its institution and observance were renewed in the wilderness, during the exodus from Egypt of the children of Israel. It was again published and enjoined at Horeb, amid all the grandeur and solemnity of the personal revelation of Deity, on that occasion; at which time, it was made a part of the decalogue, and must remain in force, as a part of the moral law of God, to the end of time.

We conceive the obligation to relate, however, simply to the sanctification of a seventh part of our time, and not to every seventh day from creation by numerical calculation.

Paley assumes that the Sabbath was not instituted at the close of creation. His proof is, that it is not mentioned in the Scriptures from that period until the exodus of Israel. But he might as well say, that it was not published, or as he has it, *instituted*, in the wilderness; for after Moses, we have a period in the Bible of four hundred and fifty years, during which it is not alluded to at all. If silence will disprove *our* assumption, it must *his* also. His reasoning, therefore, is totally inadmissible. Among the primeval transactions connected with the history of the world, we have the institution of the Sabbath in commemoration of Deity resting from the works of creation. And again, the institution is renewed in the wilderness and at Sinai, in memorial of the redemption of the children of Israel from Egyptian bondage.

We repeat, in our judgment, the great question is not the numerical day to be observed, but the sacred and solemn appropriation of a seventh part of our time to devotion and rest. Indeed, a uniform, definite Sabbath day, as to precise time, over the face of the earth is impossible. The spherical form of the earth, and its annual revolutions forbid it. Select two different points, for example, upon the earth's surface;—at one it is sunrise, and at the other sunset. At the one it is noon, at the other midnight. Upon the Jewish or Christian plan, however, the great object is secured. Six days for labor, and one for devotion and respite from labor, whether it be the *seventh*, according to the Jews, or the *first* day of the week, according to Christians. The day, as such, is not material, but that there be such a day, and duly and religiously observed.

The Christians, without any express warrant in the Scriptures, observe the *first* day of the week; and with them, this day commemorates the resurrection of the Son of God, as the Patriarchal Sabbath memorialized the rest at the close of creation, and the Jewish the redemption of Israel from the tyranny of the Pharaohs. We say, without an *express*, for we certainly have an *implied* warrant for the change from the *seventh* to the *first* day of the week. The Sabbath was at first a monument of the rest of creation, then again, by Divine proclamation, a monument of the national freedom of Israel from the slavery of Egyptian cruelty; and why not, thirdly, a monument of the world's redemption, completed at the resurrection of Jesus Christ?

Among other reasons for the belief of this change by Divine authority, we would briefly notice the following:

First, all history agrees, that from Christ to this time, the Sabbath has been celebrated among Christians, on the *first* day of the week. Now, it is preposterous to suppose that this change would have been made by the early Christians, without the authority of Christ, or his apostles, which is the same.

Secondly, our Lord met his disciples, after his resurrection, several different times, on the *first* day of the week, for religious intercourse, thereby distinctly marking the day as one of his own approval, for such purposes.

Thirdly, St. John in the Apocalypse, expressly styles it the "Lord's day;" that is, the day of his choice and appointment, and this seems to be conclusive.

Fourthly, on this day the Holy Ghost descended in visible form upon the primitive preachers at the Pentecost, preparing them for the world's conversion, they being assembled for worship.

Fifthly, on this day we find St. Paul preaching at Troas and other places, and administering the sacrament of the supper.

Sixthly, St. Paul entreats the primitive Christians, in their assemblies on the *first* day of the week, to make collections for the poor—and other passages to the same effect.

Seventhly, Pliny, in his letters to the emperor and senate of Rome, from the proconsular province of Bythinia, says, the primitive Christians all observed strictly the *first* day of the week, as a *religious festival*, in memory of the resurrection of Christ. Hence, it is more than probable they had Divine authority for the change from the *seventh* to the *first* day of the week, although the precept is not found, except by implication, in the New Testament.

The *force* of the obligation, relating entirely to the consecration of the seventh part of our time to *God* and *rest*, the specific regulations of the Jewish, will apply to the Christian Sabbath; and hence, the silence of the New Testament on this subject. On the day, therefore, received as Sabbath, every thing should be abstained from, inconsistent with proper reverence for the Deity, and due rest for ourselves, and all under our control. Proper reverence for the Deity implies that his existence and attributes, his works, his providence,

and his word, be treated with becoming respect and seriousness. He who can profanely trifle with either, is capable of conduct as little and degrading, as it is vicious and abandoned. All allusions to the Fountain of supreme excellence—the God of being, and the blessings that gladden it, flippant and irreverent in their character, show a trifling and polluted mind, let loose from all the moorings of both virtue and decency. A man who on all occasions, without temptation or provocation, is vulgarly mouthing the name of God, and hawking his senseless ribaldry about every thing sacred and serious, shows himself more fit for companionship with fiends than the society of the virtuous and well-disposed.

All serious and manly scruples in relation to the truth of Christianity, and the claims of the gospel, we are disposed to treat with respect. We would suggest nothing in opposition to the most perfect freedom of inquiry. We would not except to any severity the skeptical may find themselves capable of resorting to, provided it have the attributes of dignity and decorum; but to insult Heaven with profaneness, and attack the gospel with the weapons of scoffing levity, and licentious badinage, is a species of unfair and contemptible warfare, that outrages any possible severity of retort. Who can refute a mere sarcasm, or invalidate a sneer, except by letting the scorner know, that the smile of disdain curling on his lip, does not indicate a scorn for virtue half equal to the contempt that common sense must always feel for him? While, therefore, we concede perfect freedom of inquiry to all concerned, and would enforce nothing, *ex cathedra*, the well-settled opinions, and reasonable expectations of society, impose the obligations of candor and sobriety, on all topics connected with the momentous interests of natural and revealed religion.

Simple fear or dread with regard to the Deity, is not reverence. Reverence implies that we appreciate and respect the

claims of Heaven, and not only that we respect these claims, and hold them in just appreciation, but that we consistently accord them in life and conduct; and if this be not so, our fear and dread of the Creator and Judge of all, indicates the existence of no feelings and emotions but those of servility and selfishness. God, to be revered, must be continually regarded by us as the moral governor of the world; and the indications of his will in nature and providence, as well as its undoubted attestations in the department of revelation, must be duly heeded; not less from a conviction that duty and principle require it, than from the suggestions of interest, the hope of good and the fear of evil. Whenever a man is able to persuade himself that to amuse himself, and trifle with the momentous concerns of the everlasting future, is evidence of elevation and independence of mind, it is perhaps a useless task to expostulate with him. Such a man is too low ever to estimate any thing worthy of human nature, and can never fail to be distinguished by the contempt of any community in which he may be thought of sufficient importance to be despised.

LECTURE XVI.

CIVIL GOVERNMENT

IN asking your attention to man in his *civil* relations, and as a member of *political* society, we shall waive all discussion of his primitive state, further than is necessary to a proper understanding of the adventitious aspects in which we are called to contemplate him. The propriety of this arrangement will be obvious, when you reflect that the primitive condition of man belongs properly to the division of natural law.

In a state of nature, all men are equal. Equal in point of personal right, liberty, and independence. No one has any better claim to command, or to exact obedience, than another. The liberty and independence of each man, in relation to all the rights and grants of a state of nature, are entire, provided he abstain from the injury of others, whose rights are equal, connatural, and coinherent with his own. These rights and immunities are the gift of God, and belong to the essential nature, and primitive state of man. Civil government does not destroy them, but should be considered the more perfect, in so far as it is based upon and conformed to them, being, in its very nature, an arrangement by mutual consent of all concerned, the better to secure the ends and interests of natural society—the state in which man finds himself by nature, and the appointment of the Creator.

Civil government, when founded in right, so far from subverting the natural liberty and equality of man, is the result of both. Men, equal in nature, proceeded, in the exercise

of their liberty, to the adoption of conventional regulations for the purposes of security and mutual advantage. The whole system of civil jurisprudence, when it is not an outrage upon the rights of man, is founded in, and proceeds upon the fundamental assumption, of proper, social equality. It is the *aequabilitas juris* of civilians—the great principle of common equality. The *lex talionis* also of jurists, or law of retaliation, is based upon the same great maxim.

The arrangements of civil society may modify and give direction to the natural liberty and equality of mankind, but can never justly destroy, or even impair them. Civil society, or government rather, is that state in which a community of human beings is found, when the natural liberty and independence of each member has been waived by general consent, for the purpose of placing the supreme power, by delegation, in the hands of one or more of their own number, whose duty it shall be, to represent and carry into effect, the will of the rest. All right to govern originates with the many; and when government is not founded in the will and wishes of the governed, the right is usurped, and the government becomes a tyranny.

The argument in favor of government by the *will of one*, or simple monarchy, attempted to be derived from parental authority, and filial obedience, by Paley, is defective and inadmissible. The right of a parent to govern his children, is a dictate and grant of nature; but in all ages, this right has expired with the parent, when the manhood of his offspring placed him upon an equality with himself. His influence might continue, but his authority, as such, was confined to the nonage of his children. The term of their immaturity fixed the period of his guardianship. The parental right to govern was created by the correlative dependence of the child, and the natural claim of such dependence to protection.

Again, the rights of all parents are the same; and these

have, in no state of society, had a common parent to rule them. Their relation is that of proper equality, without any single sovereign will to guide them. A parent cannot transfer his authority. He can have no successor. His right is limited, temporary, and incommunicable; and arises out of the very nature and necessity of things. We repeat therefore, that parental government furnishes no presumption in favor of monarchy. The assumption is perfectly gratuitous, and utterly destitute of all applicability whatever.

The well-known fact, to the student of history, that civil government must have existed, in considerable perfection, long anterior to the personal aggrandizement of military chieftains, will also negative his *other* supposition in favor of monarchy. The only possible supposition upon which monarchy can be reconciled with natural right, is, when a community shall deliberately resolve to invest *one man* with the supreme power conceded by them in the act of such investment. In which case, so far as mere power is concerned, the right of the regal chief becomes legitimate; and even this furnishes no possible pretext for hereditary monarchy; for it is a perfect burlesque on common sense, to say that the present generation shall appoint the rulers of succeeding generations. This doctrine involves the right of *perpetual entail*, which Paley stoutly denies, in a preceding chapter, upon the rights of testators, embracing the whole range of testamentary regulations, and why not those relating to government?

That such forms of civil government may exist, is what all know and admit, but their dictation by a congruity with the law of nature, we explicitly deny. That the physical force, and numerical power of a people, may, in the last resort, furnish the right of civil government, abstractly from other considerations, we are obliged to admit; but the conformity of such a government to the law of nature, is a separate question.

And, finally, after all that can be said upon the subject, we are obliged to adopt the conclusion, that the origin of civil government, is to be sought in the will and conventional arrangements of the multitude, in view of their own interests and welfare; the power and force necessary to government always belonging to them. And the essential right or rectitude of such government, must always depend upon its agreement with the original constitution, and primitive rights of man. But as this subject will be resumed in another place, we dismiss it for the present.

SUBJECTION TO GOVERNMENT.

The reasons that continue any government in existence, are sufficient to secure *subjection*. These are generally so multifarious as to preclude enumeration. When the causes that led to the formation or adoption of any form of civil government are rightly understood, you are in possession of the general reasons of subjection to such government. In the case of all just governments, the reasons of subjection are perfectly intelligible. It results from a conviction of general right, and the obvious welfare of all concerned. The civil compact implies the consent of each member of the state, to consult the good of the whole; and the duty of subjection arises naturally from a disposition to conform to the implied terms of the civil confederacy. The motives that influence subjection to bad or unjust governments, must partake, more or less, of the nature of the governments themselves; and we do not feel called upon to examine them, as they would amount to an inquiry into some of the principal causes of human wretchedness and degradation.

Power must always belong to superior force, and this force resides in the nation or community governed; and they alone, originally and properly, possess the right as well as power of government. And if government be founded in this right,

the fact and doctrine of subjection, are referable to the voluntary good-will and inclination of those who yield obedience. And if government be founded and perpetuated independently of the will and wishes of the people, *then* subjection may result from a variety of causes, which must always be hateful to the governed, and dishonorable to their oppressors.

A people, although enlightened on the subject of their rights, may submit, from forbearance, as the Irish have to the oppressions and exactions of England, for centuries; and as the North American colonies did, for a time, to similar abuses. They may submit, from the hope of approaching change, or from the utter hopelessness, owing to peculiar contingencies, of any efforts at reform. They may submit from mental feebleness and moral irresolution—the natural offspring of old despotic governments. Or they may submit, as Paley seems triumphantly to insinuate, from ignorance of their rights, and unwillingness to meddle with what has long been consecrated by prescription and usage, together with the advantages possessed by their cunning and artful oppressors. These several reasons, operating variously upon the different divisions of a community, may lead to subjection to a government, without any conviction of right, or sense of duty, mingling with the *motives* to subjection.

Submission to good government is a reasonable service; and as motives are not wanting, obedience can be readily accounted for; and in the case of unjust and vicious governments, the motives are necessarily diverse in their character; and in their application to individuals, multiplied almost beyond calculation. And here, as all inquiry must be resolved into first principles, we deem any further attempt at enumeration little better than folly.

The right to institute a government implies the right of abrogation, should the public welfare plainly require it. When, therefore, it becomes obvious that any form of govern-

ment produces a larger share of evil than good, the duty of submission ceases, by right; and the people may resolve themselves into the primitive elements of society, and subsequently adopt any form of government they see proper.

DUTY OF SUBMISSION TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

We admit it is the will of God, that human happiness should be promoted. We admit, also, that civil society, subject to proper regulations, promotes that happiness. We admit, further, that civil society cannot be upheld to advantage, unless each member shall, in his conduct, consult the good of the whole. And what does it all amount to? The conclusion is, that so long as the good of all concerned requires it—so long as the government in question is productive of a greater amount of good than evil, and this proportion of good is preferred to change,—so long as the reigning order cannot be resisted or changed, without damaging the interests of the people beyond the indemnity likely to be received by the proposed change,—*so long*, and no longer, it seems to be the will of God, that we should submit, and, of course, it is our duty to do so. And it turns out at last, that it is the duty of a people to submit to civil institutions, as far as they answer the ends of good government. That is, the happiness of the governed. And beyond this, duty has nothing to do with the matter, and submission becomes a question of policy or forbearance.

To suppose that God makes it the duty of a man to uphold a government essentially vicious, is, to say that he directs him to connive at what is wrong, or rather, requires of him the guilt of moral turpitude. The perception of right and duty is always necessary to rational virtue; and no man, from a sense of duty, can render obedience to a government, the fundamental principles of which, amount, in his estimation, to a subversion of natural right and moral obligation. He

may, under such circumstances, continue to submit, but it is not from a sense of duty; or if from a sense of duty, it is a sense of duty to himself, knowing that resistance is vain, and that unjust and rigorous punishment must follow such resistance. He may think he owes it to himself and others, to bear the burden imposed, rather than incur unjust punishment, although it is not done from any sense of *right or duty*, abstractly considered.

One man, or a few men, can never acquire the sovereignty of a state, except by the declared will of the state, or by usurpation. If by the former, the compact is express,—if by the latter, and the people submit without resistance, the compact is implied; the people virtually declaring, by their conduct, that although the sovereignty be usurped, yet, if it be not abused, they will bear with the usurpation, rather than hazard the evils of resistance. To say that millions of human beings, free and equal by nature, may be subjected, without their consent expressed or implied, to the will of one man, or a few men, usurping and claiming sovereignty over them all, and yet, that these millions are morally bound to submit, without murmur or resistance, is a proposition, in the refutation of which, we lack patience to engage. It is refuted and discredited by its own absurdity.

So far from admitting that no government ever existed, in virtue of what is called the social compact, we affirm that no government, of whatever kind, ever existed without such compact—it is essential to the very idea of government—the very term government means, and the thing signified implies it. In all governments, the governed and governors are the contracting parties, by fair implication, and owe reciprocal duties, in virtue of such compact. If no such pact or understanding, either expressed or implied, belongs to governments, what mean the solemn oaths, pledges, and assurances, proclamations, and memorials, which form so conspicuous a part in

the civil history of every enlightened nation? What mean the regular periodical parliaments, diets, assemblies, cortes, chambers of deputies, confederations, and congresses of all civilized nations?

If we espouse the position of Paley,—that all idea of paction or contract should be excluded from civil government, the assumption is contradicted by the history of even the most familiar monarchies of Europe,—those of France, England, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, and Bohemia, where princes and magistrates have been deposed by the people immemorially, for violating the very compact whose existence is denied by Paley. Why did our author not say, that the duty of obedience was imposed by the will of God, as made known by natural law and social right? Are not these as intelligible as the sinuous and ever-varying doctrine of expediency, and is not their authority equal? But it seems this would not have answered the purpose of proving that civil rights are derived from the concessions of princes!—a doctrine fit only to be taught in the temples of China or the palace of Constantinople!

The right of security and well-being, which is natural and inextinguishable, gives the right of resistance, without doubt, to any unjust or oppressive measures, threatening such security and well-being. Every political society is connected by certain bonds and ties, and when rulers disregard and outrage these relations, to an extent that forbids the continuance of the existing compact between them, the people have a right to become a separate and independent party, in defence of their own claims and welfare.

The right of resisting injuries and preventing suffering, is a part of the law of self-defence, and belongs to a people, not less than to individuals. To admit and support unjust and oppressive pretensions, is an act of direct injury done to the human family at large; and no man is morally bound to do it.

It follows, therefore, that it is the duty of all to render obedience to the governments under which they may live, so long as it *can* be done consistently with the rights of conscience, and the claims of human welfare; but when this is impracticable, the obligation ceases.

The Scriptures do not attempt to define the nature, or fix the limits of social right and civil obligation. They make little or no reference to the subject, except incidentally or allusively. They evidently assume, that civil government, in general terms, is consistent with the will of God, and in the light of providential arrangement, is an ordinance of *his*, as St. Paul styles it, or as St. Peter has it, an "ordinance of man;" indirectly, we may assume, claiming the Divine sanction; on which account only, it can be called,—an ordinance of God.

But that the Scriptures do not, at the same time, inculcate the doctrine of unlimited passive obedience, and non-resistance, is plain from innumerable intimations to the contrary. Such as the injustice, impiety, and oppression of princes and rulers, and the heavy curses and judgments denounced against them on this account, and the disapprobation and indignation everywhere discernible in occasional notices of the vicious and ungodly policy of profligate rulers, and unprincipled governments. In the passage quoted by Paley from St. Paul, if we are surprised at the unmeasured terms in which the apostle inculcates submission, we shall find ourselves righted, by allowing his *practice* to illustrate his *principles*.

When the Jews on one occasion, and the Roman governor on another, oppressed and maltreated him, he resisted in both instances—demurred to the punishment, and appealed to Cæsar. When on one occasion he was smitten by order of a magistrate or ruler, he met the insult with manly resentment, and flung into the face of the violator of his rights, the burning retort, "God shall smite thee, thou whited wall,"—(that

is, *political hypocrite*,) "sittest thou here to judge me, after the manner of the law, and commandest me to be smitten, contrary to the law?"—Thus denouncing him as a perjured miscreant, by a breach of the law, in the very act of administering it! When Herod sent a deputation to our Lord, to ensnare him, by catechizing him on the subject of his political pretensions, the riving rejoinder he returned by the wily deputies was, "Go tell that fox," (or dishonest intriguer) and then follows a detail, having no reference to Herod's anxiety. Add to this that the apostles publicly charged the Jewish rulers and Roman government with the murder of the Son of God, compassed by bribery and perjury.

Indeed, we find in the Scriptures, officers of God's own appointment, not only reprehended and resisted, but even deposed for their crimes and venality. And if so, why not those of human appointment, when found guilty of similar offences? "Render to Cæsar," says our Lord, "the things that" (of right) "are Cæsar's," but mark the limitation! "and to God, the things that are God's." From all which it appears, that submission to civil government, in general terms, is a moral duty, but its extent, limits, and peculiar nature, must be determined by recourse to the great primary principles of moral right and Christian duty.

LECTURE XVII.

CIVIL LIBERTY.

A NATION, or community, living under the equitable administration of laws, essentially conducive to the welfare of the whole body, may be said to possess *civil liberty*. This species of liberty must always be distinguished from what we denominate *natural liberty*, which allows us to do what we choose; whereas, civil liberty is freedom to do whatever may comport with the laws, and general welfare of the whole body. Subjection to the dominion of equal and equitable law, must always secure a large portion of rational freedom to the people of any country; and it will usually be found, that under the administration of such a system of laws, by the prevention of encroachments and kindred evils and impediments, a greater proportion of available liberty will be secured, than could probably be turned to account, were no civil restrictions to be imposed upon the natural liberty of man. Under such circumstances, the diminution of a man's own freedom, is compensated by the limitation of another's, so that the aggregate enlargement, is equal to the intentions and provisions of nature.

If we admit that civil restraint is a sacrifice of natural liberty, in some respects, yet, as more than equivalent advantages are secured, upon the whole, by such restraint, it is preferable to a state of nature. And we may add, any people have a right to seek the repeal of all laws, not productive of

such advantage, and direct the enactment of others, that would produce the desired effect. When we speak of equal liberty, we intend to convey the idea, of liberty secured by law; so that the governed are provisionally, and prospectively, as well protected in their rights, of whatever kind, against the encroachments of rulers, as the latter are against the possible discontent and violence of the people.

A government that does not secure the people against an abuse of their rights, by proper checks and balances, cannot be said to be *free* in its character; for in all such cases, liberty depends upon the administration, instead of resulting, consequentially, from the laws. Such a government is unjust and despotic, although its administration may be virtuous and liberal. All liberty possessed under a government of this kind, as has been the case in Russia, ever since the days of Peter the Great, is fearfully contingent, and may be considered as the mere negation of oppression and despotism.

Among the checks and balances of good government, the safeguards and preservatives of liberty, may be ranked the following, (some or all, as elementary principles, and perhaps, others in addition :)—The direct or virtual concurrence of the governed, in the formation, and their consent to submit to the laws,—the separation and independence of the legislative, judicial, and executive departments,—the supremacy of the laws preëstablished and promulged, in all possible cases of adjudication,—self-imposed taxation, upon the basis of representation,—the proper subjugation of the military to the civil department,—the purity and freedom of the elective franchise; all of which should be duly provided for in the constitution, which is properly the *original act*, and deliberate will of the people, in deciding upon their form of government; and is understood to embrace the fundamental laws of government, paramount to all subsequent legislation; for as the legislature is the creature of the constitution only, it cannot change or

annul it. This can only be done by an act of the people themselves, in their conventional capacity of original sovereignty. What is further necessary to a proper understanding of this subject, will be called up in other places, so as to furnish you with a comprehensive view of the natural rights and civil relations of man.

LECTURE XVIII.

FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.

WHEN the supreme power of the state, originally belonging to the whole body of the people, is properly invested in rulers chosen by them, and subject to the same laws with themselves, and also subject to the paramount laws of the constitution, by which they are regulated, as the agents of the people who ordain the constitution, the idea of arbitrary power and despotic sway, cannot, in their usual acceptation, attach to the sovereignty of the state. To other forms of government, the imputation may apply, but here, it falls to the ground.

The original sovereignty of the people of the United States, is vested, by express constitutional stipulation, in the national legislature, the chief magistrate, and the supreme judiciary; and not in the legislature alone, as alleged by Paley in relation to all governments. Nor is he correct, except in part, in saying, the constitution takes its form from the legislature; for in strictness, it is the constitution that creates the legislature, as noticed before.

In the language of ordinary classification, we have but three simple, or absolute forms of government—*despotic*, *aristocratic*, and *democratic* or *republican*. The *first*, is where a single will governs, and *one man* combines in himself the legislature, judiciary, and executive. The *second*, is where a few govern, without the concurrence or consent of the great body of the people. The *third*, is where the people govern themselves; either directly, in which case it is a

democracy, or by their **representatives**, when the government becomes a *republic*. Almost all governments, however, are *mixed* in their character, and partake, more or less, of the nature of these simple forms.

In the whole living history of the world, our own government is, perhaps, the only example of a pure unmixed republic. Many of the evils and dangers of a republic, judiciously anticipated by Paley, have been overcome in practice in this country; and others have been duly provided against; and this remark applies with great force to the federal relations and energies of the government.

A number of disadvantages which have attached to all the democracies and republics by which we have been preceded in history, do not exist in our government, having been previously excluded by the national and local legislatures, since the date of our text-book; and should the proud experiment of an extended, confederated republic, fail in the instance before us, it will not be owing to want of wisdom and foresight, or the relative proportions and strength of the entire system, viewed abstractly; but such a catastrophe must result from the corruption, venality, and unprincipled licentiousness of the people and their rulers. This is certainly to be dreaded; for no government of God or men—of human or heavenly origin, can permanently sustain a nation, unless it be virtuous. History will spread out before you the whole map of dilapidated states and kingdoms, and furnish you with a plenitude of proof on the subject.

We shall offer you no comparative view of the advantages or disadvantages of the several forms of government proposed by Paley. To bring the subject before you in outline, will be sufficient to a proper understanding of it. In whatever repute monarchical and aristocratic governments may have been heretofore, it is but too plain, that throughout the whole range of enlightened nations, they have been losing, for the last

half century, much of the importance that was formerly attached to them. There is not at this time a crowned head in the whole European world, who has not been called upon within the last twenty-five years, to abate somewhat of royal or imperial prerogative, and make concessions to the people; and for not doing so, some five and twenty of them have been deposed, exiled, and beggared. And as it is universally conceded, that the great mass of the people are becoming more and more enlightened in every civilized region, this historical fact will have its weight with you, in estimating the value of different forms of government.

Despotism has nearly fled from all the Germanic states. Catholic America has quite shaken it off. The Pope has been disarmed of his former secular power—the sceptre of the Turk has been broken—the kingdom of Portugal is severed—the power of Spain is no longer dreaded—France is nearly free—England is reforming—Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark are laboring under a dead palsy—Poland, although crushed for the present, is not yet lost; and in a word, the world is everywhere, with few exceptions, rising into newness of life; and this comparative sketch for the present must suffice to enable you to anticipate what else might be said with equal propriety.—[The reader will bear in mind, that these lectures were written by the author some years ago.—ED.]

LECTURE XIX.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

THE judicial division of the constitution of a state, securing the proper and uniform *administration* of public justice, is essential to the welfare of every community, and a vital part of what we denominate a good government. The dispensation of equal and unbending justice, resulting from the knowledge and impartiality of the tribunals established for the adjudication of disputed claims and controverted rights, will be found to minister, upon an enlarged scale, to the well-being of every nation, and is calculated to check and oust, alike the aggressions of power, and the exactions of cupidity. Equal justice is one of the great ends of social union and civil; and the tribunals to which the constitution of a country intrusts the interpretation and administration of its laws, should be above suspicion, on the score both of intelligence and probity. Municipal law, and the adjudications that proceed upon it, should be conformed, as far as possible, to the dictates of natural equity and social justice.

One of the greatest objections to the law of every land, is, its want of simplicity and perspicuity—a lack of elementary fitness, and adaptation to the purposes for which it was intended; and a reformation of our innumerable tomes of law, in this respect, is a desideratum worthy the attention of every enlightened legislature. The most of our laws require to be disencumbered of an unwieldy, senseless mass of verbiage; disfiguring and defacing the obvious meaning, often bidding

defiance to all comprehension, and offending alike against good taste and good sense. If the object of law be to dispense justice as readily and effectively as possible, why such masses of unmeaning tautology, and such a medley of fringe and fustian as tend directly to give obscurity and doubtful meaning to the law, and so defeat the ends of justice?—But this by the way.

The point at which the government of a country comes most seriously in contact with the people, is the administration of justice; how important, therefore, that it be skilfully and impartially conducted, and also with as much expedition and as little expense as possible. Confidence in the purity and fairness of judicial tribunals, is necessary to the good faith and proper subordination of the people of any country; and nothing contributes more to the health and vigor of the body politic than the obvious growth and prevalence of judicial excellence. However striking the agreement may appear to be, between the constitution of civil government and the law of nature, ample room will always be left for doubt and contest, and the law of nature is compelled to refer the parties to the law of the land for final adjustment. Hence it is the more important, that forensic justice be studied with discrimination, and administered with purity, that the contests of doubt and litigation may be conclusively subjected to the established principles of equity, and the law of evidence.

It may strike you as remarkable, that considering the number and plainness of the precepts of revelation, the deductions of reason, and the maxims of morality, there should still be so many questions of controversy for ultimate adjudication before legal tribunals. In attempting to solve this difficulty, it must not be forgotten, that the cognizance and dictation of the laws of nature and religion, do not extend beyond the essential principles and distinguishing outlines of moral rectitude and relative propriety; and that it becomes

the office of municipal law to examine and decide upon facts, motives, circumstances, and evidence, undetermined by natural law, and left unsettled, as such, even by revelation.

The wisdom of those constitutions which have decided, that the component division of the government which *makes* the laws, shall not *administer* them, and thus have it in their power to subserve interested purposes in doing so, is too remarkable, and commends itself to your approval too strikingly, to require any thing more than a bare notice; nor can it have been overlooked by you, that one of the most valuable and important judicial functions of a government, is that of *trial by jury*:—where the question of disputed claim or right is judged of by the peers of the litigants, who without their previous knowledge or expectation, are casually called upon to sit as judges of law and fact, uninfluenced by prepossessional bias, the hope of gain, or the fear of detriment of any kind.

And we may add, before closing, that additional security is found, in every well-regulated system of judicature, in the doctrine and practice of appeal from one tribunal to another, until the contested question reaches the place of final resort, having supreme appellate jurisdiction, and whose decision is conclusive, and places the question beyond reversal. Such a tribunal of revisionary control, and admitted supremacy, will always be necessary to the termination of legal controversy; and any country possessed of these advantages, cannot suffer a larger share of injustice than usually, and perhaps necessarily, falls to the lot of humanity.

An inquiry respecting the constructive character of courts of judicature, and the local administration of municipal law, must necessarily be too minute, as well as extended, for introduction here.

LECTURE XX.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

THE philosophy of *punishment*, as a constituent part of the regular administration of public justice, is a question of great moral, as well as political importance; and it is one that is far from being easy of satisfactory solution. The great object of retributive justice, with which we are now concerned, as an administrative procedure, is to secure the ends of good government. The ends of justice are answered in the prevention of evil; and this constitutes what is loosely called the *satisfaction* of justice; and in the case of *crimes*, which are acts of injustice, in the relation and fitness of things, punishment becomes the mode, method, or means of this satisfaction. The satisfaction of justice implies an end accomplished. Now it is plain, punishment is not this end, but is the contingent method of securing it;—thus furnishing the means by which the satisfaction and claims of justice are realized. The evasion of punishment, in the light of causation, is crime. The motive of punishment is the correction and prevention of evil; and these constitute the satisfaction of justice, by securing, relatively, the object of its administration.

This administration of justice among men, must necessarily proceed upon maxims unlike those, at least in some aspects, upon which the perfect justice of Deity proceeds. Infinite intelligence weighs the demerit of actions, as we *cannot*, and always awards punishment accordingly. But human government, by the doctrine of punishment, proposes to itself to

suppress and prevent crime; and hence, does not proceed upon the strictly *ad valorem* maxim, in appending punishment to offences, which often can only be judged by their consequences; but punishes in view of the facility with which crime may be committed, the exigencies of society, and the probability of preventing the recurrence of similar violations of order and justice. The great object of the institution of human punishment is, to withhold from crime—to prevent, as far as possible, its occurrence. And hence, every enlightened legislature should predetermine, proportion, and direct the award of punishment with a view to this end; that all examples of this kind, and even the prospect of penal infliction, may operate as a salutary restraint.

In order, however, to enable a government to show lenity, whenever it can be done with safety to the general interest, it is necessary that the constitutional provision and power of pardon be appended, as a judicial function, to the executive magistracy of the government. Such a provision cannot fail to be productive of much good effect; for it often happens that the solemnity of trial, the agony and shame of conviction and confinement, operate the intended results of law, as effectually as the ultimatum to which the process points. We may remark, however, that a variety of weighty considerations dissuade from all practices in civil jurisprudence that would tend, in any way, to lessen the certainty of punishment; although circumstances may dictate the obvious propriety of making its severity more or less discretionary. The certainty of punishment will never fail to increase the dread of it; and this dread will often supersede the necessity of it altogether.

It is the right of *safety* that gives to a state the right of *punishment*, upon the principles of retributive justice. To secure the first right, therefore, is always to satisfy justice; for justice can know no satisfaction beyond its defined and functionary ends. If we ascend to first principles, the foun-

dation of the right of punishing is laid in the claims and safety of society; and any degree of punishment, beyond what is necessary to secure these, becomes so much tyranny and oppression. To allege that the delinquent *knew* beforehand the amount of punishment, does not alter the case; for it is *only* the security of society that gives the right of punitive infliction at all; and if we exceed this necessity, it is injustice and cruelty. For the principles of penal jurisprudence among men, should resemble, as far as possible, the arrangements of Infinite wisdom in a similar procedure. Whenever punishment, therefore, becomes excessive in its infliction, the satisfaction of justice, which equally consults the rights of all, requires the punishment of those who have thus transcended the right of punishment.

We deem it unnecessary to furnish examples of crimes and punishments. Our concern is with the essential principles of retributive justice, upon which examples are calculated to throw but little light.

LECTURE XXI.

RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS, TOLERATION, ETC.

THE argument of Paley throughout, in favor of *Religious Establishments*, is essentially *political*, and his labored conclusion is worthy of the chapter. That the selfish exclusion of state policy seems to require it, and the ultimatum of his reasoning further, is to us as extraordinary, as his methods of deduction are unfair and inadmissible. He assumes that the progress of truth, the means of instruction, liberty of conscience, right of private judgment, the peace of society, and public safety, are all better secured by a religious establishment and consequent union of church and state, than by any other possible means. Now, we feel obliged to except and demur to every one of these propositions, as perfectly gratuitous, and founded in a misconception of the essential nature and character, both of Christianity and of the human mind.

Human nature is evidently distinguished by an innate, elementary independence, which spurns, except by consent, all prescriptive restriction in matters of opinion and conscience. And if He who gave his signature to this moral freedom and independence of inquiry, in the very constitution of our nature, has been consistent with himself, both must be recognized in the Christian system, and fully sustained by the same handwriting; and if, as we are told, a religious establishment implies the creation of ministers by public authority, and their maintenance at the public expense; also, the selection of a particular class of Christians, as the only beneficiaries of public bounty, and this state of things upheld by the necessarily

arbitrary advantages and disabilities of a preëstablished, standing *test*, political as well as religious, in its very nature and unavoidable bearings, to us, the conclusion is irresistible, that a religious establishment of any kind, must of necessity, be secular in its character, and amount to an interference of state, in two important particulars, in which such interference should always be disowned. That is, it makes freedom of inquiry depend upon a sectarian legislature, sworn to be illiberal, and places in the hands of the magistrate an empire which can only, by right, belong to God and conscience!

Such an establishment, moreover, makes religious opinion a pander to the state, by constituting it a condition of political eligibility, thereby precluding the honest, the worthy, and the competent who may be influenced by principles of dissent, from both their natural and civil rights, and inducing the pliant, the interested, and the dishonest, to forswear and perjure themselves, by a declaration of faith and confidence where none exist. And how does such a state of things admit of the right of private judgment? Why, the language of an establishment is—we have fixed your alternative by prescription.—If you *go* with us, you *share* with us; if not, you are disfranchised all the rights of government except mere protection! But although disinherited, we shall claim at your hands an ecclesiastical *levy* for *our own* aggrandizement, and for not disturbing you in this disinheritance of right, we claim to *tax* you without representation, and without consulting you! *Subtraction* with you, is *addition* with us; but as there are many things we have it not in our power to deprive you of, we take from you what we *dare*, and generously tolerate you in the possession of the rest! Toleration, of course, implies our *right* to oppress you further, but should we decline the assertion of this right, it becomes your duty, as good subjects, to ascribe it to want of *disposition*; although, to you,

it may appear quite evident that it is only for want of *power* to do it with safety to ourselves!

And what is the liberty of conscience secured by an establishment? It is the liberty, it would seem, of being *compelled* to let others *think* for you, or else be punished for your dissent! And how does it furnish the most available means of instruction? Plainly, by securing a salaried ministry in their places, *whether* the people want them, and they do *their* duty, or not. In like manner it secures the progress of truth, by checking the freedom of inquiry, and by the infliction of pains and penalties upon those who may be too honest or enlightened to believe, that faith in Christianity is any way dependent upon legislative enactment. So likewise, the peace of society is secured, by making its divisions irreparable—by the haughty insolence and triumph of power on the one hand, and the spectacle of oppressed worth, and indignant talent on the other.

And finally, the public safety is guaranteed, by the oppression and alienation of full *two-thirds* the population of a vast empire! After all, the most serious objection to the whole system is, that it erects a standard of opinion and piety unknown in the Scriptures, and creates terms of membership in the Church of God, disowned by the whole polity of the New Testament.

And we may add, all that can be said by the advocates for establishments, on the subject of toleration, whether partial or complete, cannot affect the preceding view of the subject. Toleration, in any sense, implies unauthorized restriction. The very term is an *insult* offered to freedom of inquiry and liberty of conscience, and is, in fact, a synonym for oppression. It follows, therefore, to our conception, most indubitably, that a religious establishment innovates upon the nature and principles of Christianity—is opposed to all freedom of inquiry,

as well as to the right of private judgment—it withholds from the ministry the only adequate motives by which they should be influenced, and subjects the people to the temptation, that their motives are only mercenary. It is also at war with the peace of society, and should be looked upon, as an oppressive incumbrance, by every free state, unworthy the growth and the glory of an independent and happy nation!

Lecture

ON

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

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Lecture on Natural Theology.

NATURAL THEOLOGY is that knowledge of the Creator, and our relations to him, derivable from the created universe by reason and observation; furnishing such evidence of his existence and principal attributes, as to render doubt absurd, and otherwise ridiculous. It is the amount of what we can learn of the majesty and wisdom, the beneficence, and the laws of the Author of our being, from the contemplation of his works. Natural Theology is not a perfect system of instruction, but so many of its truths are known, with a sufficient degree of moral certainty, and affording inferences, and conclusions, so clearly convincing and satisfactory, that the mind cannot reject them, without absurdity. Natural theology deals in general truths. It directs our attention to nature, as a visible manifestation of the infinite Creator. It teaches us the first great truth of all theology, *the being of God*: for the mind has never been able to resist the conviction, that the unerring indications of design in the assemblage of things about us, constituting the visible universe, demonstrate the existence of an infinite designing Mind. And to suppose that the universe, with its infinite series of particular and general relations, is not the result of designing intelligence, is virtually to assume that the human mind itself is a cheat, and the deductions of intellect, nothing better than fortuitous impulses! The human mind is so constituted, that it cannot be made to ask for proof; for it is self-evidently true, that

harmony and adaptation of parts, in any given entity, bear a specific relation to *design* ; and every conception of the one, is followed, necessarily, by belief in the other. The universe is a spectacle of *such* relations ; and whether we gaze on the wonders of the heavens above, or the seemingly unimportant organizations that cluster at our feet, infinite design is the lesson taught, and the existence of an eternal designing Mind, the truth we learn. The proofs of the existence of a God, therefore, are as innumerable as the things which exist about us : and whenever we look upon the latter, we can only conceive of them as effects, and by a law of our intellectual being, we are obliged to refer them to an adequate cause ; and that cause not only implies intelligence, but power. Power and intelligence are personal attributes ; and hence, we arrive at the ultimate truth of the personal existence of Deity, whose manifestation, through the medium of his works, proclaims him the God and Father of all.

The importance of the study under notice, admits of ample proof and illustration. For example, it affords the collateral attestation of the works of God to the truth of his word. It is the only ground on which you can approach the pagan, preparatory to his conversion to Christianity. It is the only argument, the relevancy of which, will be admitted by the pupil of atheism. It is made, in the Scriptures, the *law* of acquittal or condemnation, with regard to all, destitute of the light and advantages of revelation. It was the argument of St. Paul with the Lycaonians and the polished Athenians, when he attempted their conversion to the Christian faith. It facilitates the belief of revelation, by a *kind*, and an *amount* of evidence, the human mind is not prepared to resist, without great moral debasement, and voluntary obliquity. It lays the foundation of all religion, by constantly referring the phenomena of nature to the supreme intelligence of its Author.

The proof afforded by natural-theology, that the production,

order, and support of nature, require the presence and energy of an infinite, intelligent mind, prepares the understanding of a candid, consistent Theist, to attend to any additional disclosures or information, on a subject so deeply interesting, which may furnish reasonable proof of being an authentic communication from the Creator to his creatures. It supercedes the necessity of all reasoning *à priori*, or recondite inquiry, to assure ourselves of the existence of God. We are convinced of his existence by one grand, physical argument—the phenomena of the universe, of which we exist, as related, permanent parts. An additional truth which is taught us by natural theology, is, that the earth is everywhere found in a state of ruinous disorder, exhibiting, everywhere upon its surface, and in its lowest depths penetrated by man, the marks and evidences of disruption and violence. Reason suggests, that it could not have left the hand of a beneficent Creator in this condition. Indeed, it is demonstrable, that the ruin of which we speak, was the effect of some fearful visitation, long posterior to its primitive formation; and we are thus conducted to the conclusion, that such a penal visitation, could only have been incurred by the moral obliquity of its rational inhabitants; and that this primitive dispensation, resulting in the ruinous disorder of our globe, and of which we have spoken, was a direct infliction of the Creator. And thus, we are led, by natural theology, to assume the original defection of our race, and also the justice and holiness of Deity in the moral government, as well as his being and natural perfections, in the creation of our world.

The class, or kind of evidence we are now considering, addresses itself directly to our intuition, especially, so far as regards the Divine existence; and he who is prepared to reject it, or does not feel its force, may with equal propriety, ask the geometrician to demonstrate the truth of those axioms upon which, always taking their truth for granted, he finds himself

obliged to base all his mathematical reasonings.* Verbal sophistry in the last instance, it occurs to us, is not more despicable, than avowed skepticism in the former. All truths, as such, are certain and settled; and a truth of *one* kind, is as immutably true and certain, as a truth of *another* kind *can* be; and when fully, and distinctly perceived, is as incapable of being doubted or distrusted. Mind is definitively the *substratum* of all truth. Without the intuitions of intelligence, there is, there *can* be no such thing as truth. And what is clearly perceived by the mind, with regard to moral relations, is, to mind perceiving it, as essentially true, as it is possible for any of the axioms of numbers or admeasurement to be. It is the clear perception of truth which satisfies the mind, in both instances; and the mind is as incapable of withholding consent in the one case, as in the other. The fact is, it is impossible in either.

This reasoning applies to all truth, whether involving moral relations or not. I can no more doubt of the existence of such a people as the Jews, and such a city, built and inhabited by them, as Jerusalem, than I can doubt the solution of a question in numbers or quantity, demonstrated by an arithmetic or algebraic process. If it be asked then, why so much doubt and uncertainty as it regards moral relations, we reply, it is the want of a *clear* perception of these relations:—*clearly*, and convincingly seen, the mind is as free from doubt, as it is in the regions of mathematical truth. Moral truths are more difficult of clear perception; and hence, in our judgment, the whole difficulty. The truth, even of a geometrical axiom, cannot be perceived, by a mind not fully comprehending the meaning and application of the terms by which it is conveyed or propounded. Submitted to the understanding of an infant or idiot, it would be without any perceived truth whatever. To illustrate our meaning at large, assume, for example, that upon an accurate, *scrupulous* examination of the truth or

falsehood of Christianity, as a system, we meet, on the one hand, with five hundred clear and convincing proofs of its truth, and but one hundred objections, in the negative; and these, doubtful in their premises, and unfair and disingenuous, and by consequence, inadmissible in their conclusions. The arguments, in this instance, against Christianity, having no weight with the inquirer, and those in favor of it, being numerous, and convincingly clear and certain, would not the mind *rest*, as perfectly satisfied of the truth of Christianity, as of any of the reasoned demonstrations of mathematics? All we can know of the certainty of truth, is our *perception* of it.—The mind *sees* and *feels* it to be so. And is not the mind as likely to rely upon a clear, undoubted perception, in the *one* case, as in the *other*? I am as undoubtingly certain of the immutable differences of right and wrong,—the rectitude or criminality of certain, several actions, the truth or falsehood of given propositions or statements, as I possibly can be of the truth of the axiom,—that if equal quantities be subtracted from equal quantities, equal quantities must remain. The confidence of the mind in the truth perceived, is the same in either case; and it is as possible to doubt in the one as the other. The mind's perfect conviction is the ultimatum in every such process; and nothing beyond it is attainable, in any division of human knowledge whatever.

After the foregoing remarks upon the kind of evidence by which we are to be governed in our inquiries, we may proceed to some additional views on this subject. It is an ultimate truth in natural theology, that something must have existed from eternity, as the first adequate cause of all things. And further, that this first cause must be one, independent and unchangeable being. The assumption of an eternal succession of limited, dependent existences, one preceding the other, without any original, independent cause of all, is to assume an eternal series of effects resulting from nothing. It is the

same thing, both as to the terms used to express it, and the absurdity, finally, involved, as to say, that the universe sprang from nothing, at a determinate date. An infinite succession of effects, so far from requiring *none*, require, beyond the possibility of doubt, an *infinite, efficient*,—a cause infinitely effective to produce them. An effect without an efficient cause, is a proposition the human mind is incapable of assenting to as correct. A dependent series, without any thing to depend upon, is an absurdity our reason and common sense refuse to consider.

If, with some, we suppose an infinite series of bodies in motion, to account for some of the principal phenomena of the universe, the series being infinite, it is equal to an infinite body in motion; and will not this require, by the laws of all physical existence, an infinite mover? If by the known physical laws of the universe, there can be no such thing as a *moved*, without a *mover*, when we have an infinite series of *moved*, does not the reason for an infinite mover, become infinitely stronger? Let A be a body put in motion by B, B by C, and C by D, it is plain, that C moves B, and B moves A, only as they are first moved by D. A, B, C, therefore, are *only* moved, or rather taken together as a series, are but *one moved*. Subtract D then from the series, and you have a *moved* without a *mover*. That is, you have what is absurd and impossible; and what it is utterly impossible for the mind to conceive as true. You may extend the scale infinitely, but it cannot affect the reasoning, or alter the conclusion. Or, with regard to effects, of whatever kind, let E be an effect, proceeding from and depending upon F, as the cause of its existence, F, in like manner, upon G, and G upon H; it is seen at once, that E, F, G are originally derived from H; and H is the supreme cause of their existence, as *effects*, and effects *only*. Without H, therefore, E, F, G would exist *effects* without a *cause*; and we become

involved in the same absurdity as before. To obviate the difficulty suggested by this reasoning, some atheistic philosophers have supposed perpetuity of motion, and a series of effects, in a circle. But this is a mere begging of the question; for, let A move B; B, C, and so on to Z, and then Z move A, this is only saying, that A moves A, by the intervention of the intermediates B, C, D, etc., which is to say, A moves itself, or begins motion; and the result is,—the preceding absurdity returns upon us. To say that all things proceed from chance, is to say that something results from nothing; for chance means nothing, and is so understood by all the world. The very terms, therefore, in which we are obliged to state the hypothesis, involve an infinite contradiction.

We have called your attention to these atheistic objections and difficulties, not because we deem them worthy of grave replication, but rather to furnish you with a specimen of the weakness and absurdity, even of the strongest arguments which have ever been produced against the truths of natural theology, and to give you some idea of the manner in which the discussion on this subject has usually been conducted; and it will perhaps throw some light upon the main question, as we proceed. An unchangeable and independent being, existing from eternity, must, as the terms imply, exist without any external cause. That is, must exist necessarily; by which we understand, essential self-existence. The infinitude of such a being is equally inferable from the same train of thought, and especially, unlimited intelligence and power. Reason teaches nothing, perhaps, more conclusively, than that the admirable system of the universe, could only proceed from the counsel and wisdom of an infinitely intelligent, and all-powerful being. We are assured of existence in our own persons, and everywhere about us. All such existence must

have had an original, first cause. And this source of origination must itself, therefore, be uncaused and unproduced:—must be one and indivisible,—existing everywhere and enduring for ever.

How far the theology of nature might conduct to these results and convictions, with regard to the human mind, independently of tradition, Divine illumination, and the teachings of revelation, is a question, it is exceedingly difficult to settle, in any satisfactory way. Facts in the actual history of man, throw very little light upon the subject. The first revelation of God to man, was by actual converse, in the garden of his innocence; and it is unquestionable, that traditionary notices of this fact were handed down, and long preserved among the nations of antiquity. It admits of some question, whether any nation ever existed without some faint, traditionary knowledge of the Creator.

It is further certain from revelation, that some degree of moral illumination is given to man, in whatever relative condition we find him; for the Scriptures assume, that destitute of a written law of revelation, “they are a law to themselves,” having the great law of right and wrong, although very imperfectly, it must be admitted, “written in their hearts;” and yet it would seem, impressed there with sufficient distinctness to render a life of crime inexcusable, and to constitute those destitute of the revealed will of God, the fit subjects, severally, of acquittal or condemnation, in view of their conformity, or the want of it, to the law thus “written upon their hearts.” In our inquiries, therefore, respecting the religion of nature, we make no attempt to estimate, with any thing like accuracy, the amount of light received or receivable from it, independently of the directly revealed disclosures of the Creator to the human race. It is not to be considered as a *system* of either truth or recovery.

It is but a part of a wider dispensation; and can only be examined advantageously, and with perfect satisfaction to the inquirer, collaterally with the Christian revelation.

Without knowing, therefore, how much or to what extent, we are indebted to revelation, for the direction the mind receives in this inquiry, we are perfectly assured, that looking upon the universe about us, as we do, we cannot but receive it, as an *à posteriori* demonstration of the existence of God. This method of demonstration differs very materially from the *à priori* method. An argument *à priori* proceeds from a principle to its corollary—from an assumed antecedent to its consequent—from cause to effect. And this method of demonstration has been wielded with great dexterity, by Clarke, Newton, and others, to prove the Divine existence; but in our judgment, with doubtful success.

The argument *à posteriori*, however, to the same effect, is irresistible. This argument is from a consequent to its antecedent;—from effect to cause. This is strictly the inductive method, and the only unexceptionable method of philosophizing, or investigating truth, where the subject admits of its adoption, as it obviously *does*, in the investigation we are *now* conducting.

With the views already taken of this subject, particularly with regard to the Divine existence, you may find yourselves prepared to approach, with something like point and condensation. Upon the basis of the *à posteriori* inquiry,—the only one we rely upon as convincingly certain, your own existence, and the wonders of the universe, furnish you with the unerring signatures of design and contrivance. These demonstrate to the mind the preëxistence of designing, contriving intelligence. Now, intelligence implies, necessarily, the phenomena of thought and consciousness; and these again, not only imply, but constitute personality. For example, in order to the existence of design, there must be

intellect to perceive purposes and ends—power for the provision of means to accomplish and secure them; and the whole process involves reflection and volition. Now, the existence in which these perceptions, volitions, and purposes, inhere, and regularly result in action, must be personal; for of personality, we can form no other idea:—the seat of intellect in any existence constitutes personality.

The attempt, by skeptical inquirers, to refer the wondrous mechanism of all the different parts of the universe, to what is styled, the law of nature, does not affect the reasoning. To assign any law, as an original, operative cause of production of any kind, is a perversion of language, and an abuse of the very term. And again, the very law of which we speak, presupposes a source of emanation,—an agent establishing it. Law is not power, and cannot be supposed to possess efficiency. It supposes power in a superior, pre-existing agency; and is itself merely the *rule* or *order*, by which such agency and power are presumed and known to act and operate. And hence, the fallacy of the position.—Sifted and examined, it is meaningless.

All the various arguments urged against our main position, on the grounds of mechanism, second causes and generation, are equally defective and inapplicable. Mechanism is not power, and merely proves its existence *ad extra*, as design evinces intelligence. Second causes depend upon a first cause, and their nature has been sufficiently explained by the preceding reasoning. In fact, the doctrine of second causes is identical with that of mechanism; and the only reason of any distinction, is,—the one is submitted to our observation, and the other is not. Hence, the latter receives the denomination of second causes. As it regards generation, when it is used to mean *any* thing,—as in the case of plants and animals, it is not a principle, but a process; and refers us back, in every instance, to some *ad extra* agency, directing

and controlling the laws of reproduction. Many similar, and equally contradictory theories, have been resorted to by an ever-restless philosophy, which has been struggling for ages to avoid the necessity of conceding, that the world owes its existence to the wisdom and power of one supreme and almighty Creator. Most of the attempts, however, as we have seen with regard to many of them, have been characterized by nothing, so much as their bungling inconsistency,—their absurdities and self-contradiction. To destroy the whole of these theories together, we have only to press the single argument of design. This demonstrates irresistibly the anterior existence of an intelligent contriver, whose acts involving the utmost regularity of purpose and result, are only predicable of personal existence, and absolute individuality of being. And thus, we reach the worthy conclusion, that this being is God.

Of the attributes of such a being, so far as the religion of nature is concerned, we are obliged to judge from the extent, and the magnitude of his works—the character and complexity of his multiform operations. These appearing unlimited in every aspect, and vast beyond comparison, point to his infinitude, and teach the lesson of his immensity; not in power only, but in wisdom, and other kindred perfections, whose existence is plainly inferable, as attributes of the Creator, from their display and manifestation in his works to which we have access. Having ascertained the Divine existence by the *à posteriori* process of reasoning, and some of his perfections, such as wisdom, power, and immensity, we are disposed to concede unhesitatingly, that we may learn many of his *other* perfections by the *à priori* method of investigation;—such as his eternity and omnipresence: for having shown, by the first method, that he must be possessed of the former, by the second, we perceive it is impossible he should not possess the others too.

How far the *unity* or *oneness* of the Divine nature, is inferable from the works and light of nature, is a subject on which we would speak with respectful deference to the difficulty and intricacy it seems to involve. Still, we cannot help being struck with the obvious conclusion, that the very apparent uniformity of plan, throughout universal nature,—the striking unity of purpose in all the developments of its administration, indicate the presiding intelligence and counsel of a *single mind*, whose oneness precludes the idea of all diversity.

By the argument *à posteriori*, we have seen, that Deity must possess infinitude of perfection, with regard to *some* of his attributes, especially power and wisdom; and being the subject of one infinite attribute, or more, we infer *à priori*, that he must possess all his attributes in infinite perfection; since, to limit any one of his perfections, is to subject him to the control of a reason or necessity, extrinsic to himself, which would destroy, at once, all idea of infinitude with regard to his existence itself. For a limited perfection is not predicable of an infinitely perfect entity, such as God has been seen to be, even in the light of nature, to say nothing of the testimony of his word, to this effect.

It may occur to you, however, that there is still wanting a tie of connection, between the absolute self-existence, and other admitted perfections of Deity, and the oneness,—the proper individuality of being for which we contend; and our methods of demonstration may, it is possible, fail to convince you. The infinite perfection of God is conceded. This infinite perfection, must inhere in his essential nature. The concurrence of a plurality of beings, constituting the subject of such inherence, is a contradiction. For, assuming that each could be perfect, *only* in a limited degree, this would exclude infinitude. Absolute perfection, therefore, can reside but in a single entity; for, comprehending and exhausting

all perfection, it necessarily precludes, on the part of the subject of it, all participation with another. That being whose existence includes and encloses all perfection, of whatever kind, in an infinite degree, cannot have an associate equally perfect; for it involves a contradiction of the plainest kind. It appears then, that the uniformity of the laws and phenomena of mind and matter, as known to us, demonstrate a unity of counsel and purpose, on the part of the Creator; from which again we are led, and we think fairly, to infer the absolute oneness of the Divine existence; and beyond this, the subject receives very little confirmation from the light of nature.

With regard to the spirituality of the Divine nature, as essentially immaterial, we assume that it is clearly indicated by the theology of nature. Intending great brevity, however, in our present examination of this subject, it is not our purpose to say more on this topic, than simply to suggest, that we *know* intelligence is not a property of matter. It is equally certain, that the *first cause* of all things, must be infinitely intelligent; and therefore, as all existence is either material or immaterial, as to its constituent nature, and it is unquestionable, that intelligence is not an original property of matter, it follows by an induction, at once convincing and conclusive, that the first producing cause of all things, could not have been a material, but an essential, spiritual existence. In this argument, we take for granted, as its postulatum, that intelligence is not a property of matter. But as no one ever dreamed or contended, that it *was* originally, the demonstration is not affected by that assumption; and we rely upon our position, as fairly made out, and fully sustained, as an indication of nature.

On the subject of the *eternity* of God, we are obliged to think, natural theology throws very little light. Looking, as we are compelled to do, upon creation, as a demonstration of

design, the light of nature proves clearly, that the designer must have existed *prior* to the contrivance; and here, we are resigned to the *à priori* argument, in favor of the proper eternity of the Creator. Had there ever been a time when nothing existed, the universal blank would have continued, and nothing could *now* exist. We believe this, because we find it impossible to believe, or even conceive the contrary. The result of all inquiry upon this subject, must be, that a being who exists without cause, as the first cause *must*,—*could* never have commenced his existence, or been now existent; and hence, the eternity of God.

As indicated before, the omnipotence of God, is taught by the vastness and variety of his works. Creation itself is a proof we find ourselves unable, even in the instance of a single entity, to resist. No conception of the human mind can limit the power of a being, who is able to produce *something* from *nothing*:—a result necessarily involved, by every idea of creation. The magnificent structure of the universe, proves the existence of an infinite architect; for if creation be not strictly infinite in its multiplicity of parts—its proportions and dimensions, it is, as Pliny says, "*infinito similis*,"—very near to infinite. You can pursue this train of thought at your leisure; and whenever you attempt a comprehensive estimate of the magnitude and grandeur of the created wonders of Deity, you will find your loftiest conceptions fainting and failing, in the journey of the survey.

The *self-existence* of God has already been under consideration; and we have seen, that as a being uncaused and unproduced, he necessarily exists of himself. Existence is essential to his nature. Nor could he produce himself: the contradiction is palpable, at first sight; for in that event, he must have acted before he existed. Thus, we arrive at the conclusion of the self-existence of the Author and Fountain of all being.

Concerning the *goodness* of Deity, we remark, that in the constitution and administration of nature, the fact is obtained upon us everywhere, that all its arrangements, whether grand or minute, are essentially and decidedly beneficial, both in their nature and tendency; and this too, with reference to existence of every class and kind. And hence, an argument, at once intelligible and infinitely striking, in favor of the benevolence of the Creator. It is worthy of remark, further, that with regard to all sensitive and conscious being, a much larger share of pleasure and enjoyment, has been provided for, and secured to his creatures, than can at all be considered necessary for any other purpose, than that of fruition and happiness. And a being thus seeking the happiness of all, to whom he has given capacity for grateful satiety, or conscious enjoyment, must be essentially good, and justly claim benevolence, as an attribute of his nature.

The *ubiquity* of God is inferred, by the same method of reasoning, from the known universality of his energy and action. Substantial evidences of his care and control are to be met with, throughout universal nature; and from this universality of action and operation, we are led to assume the ubiquity of his presence. In every kingdom of nature—in every division of space, he is continually exerting and exhibiting his energy and sway. And by consequence, his presence, in the action and phenomena of thought, emotion, consciousness, light, heat, attraction, gravity, magnetism, electricity, and other developments of the laws of mind and matter. And if this view of the subject do not *prove* the Divine omnipresence, we must find it, at least, *clearly indicated*, by the light of nature.

The testimony of natural theology to the truth of Christianity, is not limited to the existence and natural perfections of Deity, but extends to his moral perfections. When thus applied, however, the argument is somewhat varied, and the

evidence may appear less vivid and distinct; nevertheless, the religion of nature is not silent, with regard to the character and claims of Jehovah, as the moral governor of the world. A large portion of the history of the world, is little more than a collection of direct and ulterior facts, evincing that every being invested with moral agency, who conforms to the high moral excellencies of the Creator displayed in the government of the world, shares his approval; and that those who do not, as certainly incur his disapprobation. It requires but a very slight attention to the administration of Deity, to satisfy the thoughtful and inquiring, that he is a being, visibly observant and abhorrent of crime of every kind; and his long-continued patience and forbearance toward offenders of every class, is equally visible, and equally distinctive of his character and his plan of administration. We are not prepared to say, that nature teaches these moral discriminations, on the part of the Creator, with any thing like absolute and satisfying certainty; but nature evidently points to them, and they are taught in her indications, with a sufficient degree of clearness and moral force, to render, even the pagan delinquent, inexcusable in the day of ultimate account. It is evidently the argument of St. Paul, that the great mass of Gentile depravity, was traceable to the fact and source, that "when they knew God," revealed to them only in his works, and his administration of the world, "they glorified him not as God, but became vain in their imaginations, and darkened in their foolish hearts."

We shall be met, however, with a broad and sweeping objection, on the threshold. It will probably be alleged, that the mere pupil of nature is left without any **sufficient** basis, on which to ground his reasonings, respecting moral relations between man and his God, or earth and Heaven. This is a grave and weighty objection, and requires to be disposed of satisfactorily. We commence then, by remarking, that the philosophical observer of nature, who has never dreamed of a

revelation from Deity, will be struck with no conviction more forcibly, than that the most perfect order and harmony, everywhere, imprint and distinguish the works of God, in all the various departments of nature. This remark applies to all the various modes of animal life, from the lofty frame and proportions of man, down to the thousand trivial atomic existences, that float in air or water. If we turn to the vegetable world, the same is manifest, from the hyssop upon the wall to the cedar of Lebanon. The same is true with regard to all the innumerable crystallizations of the mineral kingdom, embracing its metals and gems, its salts and its spars. The same law of harmony will be found connected with the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and the consequent reciprocations of the seasons, and of day and night. In all these things, we have perfect, essential regularity.

Now, let the same observer turn to what he must, sooner or later, turn to,—the indubitable marks, and multiplied proofs of disorder, and utter derangement, evidently by force and violence, everywhere manifest in the superior and hidden strata of the globe, exhibiting evidence of internal agitation and commotion originally, and at present, a confusion and dislocation, involving even the most substantial materials and integuments of a world. Let the observer, we say, mark all this, and then set himself to work, and account for the surprising transformation, in the very framework of our planet, from order and harmony, to confusion, disruption, and irregularity, and how will he be able to do it? Could any but a moral cause, demand an effect, so utterly and incontestably vast and extraordinary? And could a moral cause have existed, disconnected with moral agency—with man, the only moral agent upon its surface, and therefore, the only being invested with moral responsibility? Every attentive observer of these pre-natural phenomena, must be satisfied, that the earth, so far from being what it was when it left the hands of the Creator,

has manifestly undergone a universal and overwhelming revolution. This event must be referred to the will of God, as its ultimate cause, whether effected by supernatural agency, directly, or by the marshalling of secondary causes, essentially requiring such agency, and therefore, equally an avenging dispensation, and a part and result of God's moral government of the world. This catastrophe, obviously involving the ruin of millions, not merely of sensitive, but of rational creatures, seems to admit of no explanation, not involving a moral cause; and what possible moral cause can be supposed, except a moral change in man—the earth's inhabitants—the result of abused agency and responsibility, calling for the penal consequences of which we are speaking, and the evidence of whose infliction is everywhere manifest, both upon and beneath the surface of the globe!

The supposition that the earth was destroyed for the purpose of making a new use of its materials, is utterly inadmissible, as no new use was made of them, but they were continued as they were, and for their original purpose. It is further evident, that the disruptions and dislocations of which we have spoken, were effected by the instrumentality of water—a universal deluge. The remains of the fearful convulsion prove, beyond the possibility of doubt, that it was the result of the fearful and billowy rush of mighty waters; for what other conceivable means, could have strewn the regions of the arctic circle, with the bodies of elephants and rhinoceri from a different and distant hemisphere, hurling the ruins and spoils of remote and opposing regions to their very antipodes, and spreading out the contents of ocean, and the beds of primeval seas, upon the pinnacles of the Alps and Andes! The amount of instruction, therefore, derived from natural theology, on this subject, is,—the criminal defection of man,—the holiness of God, in the abhorrence of crime,—his justice in its punishment, especially in the instance of an entire world de-

stroyed at once, except a very inconsiderable remnant,—his mercy in preserving that remnant,—and the *method* by which we may, from the light of nature alone, approach the subject of moral relations, as intimately connected with the character of God, and the condition of man.

It will occur to you, therefore, that a similar method of inquiry must be adopted with regard to all the moral perfections of Deity. You learn them from nature, or rather from observing nature, precisely to the extent they appear to be transcribed and imprinted, in the creation, and providential administration of the world. The subject admits of almost endless elaboration; but having furnished you with the necessary clue to carry on the examination, it will perhaps throw but little additional light upon the subject, to extend the inquiry, except by occasional reference to the subject, so as to furnish its most material and important applications.

The *immortality* of man is not directly taught by natural theology, but many of its admitted truths furnish inferences, entitled to great weight, that the human soul is immortal. We might perhaps dispose satisfactorily of the physical relations of man, without assuming his immortality, but his moral and his intellectual relations, become meaningless and contradictory, without such assumption. We think it has been sufficiently shown, in the course of the instruction given you, that mind exists in a state of essential disconnection from matter, and that matter can bear no relation to it, except objectively, and in the light of instrumentality. Now, all our conceptions of death, are intimately and necessarily confined to decay and dissolution, as predicable of matter; and as mind has no properties or qualities, in the slightest degree analogous to those of matter,—none to which our conceptions of decay or death can possibly apply, we learn, at least, one truth;—it is, that the death of mind is nowhere indicated in nature, except as we are prone to associate mind with material existence. We have

only, therefore, to disabuse ourselves of this error, to be furnished with a strong presumption, in favor of the immortality of the soul. For as none of nature's indications point to the dissolution of the human soul, a strong negative probability arises, that it is, by the law of nature, incapable of dissolution,—as an individuated and indisruptible existence.

A not less striking probability of its immortality is furnished in the fact, that a strong, native persuasion of it, has been universal among mankind of every age and nation. This result could only exist, coëxtensive with the human race, as the obvious and undoubted dictate of nature; and what nature teaches, nature's God must have ordained. And thus, if man be not immortal, God has falsely impressed his creatures, to this effect, by a law of their being, they could not resist.

Again, the *desire* of immortality, ever-growing and unquenchable, amid all the diversities of earthly vicissitude, is an argument of the same kind; for it is an implication of the wisdom, not less than the goodness of God, to suppose he could plant such desire in man, without reason, or any answering objects, in the whole range of the universe. All our mental researches tend to identify and distinguish the mind, as a simple, indivisible substance, constitutently separate from matter, and precluding all addition or subtraction, of whatever kind, as it regards its substantial nature. And with this truth, you are requested to connect another, still more certain;—that within the limits of the universe, so far as human observation can extend, nothing has ever ceased to exist, since its creation. Every example of death, of which human knowledge is cognizant, has been nothing more than a change in the mode or manner of existence, in relation to the subjects of existence; and not positive non-existence or extinction of being, in any known instance. The analogy of nature, therefore, is in favor of the soul's immortality. To reduce something to nothing, requires as great an exertion of power, as to

produce something from nothing. The one appears to be as much a truism as the other; and either, involves the necessity of Almighty power—a purpose, we believe, for which it cannot be shown, that Almighty power ever was, or ever will be exerted.

The reasoning in the case of our convictions and desires with regard to immortality, will apply to our hopes and aspirations. And if it be true, that nature never gravitates to naught, and is not false and deceptive in her inspirations, we have further corroborative presumption, at least, in favor of the doctrine of human immortality. Another argument equally striking, and perhaps, stronger than any of the preceding, is, the enlarged susceptibilities of intellectual growth and moral improvement, on the part of man, throughout all duration. Whereas, if man be not immortal, the gift is useless and unmeaning. “Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die;” and dying, are no more! If such be the destiny of man, his intellect was given him in mockery, and his moral relations are a cheat!

It will further be found, in our judgment, impossible to reconcile the wisdom and goodness, and we will add, even the justice of God, in his moral administration, with the mortality of the human soul. The manifest—the undeniable inequality of good and evil enjoyed and suffered in this life, as the fruit of virtue and vice respectively, conducts us to one of *two* conclusions—either, that the existence of man is perpetuated in *another world*, in view of final impartial recompense—or that the administration of Deity is unworthy of confidence in *this*. Indeed, in whatever light or aspect we contemplate man, if we deny his immortality, the disproportion between his native powers and hopes, and his destiny, is at once vast and unaccountable. He seems, according to this hypothesis, to have been raised above the brutes about him, merely to be sunk below them. For, during life, he suffers more, and enjoys

less than they; and if earth be the conclusion of existence, the common brute is more indebted to the benevolence of nature, than man.

The fact that man is connected with a high moral economy, furnishes reasonable presumption of his immortality; as it would be worse than absurd, to suppose that God would institute a system of moral relations, with regard to man, if his destiny were limited to this life only. If man be not intended for immortality, no consistent theory of human nature can possibly be adopted by the human mind. All appears confused, absurd, and unaccountable—God is wanting to himself, in wisdom, and to his creatures, in goodness. When we look upon this life, however, as a state of discipline, introductory to endless improvement in another, all is consistent and rational.

We have already seen, that the inadequacy of matter, however modified, to the production of thought, demonstrates the existence of the human soul, as a separate entity. We have also seen, that nothing claiming existence, however minute or inconsiderable, has ceased to be, since the universe began. And skepticism has, it would seem, fixed upon the human soul, strangely gifted and divinely endowed as it is, as the only subject of annihilation, among all the works of God. Now, for such a procedure, on the part of the Creator, some good reason must be assigned. A departure so strange, and apparently unreasonable, from the whole plan, and all the known laws of the universe, requires to be proved, in order to be believed. And as the assumption of man's immortality, is manifestly consistent with the general rule in this case, and the soul's destruction is an exception to this rule, the burden of proof devolves upon the denier of the soul's immortality. We have seen, however, that no such proof or presumption is found connected, either with man or the Creator; and as a negative may be proved, in the absence of all opposing evi-

dence, it would seem, that the argument here, even from negation, is exceedingly strong, and almost conclusive.

Although then, the mere light of nature, does not demonstrate the immortality of man, it places before us a singular coincidence and combination of presumptive evidence, both negative and positive; and that is next to irresistible, in the conviction it affords of the original and essential immortality of the human soul. Such, therefore, briefly, is the testimony of natural theology to the doctrine of human immortality. It is not, perhaps, demonstratively proved, but it is rendered so highly probable—almost certain—that when viewed and contemplated in the cloudless light, and accredited revelations of the Christian religion, we must cease to doubt, or cease to be rational.

Natural theology, having directed the mind of man to the being and attributes of God, and furnished strong presumption of the immortality of man, is not silent, as we have seen, and purpose further to examine, on the subject of the moral relations subsisting between the Creator and his intelligent creation. It is out of these relations all our moral obligations arise. Man's relations, therefore, to the Creator, and the created universe about him, become the basis of duty; and these relations, instituted and ordained by the Creator, must always refer us to the will of God, as the standard of rectitude, and rule of moral action. We have seen in what way, and to what extent, nature is a revelation of the Divine character. We have also seen, by occasionally adverting to the necessary inference, what must be the reasonable claims of Deity, with regard to his rational creatures; and we must, therefore, be prepared to admit the conclusion, as invincible, that all moral excellence, on the part of man, must consist in our conformity to the character, and in according the claims of the Creator. His creation of man, gives him an unlimited right of property in man; his right of property, implies, essentially, the right

of government; and hence, is deduced, irresistibly, the general right of the Creator to prescribe laws, in view of the conduct and happiness of man.

The guaranty furnished us by natural theology, that God will not treat his creatures, meaning especially man, unjustly or unreasonably, in his arrangements and legislation respecting their conduct and destiny, must be sought in his goodness and rectitude, as learned from his works, and his administration of nature. And if such information should prove, in any degree, unsatisfactory, we can only say, it is all that nature furnishes, and for further light, we must appeal to other sources. We have had occasion to show, that contrivance demonstrates design; and that the prevailing tendency of the contrivance, must indicate, with great clearness, the disposition and ultimate views of the designer. And with regard to this, we must have satisfied ourselves, that all the contrivances manifest, from the whole assemblage of units which we denominate the universe, are obviously directed to beneficial purposes; and hence, we are obliged to infer, the universal benevolence of Deity, and yield to the conviction, that it is not more certain that God made man, than that he made him to be happy. As God is the author of our being then, so happiness is its *end*; and virtue, which is nothing but conformity to the will of God, becomes the means conducting to the end proposed in our creation; and with this view of the subject, accords the general sense of mankind. The first, the strongest, the purest feelings of human nature, have ever, in every age, coöperated with the reason of mankind, in asserting the authority—the divinity of the conviction! Virtue, consulting the will of God, as the rule of action, and conducting to happiness here and hereafter, has ever been looked upon by those who, with or without revelation, have paid the least attention to the subject, as the ordained, the needful, and sovereign good of man.

All the entire rules of virtue, are referable to the will of God; and this, we collect too, at least imperfectly, from reason and the light of nature. The subject is a complicated one, and the range extensive; and the application of these rules is, in many instances, difficult and uncertain, and in some, impossible. And further, as applied to specific examples of conduct, particularly, they not only lack clearness and perspicuity, but there is a want of sanction; and hence, the comparatively small influence the religion of nature has had, upon the vast majority of minds in different parts and periods of the world.

And hence, again, the necessity of superior light, and the reasoned probability, that a God of boundless and universal benevolence, would grant it; and thus confirm the dim and general truths and lessons of nature, by a voice from heaven, precluding all doubt as to the intentions of the Creator, and accompanying his revelations with fearful, adequate, and everlasting sanctions;—thus, uniting the theology of the Bible with that of nature, and blending the disclosures of revealed religion, with the less perfect intimations of natural and occasional discovery from the works of God; the two systems, thus reciprocally confirming each other; and the supernatural dispensations of Deity, coöperating with the visible frame of the universe, and every pulse and feeling of the human heart, in attesting and establishing the interesting truth, that God is infinitely wise and good, and is, therefore, entitled to our homage and adoration; and moreover, that our claims to moral excellence, must be measured by our conformity to his moral perfections.

It has been shown, that God created man for happiness, and that the administration of the universe has been rendered by him, subservient to such a result; and the regards of the Creator, thus shown to man, unceasingly, in the government of the world, is what we understand by his moral providence;

and that man, by these acts of the Author of our existence and blessings, is brought under reciprocal and corresponding obligations to love and obey him, is as clearly a dictate of nature, as of revelation. And as the natural perfections of Deity cannot fail to excite our wonder and admiration—such as immensity, omnipotence, and eternity, so the moral perfections of God, cannot fail to inspire us with emulous affection and adoring interest, whenever we address ourselves to the task—the grateful task of contemplating the goodness, the justice, and the holiness of “Him with whom we have to do,” both in nature, and his higher dispensations to the intelligences he has formed. No well-constituted mind can look up to the Creator, as the God and Father of universal existence, diffusing his beneficence over all his works, and especially extending his distinguishing goodness to man, without the humbling inference of dependence upon him, and the kindred, correlative feelings and virtues of gratitude, resignation, and affectionate regard. It is in this way we gain admittance, and are allowed constant access to the knowledge, the worship, and the friendship of Deity, through the portals of natural theology,—the works of God, thus consistently and sublimely attesting the interesting facts and verities of his word.

In our lectures upon moral philosophy, to which this topic properly belongs, we took a somewhat detailed view of moral relations and moral obligation, and we deem it unnecessary to repeat it here. The cursory survey of natural theology, to which your attention has been asked, will furnish you with a sufficiently comprehensive idea of its application and bearings, together with its practical uses; and we advised you, when we took up the subject, that for the present, nothing more was intended, or in our judgment, necessary.

One of the principal deductions at which we have aimed, is, that however clearly Christianity may be entitled to uni-

versal reception, upon the basis of its own legitimate, irresistible evidence, that evidence derives additional support and force, from the coincident, collateral evidence of natural theology. We started with the position, that the assemblage of effects, constituting the universe, of which we know ourselves to be separate, individuated parts, must have had a *cause*; and that the constitution and laws, the order and harmonious relations of the universe, prove that cause to have been intelligent and powerful, beyond limit or conception. We then proceeded to inquire into the character of the author of nature, from the distinguishing marks and evidences of mind and purpose, found in his works; and in our examination of the subject, arrived at many interesting conclusions.

Without any personal, historical knowledge of Homer and Euclid, Cicero and Virgil, had their works fallen into our hands, and been examined with care and capacity, we must have known much of the real, intellectual character of their authors. In like manner, it is impossible for intelligence to contemplate the works of the Creator, without connecting those works, with the character, and corresponding claims of their author. These works, not only proclaiming the existence of God, but in many respects, intelligently distinctive of his attributes, remind us also of his constant and presiding care in their regular conservation and perpetuity, reproduction and multiplication, throughout the innumerable divisions of nature, or the Creator's workmanship.

In the further attention we have paid to the nature, the laws, and the properties of matter, viewed in connection with the attributes and phenomena of mind, we have satisfied ourselves, that the latter could never result from the former; and that thought and feeling are only predicable of an entity essentially different from matter, both as it regards the constituent principles of its nature, and the modifications and developments of which it is capable. And hence, the imma-

teriality of the soul, or sentient principle of existence, in man. By attention further to the powers and susceptibilities, the enlarged capacities and interesting relations of the soul, we are taught to infer its perpetuity of being, and look forward to its proper and undoubted immortality.

In addition to all this, we have had occasion to notice the present disordered and dislocated condition of our globe, and have reached the conclusion, in view of the many convincing facts accessible in the case, that this fearful disruption, and violent disarrangement of the earth's strata, and the burden of its contents, could only result from a universal deluge of water; and that supernatural agency, not to say almighty power, was required to produce the catastrophe, and conduct it to the conclusion at which it must have arrived, reasoning from the present condition of the earth, when examined with respect to this event. Reason and nature dictate, therefore, that such a catastrophe must have been a penal dispensation; and no punitive visitation could reasonably have been inflicted, so far as we can see, unconnected with man, and not on *his* account, unless we assume his transgression and rebellion as a subject of God's moral government. We are directly conducted to this conclusion, by all the light we have upon the subject. And in the dispensation of the deluge, we have a most impressive lesson still brought home to our very senses,—that sin incurs the displeasure of Heaven; that God is just and holy, and will invariably and unyieldingly exact its punishment.

Had we intended a more minute and particular examination of this subject, we should have taken some pains to show, not only that man must have sinned, in the instance already noticed, and that he was chastened by a fearful visitation from the Creator, but that the economy under which he has since lived, has been partly penal, and partly gracious. The administration of nature indicates the goodness of God, as we

have seen, and his corrective dispensations, and the obvious system of moral discipline under which we live, blending chastisement and humiliation, with the intimations of kindness and the means of amendment and virtue, teach us, beyond the possibility of doubt or misconception, that he is not only good, and kindly disposed toward our race, but clearly and decidedly merciful, in dealing with us as sinful creatures, both as it regards our earthly interests, and all we know of our final destiny. Thus teaching us some of the most sublime and interesting truths found in the more perfect revelation of his will, contained in the Christian Scriptures.

The circumstantial, incidental, and concurrent testimony of natural theology, to the truth of revelation, is, to an ingenuous, enlightened mind, one of the strongest and most convincing proofs of the Divine origin of Christianity, within the range of human knowledge. And pressing the truth and appositeness of this general remark upon your serious consideration, we leave the subject with you, to receive from you the further notice and reflection to which it is so obviously entitled.

The full force of the evidence, attending the disclosures of natural theology, will not be properly felt, without minute, detailed, and prolonged attention; but appealing to the science in the latter mode, what at first appeared only as a series of probabilities, will brighten into proofs, and the inductions and analogies of the subject will be transformed into the verities of confirmed belief. The argument from design in the visible structure of the universe, or even in the instance of our own existence, and other kindred views of the one and the other, already taken, must arrest the mind with no common force, and awaken a natural and philosophical, as well as strong moral interest in this high investigation. And commensurate with such views and convictions, an awakened sense of obligation will arise in the mind, and lead on the inquirer to

further and more conclusive knowledge, in relation to the probable truths, by which the mind is already engrossed and occupied.

The strong moral likelihood of the truth of Christianity, to which natural theology gives birth, renders its claim upon us still more urgent and imperative; for in proportion to the light we have obtained, is the obvious criminality of rejecting further notices, and more conclusive manifestations within our reach. In so far, therefore, as natural theology shall fix and direct attention, it becomes the natural and great precursor of revelation. It may not be,—it is not the temple of moral truth, but it is the vestibule to its entrance; and hence, if for no other reason, becomes inestimably important.

It will be found, that in proportion as we advance in this study, from step to step, and from one conclusion to another, the voice of God, and the claims of his character, will become louder and stronger. And thus, instead of a reduction and depreciation of the separate independent evidence of revelation, as some have supposed, its force and value are enhanced by the previous notices and announcements of natural religion. Thus, the insufficiency of the one is supplemented by the perfection of the other. And it is in this way we are conducted to the conclusion, clearly and irresistibly, that precisely in the proportion, that the mind is preoccupied with the conviction of the truths of natural theology, it is prepared, by a necessary and consecutive process, for the reception of a superadded revelation, to the ascertained extent, it may bear the undoubted signatures of genuineness and authenticity. In a word, on the great topic of moral truths, and moral relations, natural theology enswathes the problem, and Christianity solves it!

Glance

AT THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF

LETTERS:

VIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MORE ENLARGED DEVELOPMENT,
AND HIGHER MANIFESTATIONS OF

MIND.

VESPER WOOD GLEN, DEC. 24, 1846.

Glance at the History and Philosophy of Letters.

It cannot fail to occur to the well-informed, that to accomplish any thing worthy of trial, upon an occasion like this, within the limits of a single lecture, selection and compression, as it regards both matter and method, are indispensable. And the course we thus indicate will suggest at once, that it is our purpose to seek the value of *details*, as it regards literature, in the *general effect*. The restraints and limitations thrown around us by the occasion, imperiously require, that we aim at the utmost elementary condensation, rather than enlarged statement or argument. In reference to all philosophic discussion, Lord Bacon has justly remarked, "If the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise pursued, smaller things will come in of themselves." The great problem in moral, as in mathematical truth, is to simplify the signs, guided, of course, by the restraints of legitimate method. In every discussion, indeed, the selection of the proper data will be found indispensable; and pursuing such a course, a mere hint will often prove of more value than a dissertation, by tending more directly to the object in view. We cannot as we proceed, pause at every step, to question cause and effect, but by bringing out a few elements in bold relief, upon the plain of ordinary occurrences, or the more common phase of the subject, we shall be able, we trust, so to classify *cause* and *consequence*, the *primary* and *derivative*, in nature and art, as to prevent any serious misdirection, and conduct to important conclusions.

By such method, *variety*, however complicate in relation to matter, is reduced to unity, by bringing into view the relations of dependence and verisimilitude throughout the whole. The subject we are about to approach, is one of indeterminate magnitude, and corresponding interest. The argument will assume, as its substance, that God, man, and nature, are the great themes of human knowledge; that letters constitute the principal *medium* of such knowledge, as transmitted from mind to mind, and age to age; and that precisely in proportion to the more enlarged information we have with regard to each, will be multiplied the means and probabilities of enjoyment and usefulness. It will thus be perceived at once, why we appeal to the *history* of letters, as the only available method of understanding the *philosophy* of the subject. We may assume to have a competent knowledge of ourselves, of the creation, and all about us in the amplitude of nature. But how, with any approach to certainty, can we arrive at the truth, in such an inquiry, without questioning those who have trod the stage before us? We cannot get at the philosophy of the subject, without its history, furnishing us with the facts and revelations of the past. The foreground of the picture is necessary to its perspective. The terrestrial chart can only be constructed by means of celestial observation. We are shut up, as all will see, to the necessity of only glancing at these great topics. While, therefore, in sketching an outline map, prominence is given to *parts*, we shall endeavor so to give it, as not to affect their due subordination to the *whole*. The necessary effect of such a generalizing process, will be to give, at least, some degree of method to what might otherwise, as parts or elements, appear unconnected and fragmentary. We shall not ask your attention to the various methods, and tardy manifestations of abstraction and analysis, in the order in which they have been appealed to, in point of fact, on the subjects involved; but shall attempt to glance, as directly as

may be, at the more elementary principles of our literature, whose signatures, as the argument assumes, are found in man and nature ;—found “before the eyes, and in the thoughts of all ;” and not only giving *impulse* to mental activity, but determining, at the same time, the mode of action and achievement.

We submit the whole question to the jurisdiction of good sense, observation, and induction ; only praying that we may be judged by *all*, and not by *a part* of what we say. We may have occasion to appeal to facts and phenomena, not seen by the eye, not touched by the hand, not realized by the other senses, and never to be reached by glass or scalpel. But if so, they are those of the *interior* world of mind, upon which we are compelled to rely, with as absolute certainty, as upon any of the visible demonstrations going on upon the theatre of the universe about us ; and on this account, equally entitled to your considerate notice. To the student of truth and nature, the subject presents a most inviting, yet varied and miscellaneous field of thought. It is like throwing the eye upon the panorama of a rich and boundless forest, with no single point of attraction, but *all* contributing to the joint result. We shall hope to interest you in view of *all* the aspects of our subject, but mainly, as you prize hardy and foodful thought, laying bare the foundations of the intellectual and moral life of man, relying upon *truth* and *nature*, as found in the *pith* and *heart* of things, within and about us ; asking only for fruit and progress, and seeking soil and substance, rather than cloud and shadow. We wish to show you the very remarkable, the natural sequent coincidence between letters and the philosophy of human life. We are anxious to make appear, what we cannot for a moment doubt, that nature and providence, connected with the allotment of humanity on earth, give birth, as final causes, to literature : and the aggregate good sense of the better part of mankind, has been, in all

time, its great preservative principle. To know ourselves, especially *mind*, in its laws, action, and destiny, is the great primary desideratum of all true philosophy. If we succeed then, in showing that literature furnishes, to a great extent, a true statistical account of the intellectual and moral phenomena of our nature, by an exhibition of facts and things, examined in the different and opposite points of view, connected with different and unressembling eras, and the excitement and inspiration of various related and unconnected interests and pursuits, we shall, so far, prepare you for an appreciation of letters, not unworthy the more specific object of our present interview. We use the term *letters*, in a sense inclusive of all the varied possible forms of literature, whether science, art, or literature *proper*, as distinguished from them. And intending to treat of letters, as the source—the ancestry, of much the larger share of our knowledge, we shall begin where man and nature began, and work our way forward and upward, from the elementary—the first rudimental platform, to the magnificent structure adorning it. And as this can only be done by an appeal to numerous facts, and the rigid equations of truth and candor in their examination, the character and difficulty of the task before us, will be perceived at once.

The origin of letters must be sought in the ultimate constituent principles of human nature. Literature, in the light and aspects in which we propose to consider it, is a production—a growth, whose incipient genesis must be looked for in the essential elements of our common nature. And indeed, however viewed or examined, in the last analysis, *mind*, the higher division of our nature, will not only be found its *point* of departure, but its varied progress, in every stage, always a picture of the actual living world of man. Mind, we all know, must, for general practical purposes, be translated into visible symbols; and literature is such a manifestation of mind

and thought in their higher phases. There is, and always will be, a living creative sympathy between intellect and letters. All decisive intellectual progress is connected with letters. The latter must be regarded as the true index and measure of intellectual strength and achievement. In every instance of such progress, *mind* is the text, letters the comment. Turning to the origin of literature, and marking the cause and sequence of its growth, it may be looked upon as a vast prophetic scroll, the only lexicon of which, is the human mind. It is a volume large as life, and comprehensive as the circuit of existence; distinguished by gradual accumulation in the progress of ages, and yet, in strictness, disclosing only the general sphere of human thought and action. And so truly and essentially is literature a product of the human mind, that in whatever state or stage we examine it, it bears, incontestably, the strong impress—the living image of humanity. Whatever tends, beyond doubt or failure, to improve the destiny of man, must be regarded as coincident with the tendencies of his being; and in effect, fulfilling the will of God who made him; and as *certainly* accomplishing the purposes for which he was made. And thus, we look upon literature as not only *subjectively* good in itself, but the cause of good in its *objective* bearings and relations. Its essential elements are found in man; and whether we look at its intrinsic nature, or external environment, its true *shekinah* must be sought in mind.

In every attempt to *know*, man must begin with himself. Ability to know himself, is an incontestable attribute of his nature; and upon this nature, and such conscious ability, all induction and inquiry must repose, as their great foundations. Thus, we begin at the end, and end at the beginning, and the subject still is man. The empire of the world belongs to *thought*. So far as man is concerned, *thought* is the grand *entelechia*,—the very *soul* of existence. It is the essential

lever, even of the physical forces appealed to by man, for the comfort and dignity of his nature. It is the invariable precursor of progress in every thing. In the whole heaven and earth of our literature, *mind* is the electric fluid, and language but the conductor. Language is but the livery of thought—the tangible representation of mind—its *visible credentials* in all its essential activity, but nothing more. In every sphere—in every phase—in every possible vicissitude of human action, enjoyment, or suffering, *mind* is the great citadel of our being, and language one of its necessary, yet most important dependencies. *Thought* is the *picture*, *language* the *frame*. *Mind*, the *light* of the temple, *language* the *candelabra* by which it is thrown off and diffused. In this way, analogous to the propagation and travel of natural light, the undulations of thought and feeling are propagated, from age to age, and from one extreme of human society to the other. And thus viewed, literature is not merely the wardrobe of intellect, but an ever-living expression of man and nature;—the record of mental activity, and the code of intellectual legislation, in all ages.

To illustrate our meaning, however, and *accredit* our reasoning, it will be necessary to glance at the history and philosophy of letters, in something like regular sequence. Language, in relation to the mind, is by the appointment of nature, *what* action is to the body. And mind without language, would be as helpless and unproductive, as the body without action. We have seen language to be the great *index* of our intellectual nature. It is intimately, and to a great extent, creatively connected with sensation, thought, and emotion,—our *sensitive perceptions*, the operations of the understanding, and the affections, as distinguished from these, in all their exercise, use, and relations. Unable to express, indicate, or convey them to others, what, we ask, would be their value? A fundamental want of our being, therefore, desiderates the neces-

sity of language, and accordingly, in all known instances, sensible objects and phenomena, consentiently known and observed among men, have, primarily, given birth to the parts and elements of language. And so far, such objects and phenomena give meaning to words, and force and power to language. After its gradual elaboration and established use, however, language, in turn, becomes the expositor of things, and the means, not less than the signs, of knowledge. Language is first seen as an *effect*, then as a *cause*; but always as a conventional expression of the general mind,—the type and representative of the progress of development. The common want of our nature required, not only that thought, by means of the voice, should be articulated, and cadenced to the ear, but by an appeal to intelligible *forms*, envisaged to the eye. Language thus considered, articulate and legible, oral and written, becomes the law and condition of mental development; and like the vegetable world released from the bondage of winter, exhibits mind in foliage. Human invention immemorially, and in every vicissitude of external hindrance or furtherance, has sought some intelligible, and especially imperishable representative of thought. Even among the most savage tribes and nations, constant effort is observable to create a language for the *eye*, that by such method, connecting itself with the suggestive principle in human nature, knowledge might be rendered as perpetual as the generations of men. All this is sufficiently natural and providential to be readily accounted for. In order to intercourse between the absent and distant, the preservation and proof of facts and events, the better and more perfect security, as it regards alliance, confederation, contracts, covenants, and evidence of various kinds, something more fixed and permanent than merely oral language became necessary; and the felt common want led to the invention, finally, of legible, written language.

The fact that all language was created by the varied combi-

nation of a few primitive vocal articulations, led to the selection of fixed *notary* signs, to represent the primary natural elements of language; and hence, the origin of *alphabetic* characters, susceptible of almost any extent of combination; and the first grand epoch of human improvement, apart from direct revelations by the Creator. In this way, we propose showing that in the whole history of human progress, the prevalence of written language is the last term of receding barbarism, the close of fabulous, and the commencement of authentic history. After such a result in the historical progress of society, knowledge is addressed not merely to the *ear*, but with centuplicated force and facility, is presented to the mind, as if in diagram, through the medium of the eye, the *sign* and the *sound* making, distinctively, the same impression upon the mind. We introduce the *history*, that we may understand the *philosophy* of letters. We regard such a course, as both philosophical and necessary. The results of the past, rightly understood, desiderate and point out the future probable destinies of the human race; and this single fact must, indefinitely, enlarge the powers and resources of human nature. It is equally true of all time, and all things, that the results of to-day depend upon those of yesterday, and influence, in turn, those of to-morrow. Without an appeal to history, therefore, the reason and sequence of things, in the premises, could not be understood. In the history of letters, we have *mind* teaching by example; and when we properly understand the example, in the light of cause and effect, we achieve the philosophy of the subject.

Of the invention of letters, *when* or *by whom*, we know but little certainly. Much has been said, but little known. Of Hermes, Memnon, and Cadmus; we have little more than dreaming—few records, and fewer remains. So truly does it often happen, that the authors of inventions and discoveries, destined to give dignity and consequence to future ages and

nations, are themselves without name or history, in the records of the past. As far back as our knowledge extends, whether guided by sacred or profane history, Egypt, for example, was in possession of both hieroglyphic and alphabetic writing; and most probably logographic, or the Chinese method also, as the connecting link between the one and the other.—Hieroglyphics representing thoughts, facts, and phenomena, as separately existing and conceived of;—the logographic method employing a distinct, different sign for every separate word; while the alphabetic represents, by a few intelligible signs, the simple elements; and is, in fact, a mere gamut of the voice, resulting from the lingual organs in man. The alphabetic, syllabic form of writing, which now prevails wherever letters are known, except among the Chinese, is based originally upon an analysis of sound, so as to present the elementary parts to the *eye*, as nature had before adapted the primary intonations to the *ear*. It is an analysis of sound, giving the elements of articulation, not unlike the prismatic decomposition of light, giving us the primary colors of its elements.

A thousand kindred inventions, besides those mentioned, anterior to alphabetic writing, evince conclusively, that man had always sought a language for the *eye*, as well as *ear*. The latter—that only adapted to the ear, he saw was perishable and uncertain. But the former, possessing the permanence of mathematical signs and formula, it was seen and felt, might overcome time and space, and triumph over fate and oblivion! Hence, without assuming for written language the Divine origin contended for by many, it may be rationally referred, for its origin, to the wants and necessities, the invention and ingenuity of the human mind. The single fundamental want of our nature, to which we have asked attention,—the intuitive desire, the irrepressible wish of man to live in the distant and future, and to be known by his contemporaries, and to

posterity, is quite sufficient to account for the result, without any appeal to the supernatural.

That letters, and the art of writing, were familiarly known to the Hebrews and Egyptians, the Ethiopians and Phenicians, some eighteen centuries before the Christian era, is entirely certain, and placed beyond dispute, by the notices both of profane and sacred history. And to these we may add both painting and sculpture, as kindred arts, whether as it regards design or effect. The idea of record—of registration, connects itself with the whole moral administration of Deity, in relation to the world of man. If we turn to the Pentateuch and Book of Job,—the oldest documents extant in the whole commonwealth of letters,—we shall find allusions and notices to this effect, ages before any Cadmean dream had intimated to Greece the existence or possibility of such unlooked-for thaumaturgic discovery. The method itself is one by which thought and feeling—the impalpable facts of consciousness, are rendered visible. It is the only possible medium by which to secure its safe transmission from age to age. It connects itself with all that is valuable or permanent, as known by us, on earth or in heaven. It becomes the established vehicle for the commerce and transmission of thought interminably. Anterior to the birth of letters, each successive generation of men may be said to have died intestate, leaving all their intellectual treasures to instant plunder and consumption. Since, however, each generation survives by testamentary provision, and exerts an influence through its immediate and remote successors, which time himself can only destroy with the world's destruction. Literature is a cabinet filled with the remains of every age and every country; thus rendering the transitory eternal, by enabling mind in every age and region, to bequeath to other minds—to posterity, the better part of itself; and so contribute to the indestructible aggregate of human knowledge. To register, (as society is

effort with the light of the past, and both are thus made to blend with the hopes, brightening the horoscope of the future. And thus, by analogy, the history of the past becomes an embodied representation of what is to come; and answers the purposes of prophecy.

By learning the incipient state, and precondition of things, we have something like satisfactory warrant, in fixing upon their final issue, and can arrange for action or endurance, accordingly. But it may be you will demand something less vague, less indeterminate than history. In the varied consciousness and action, however, of individuals, we have the history of the world. Individuality may be merged in the aggregate of society,—the conjugation of the social and civic relations, but to understand either, we must return to individual man. How can we know any thing about the general syntax and disposition of parts, in any system or combination, without first knowing the parts themselves, and the relations we predicate of them? The more man knows of himself, the more he will know of God, of nature, and his kind. The better too, will he be able to understand his relations, and his duties, and the less likely to neglect or pervert them. If then, we present you with a literature, reflecting your own image and likeness, and the image and likeness of all you know or have known, whether persons or things, it cannot fail to lead to more enlarged and correct appreciation, and wider and deeper sympathy, with regard to the claims of that literature; and this especially, as between the structural character and purposes of literature, on the one hand, and the nature and relations common to us all, on the other, there exists the most perfect parallelism. The one is indicated—presuggested by the other.

Language is a substitute for the senses. One man's senses are cognizant of phenomena of which another's are not; the one relates to the other the information of his senses, and the

latter, and a thousand others, have, without effort, all the knowledge of the first. In like manner, language supplies the place of consciousness, with regard to internal phenomena. The thoughts and feelings of one man, in their order and sequence—the result, perhaps, of years of laborious application, become ours by means of language, in a very short time, without being subjected to the difficult methods by which the original investigator reached his conclusions, and felt himself brought under their influence. In this way, one mind, in fields of mental and moral exploration, becomes, by means of language, oral and written, but especially written, the evangelist of important revelations to millions, who, but for the vigor and guidance of such a mind, had never possessed them at all! Thus the ignorance of innumerable multitudes, and the darkness of ages, are dispersed in a very short time. We have said, language is to the mind, what action is to the body—the evidence and demonstration of its vigor and ability. It is not only the index of our intellectual nature, but the only instrument of enlarging the dominion of mind. It is a living picture of the actual world about us; always furnishing material and motive for thought and action. It is, in fact, the vesture of thought and feeling, in which we clothe all the phenomenal developments of mind.

In the brief analysis we have given you of the philosophy of language, all legible language, engraved or written, and including of course the modern improvements of typography, divides itself into two great classes;—those methods representing objects and ideas by conventional signs, and hence called ideographic, and that (the alphabetic) representing simple sounds, as lingual elements, and hence called phonetic. This general classification, again, differs only from its primitive basis, oral language, as it regards convenience, enlarged power and perpetuity; and the preceding reasoning applies to all, but preëminently to the department of letters. - And still

organized the world over,) is to diffuse thought; and where the light of knowledge pervades, its tendency (unperverted) is to improve—to regenerate. Time alone had long since antiquated antiquity itself, but for letters! Duration, that crumbles palace and pyramid, but for the lettered scroll and tablet, would have made all the past, as if it had not been! The mummied Pharaohs are feeding the camp-fires of the plundering Arab—are sold in our shops for paint and plaster, and the deathless story of their prowess and dynasties survives only, and has become immortal, because engraved on pillar, column, and temple. Thus appealed to, history becomes the associate and interpreter—in fact, the great teacher of philosophy.

The subject, to be understood, must be examined *inductively*, by comparison, analysis, and inference; and without the aid of history, we cannot proceed a single step. It is its history, properly, that gives to the subject form and pressure. What have we of the past, except words, once *spoken*, it may be, but now *written*—that is, its literature? Take any reputed fact in history—the fall of Babylon or Nineveh, the siege of Troy or Jerusalem, the plunge into the Granicus or the passage of the Rubicon—by what tenure are we said to be in possession of these facts? Why, true as strange, none in the wide world, except *words* in a given state of collocation;—the words of the record, as the visible symbol of thought; that is, language. So viewed, language in history becomes a kind of *apotheosis* of all knowledge, not implied in the consciousness of the moment. Through this medium the influence of events, far back in the night of time, are constantly giving color and character to the present. Literature, always to be viewed as means rather than an end, is not only found to be *conservative*, with regard to the past, but *perfective* of the present and future. It is only by combination of the known that we aim at the unknown. We connect existing

further, while language is in itself one of the most distinguishing characteristics of man, it secures the perpetuation of all others; and thus enables him to strike out a path of his own, by means and methods as various as they are appropriate. The power of language is a subject but too little understood. Analyze its elements, as before suggested, and look at its indefinite expansibility—not merely for the expression of all within the world of thought, but its possible application, illimitably extended and multiplied, to the intellectual and moral, not less than the physical purposes of our being. Language is not only important on account of its abstract import, as the typical representation of thought, but it claims a deep, and seldom-discerned significance, in view of its purposes and results, including all the conditions and operations of intelligence. “Knowledge is power,” not abstractly, but only in a state of transition from mind to mind, and age to age; and of this transition, language is the only medium—the indispensable condition.

We would especially invite attention to language in its higher elements and phases,—in its graver, and more imposing forms and functions, as dignified by use, and consecrated by the great mission assigned it, deriving value and consequence from the appointments of Providence, and its influence upon the destinies of man. Turning to time and space, cause and effect, substance and phenomena, sensation and consciousness, life and death, truth and order, God, religion, and eternity, language is the medium of our conceptions with regard to all. Even Almighty Power, in the grand creative act of giving birth to the world, appealed to language. “God said” (we follow the Hebrew) “let light be, and light was.” Connected with the great procedure of the world’s redemption, the same importance is attached to the same instrumentality. “In the beginning was the *Word*, and the *Word* was with God, and the *Word* was God.” The creative utterance, in

the one case, and the distinctive characteristic of the great Messenger revealing the will and mind of God, through the medium of language, in the other, are in striking analogy with our general reasoning. How naturally and irresistibly, therefore, do we recognize the connection, inexplicable it may be, but felt to be vital nevertheless, between language and every thing, trivial or illustrious, of common or extraordinary occurrence, to which the human mind has given birth! In these views, however, it will be perceived, we assume language to have passed from its oral or chrysalis state, in which it must always be fugitive and unsettled, into the fixed forms of legible—the permanent condition of written language; and hence the distinctive classification—letters or literature. So viewed and distinguished, letters become the visible type of invisible truth, and literature successively embalms what mind produces or discovers. *Here* and *thus* are placed before mind, the thoughts and emotions, the interests and anxieties of buried ages and nations, in imperishable enshrinement! Thus the moral circulation of the great social system is secured, and the Pythagorean dream of transmigration is realized in the descent and inheritance of thought and feeling, from generation to generation. The minds and thoughts of past ages are not perhaps so truly embalmed and preserved, as reproduced and perpetuated in their literature, as if by regular prosemination. To this effect the invention and art of printing have alone contributed more, within the last four hundred years, than all the means together for three thousand years preceding! The wonder-working thaumaturgic power of the press, is incalculable. Truths and facts grown old, and even obsolete, are reproduced, born anew, and by courtesy of oblivion, allowed to pass as novel, if not original! The literature of the past proves to be the seed-field of opinion and conviction, and turned up and cultivated by authorship and the press, it yields in rich abundance, both fruit and flowers. It is con-

stantly at every step, reproducing the order and methods of discovery and improvement; while each new development is compared with the old, with a view to the truth, utility, and grandeur of the whole. Knowledge is kept in a state of unceasing transition, as it regards time and space; thus keeping in active circulation the universal produce of the human mind, and reflecting the mind of every age and era, for the benefit of all succeeding time.

It is in letters only that we meet with the true phoenix fires, in which humanity, from generation to generation, renews its youth! The contemporaneous thoughts and convictions of every age and epoch, are brought together, and (compared with the past) are made the chart of the future. On this account, literature has always been the great vanguard of civilization, and the moral progress of man. Viewed as a vast whole, it is the expression of a large portion of abstract universal truth,—a historical representation of a large share of human consciousness. Its influence may be aptly resembled to that of gravitation, extending alike to objects near and remote, and performing its functions unmarked and unregarded. It is a light which cannot be hid. Witness the Indian and Egyptian priesthoods—the exclusive lettered castes of those countries, inexorably withholding what they knew, the knowledge of their order, from the other castes—the people; ever and anon, however, there is revolt among themselves, and dissent and secession give all the treasures of the priesthood to the popular mind, to be henceforth used as a common stock.

Again, no important event now found in the earlier records of time, could have inspired belief, or commanded respect, in the absence of letters; and the most eventful occurrences must, in the course of a few generations, as among all unlettered nations now, have assumed the character of mere fable. In a word, the world everywhere and in all time, would have

been seen living in darkness, and with closed doors, and so far as we can see, without the hope or prospect of change.

The Divine, not less than human sanction, has directly accredited the value of letters. The God of Christianity, in making the most important of his revelations to man, as in the instance of the decalogue and law at Sinai, and the Apocalypse in Patmos, definitively required that they should be reduced to writing, and permanently preserved, as the records of his will and purposes concerning man. The Book of God's Remembrance, and the Lamb's Book of Life, are evidence to the same effect. The general induction is strengthened further, by the fact, that the invention of alphabetic signs, always looked upon as a tide-mark in the flood of recorded time, or rather the grand starting-point of improvement, among the historic nations of the earth, took place when the old Eastern world was in a state of transition from barbarism to civilization; and that, in like manner, the invention of printing occurred at a time when the barbarous nations of Europe were in a similar transition state, with regard to modern civilization. And thus we have the evidence from nature's own lips, and the plainest lessons of providence, authorized by revelation itself, that both by Heaven and earth, letters are intended as the great, and only universal intermedium of human improvement.

But it may be you are impatient to arrive at the *cui bono* of all this,—anxious to know what good is certain, or likely to result from it. We remark, then, that literature and science, to a large portion of mankind, and primarily to all, is a direct revelation of things unknown—a revelation of the universal mind of man. It is the promulgation and publicity of all knowledge; and including the minds thus enlightened, it is, in fact, the great commonwealth, alike of human knowledge and accomplishment. The man of letters, having been trained as the pupil of the past, is the better prepared at

least, as both artist and actor, with regard to the present and the future. His training is the more primitive and unselfish in proportion as he imbibes the thoughts and feelings of other ages and nations, uninfluenced by those of interest or rivalry with regard to himself. And thus, he becomes a citizen of the past and future, almost as truly as of the present. In literature, we meet with not only the common, every-day aspects, but the higher collective phenomena of the universal mind of man; illustrating the laws and destiny of our being; and assuming form and compactness, in the shape of the various arts and sciences: it is, in effect, the epitomized reason and common sense of mankind, speaking to the intelligence, the heart, the imagination, and even the senses of man. The great determining considerations by which mankind should be governed, from age to age, must be deduced from the outline history and philosophy of the past; especially the lights and shadows, the dark and brilliant passages in the progress of mankind: implying less, perhaps, the discovery of truth, than the rediscovery and extension of its application and bearings. We have constantly before us, the memorials of man and mind, regarding both substance and phenomena in all their phases and relations; having reference to all that is connected with general nature, and all that *ought to be*, as it regards the world of mind. Thus, rules of action, derived from the opinions and practice of mankind in preceding ages, are perpetually reproduced, in greater perfection and force, for the benefit of succeeding generations. *Here*, we have the material and the product of thought, furnished by innumerable contributors, during a succession of ages. It is the concentration of a boundless landscape within the radius of a single eye. It is the history of humanity struggling with its destinies, since the morning of time. It is the journalized experience of the world, including alike endeavor and sufferance for near six thousand years! Mind is seen, in all the spacious circuits

of its musing, from the pastoral philosophy of the first generation of men, down to the bustling and rival activities signaling the last. The conversations and fortunes of the first man and woman in the garden of their creation, the story of their fall and expulsion, the promise of a Deliverer, the piety of Abel, the prophecy of Enoch, the tale of the first murder, the curse of the fratricide, and other facts of antediluvian date, are, after the lapse of nearly sixty centuries, giving color and character to the minds of millions, as if they formed a part of their personal history ! How many a saying, maxim, sentence, fable, or fact, uttered in the childhood of Greece or the infancy of Rome, has survived the glory and magnificence of the one and the other, by thousands of years ; and is now giving direction and activity to thought and feeling, in every lettered nation of the earth !

The civilization of Europe and of the world, as understood in general history, to a great extent, commenced upon the Acropolis of Athens, three thousand years ago. In the department of letters, however, we find nothing in Greece, rivaling in age, the records of the Pentateuch ; nor yet among any of the cultivated nations of the East. If we take the highest pretensions of Indian chronology, as found in the celebrated Sanscrit books, and allow their own list of kings, as found in the famous *Puranas*, we are only carried back to the age of Abraham ; when Egypt and Phenicia were old-established kingdoms, in possession of civilization, commerce, and letters. No historical epoch in India can, without the sheerest fable, be traced farther back than the Abrahamic period ; leaving an antiquity, even according to the Mosaic account, of 2200 years “ without form and void.” The Bible, in fact, is the great—the exclusive store-house of primeval history. It would not be difficult to show, that the earliest accredited history in the whole Asiatic world, Chinese not excepted, does not reach back more than 800 years before

Christ,—say, to the foundation of Rome, where the Hebrew literature had flourished for ages: at least, during seven centuries. Herodotus, the father of profane history, appears between Jeremiah and Malachi, the last of the Hebrew prophets; and about 1000 years after Moses. While, therefore, the inception of the laws and elements of a more refined taste and civilization, connects itself with the mind of Greece, the more important and far-reaching results of moral illumination, date back to the bards and prophets of Hebrew memory. And notwithstanding the rich luxuriance, and cumbrous magnificence of the oriental,—the terse vigor and beauty, the chastened splendor, and ideal force of the Greek,—the lofty rhythm, and cadenced grandeur of the Roman, we have nothing to equal the rapt, intensive abstraction, and solemn majesty of the Hebrew mind. We cherish, perhaps, a full share of admiration for Olympus and Parnassus, Helicon and Pindus, as the sanctuaries of poetic invention, and classic taste; but we find the germs and rudiments of a higher philosophy, and a nobler era, in the old Hebrew and Jewish literature. The *sacred* history of the world is all we know of it, for a succession of ages. *Here*, all is clear and well-defined: no mystery or fable. The persons, families, tribes, and nations introduced, though simple, and inartificial in taste, are enlightened and cultivated, to an extent altogether unknown in the first fabulous, or even accredited eras of profane history. The savage hordes and nations of barbarism, figuring so conspicuously in the earlier pages of classic history, occupy the dark interregnum, between the close of sacred and the advancing dawn of uninspired history. This gloomy period, during which the incubus of barbarism, always to be viewed as an apostacy from man's primitive state, appears to have settled upon nearly all the postdiluvian nations; this period, we say, is buried in doubt and uncertainty; and is likely to remain an impassable gulf in the history of the world.

The want of letters left dim tradition to dole its twilight histories, and tell its tales of yore. During these pseudo-classic, these pro-historic times, man and nature are presented to us in masquerade. Nothing but the monstrous or extra-natural seems to have afforded interest. But all is now changed. Within its later eras, the genius of literature has thrown itself amid the unthreaded labyrinth of ages, and fixing at once upon the formless aggregate of unrelated facts, has, by means of the proper clue, traced the progress of improvement, and given birth to the philosophy of history.

We have seen, by various forms of induction, that the instrumentality of letters, is essential to the commerce of mind—enlarged intellectual intercourse. This intercommunity of mind and thought is indispensable. Without intercourse beyond what is merely personal,—intercourse with the distant and unseen, mind, man, *the world*, would soon labor under a dead palsy; precluding growth, or advancement of any kind. You may regard mind in the revolution of ages, as an immense curve, and assume that a single arc or segment only, could be examined by any one mind, and how infinitely would it reduce the scale of the utmost information, possible to any one man, without a direct communication of knowledge from mind to mind! Hence, the necessity of language, or rather letters, the influence of which is propagated by a chain of subtle, but well-known sensibility throughout the mass of mind, found in every social scene. But for such intercommunication, the transmigration of thought from mind to mind, and language to language, giving permanence and universality to literature, how, for example, could the philosophy of analogy,—the great secret of the discoveries of Newton and Butler, (physical and moral,) ever be applied to any available purpose? Indeed, the science itself could not exist, and all discovery would be impossible. Whereas, now, a single thought is

often like a flash of lightning, throwing a whole landscape upon the eye at once!

The laws of our being, and those of the physical universe, although often confounded, nevertheless, mutually illustrate each other. Take the instance of intellectual freedom, or moral liberty—a distinguishing characteristic of our common nature; since it has been severed, and examined in a state of disintegration from theology, the result is likely to adjust, at no distant day, all the conflicting creeds of the religious world on this subject. The truth is gradually developing itself, by the study of nature and humanity as essentially independent systems, that physical and moral law are fundamentally different. That the law of gravitation, and that of the decalogue, cannot be obeyed, or conformed to, in the same way, or in any similar sense. Conformity or the want of it, to the one, is rewarded or punished by inevitable sequence in the order of mechanized cause and effect; but in the other, retributively—involving the subjective capacity of the agent, to *do*, or *not to do*, as he may elect. In the one case, we have the forced regularity of mechanism,—that, for example, constituting the harmony of the celestial orbs; in the other, responsible intelligence resisting opposing obstacles, and still cleaving to the eternal principles of moral right. To say nothing of ancient theories, Hobbes, with different schools of materialists, as also many theological schools, failed entirely to distinguish between *necessity* and *obligation*. And accordingly, a large portion, both of philosophy and religion, has long been inclined to regard even thought, as so absolutely mechanical—so meshed up among the *forces* of nature, and the dynamics of art, that it might, so far as this theory is concerned, become the part of a locomotive, or be made to spin cotton! In fact, the human mind, instead of holding, as it should, independent rank and place in the universe of God, and in itself constituting a

grand division in the great moral system, apart from what we call nature, has been so mixed up with physical cause and consequence, as to destroy intellectual independence and responsibility altogether.

To go no farther, I need hardly name the technics of a modern 'ology, in which man's mental and moral nature is made, it is difficult to decide whether the sport of fate, or the plaything of chance;—a system whose mental nosology resolves every thing into fixed, organic results; giving us even the latitude and longitude, together with the relative polar, and equatorial adjustments of all our intellectual and moral aptitudes; the whole determined by a cerebral chart, based avowedly upon actual survey, whose infinitesimal accuracy bids fair soon to discriminate, between the south, and south-west side of a hair! A theory, which, superseding the galvanic influence regulating the vibrations of the brain of La Place, has not only subjected all our mental and moral phenomena, to the necessary sections of a diagram, but actually reduced them to the convenient simplicity of a geographical lesson, (and, in rare accommodation to the incapacity of the learner,) spread out upon the map of one's own skull! Let us not be misunderstood; the system we rebuke, has *some* truth in it, but not enough to make the *system true*. It has grown too fast, and become immodest, and ultra in its pretensions.

Returning to the influence we have assumed in behalf of letters, the view of the subject we have taken, may be reduced to demonstrative certainty. Its influence is visible along the whole line of ages. It has stamped its elementary forms upon the development of mind, in all the revolutions and fortunes of the world and time, as far back, at least, as our information extends. Let education be regarded here, for a moment, as a science, with its subject—its fixed laws and definite object, and recollect no science can exist without it, that all

the sciences are equally dependent upon it, and that the growth and influence of all science are measured and graduated by that of education, and who can estimate its value, or set limit to its uses ! Hence, literature becomes a fixed, unchangeable element of improvement. Its influence is rapidly gaining, both in extent and intensity ; and by a law of mental progression, is slowly, but certainly tending to the universal movement and melioration of mind. Intelligence is everywhere appealing to time and reason, history and philosophy, and plying its effects for the relief and supply of human want. Letters have distinguished all the great epochs of history. Mind, by means of letters, is unceasingly issuing the laws of thought to distant posterity. It is the chosen medium of the supremacy of thought. It is the order and record of all mental development. Alike the offspring and auxiliary of reason and religion. And so considered, the canons and claims of literature are of universal and eternal validity. To this conclusion, we are conducted by the varied induction, which shows it to be, in substance and import, a direct revelation of the higher elements of humanity. The history of literature, as exhibited within the entire area of civilized nations, presents a grand epic of literary events, at which we can merely glance. We see Egypt, Ethiopia, and Phenicia, giving letters to Greece ; Greece to Rome ; and Rome to the Gothic nations of Europe ; and finally, the world colonized, and placed at school among *these* !

From the remotest antiquity, the general movement of letters has been from East, Westward. We first meet with full and tranquil daylight in Greece. But in the twilight of history, at a much earlier period, we trace the existence of a limited, but potent literature, nearly contemporaneously, in the family of Ham, as mixed with that of Shem, in Ethiopia, and upper, which was the elder Egypt ; and in the Shemitic family proper, among the Jews and Arabians ; and sub-

sequently, among the Japhetic nations. In the East, literature was a garden : in the West, a luxuriant wilderness. In the East, its uses were sacred : in the West, social and secular, as well as sacred. In the East, it was appealed to, to govern : in the West, gratification and enjoyment were its common purposes. In the East, faith was its burden : in the West, science.

But let us explain, and make our deductions. We take our facts from history ; for their collocation, and the reasoning based upon them, we alone are responsible. Take the old continental world of the Bible, and early classic history ; that is, Asia, and continental Europe, and the *then* known divisions of Africa. Mark the three great postdiluvian families, springing from Shem, Ham, and Japheth. Note the distinct expansion of each, as far as clearly traceable upon the page of history, until you reach their first grand historical distribution ; into, say, Shemitic oriental nations, the Indo-European nations, and the various tribes of Africa. The first and the last—the Orientals and the Africans, have been immemorially distinguished, by an invincible instinct for the mystic and marvellous—irrepressible veneration for religious symbols, and unconquerable immobility—resisting all change, whether of character or location. While the other grand division—the Japhetic family of nations, has been characterized by activity and enterprise—love of science, and practical achievement, freedom of thought, and independence of action, together with an all-absorbing passion for adventure, discovery and emigration, which has rendered them the pioneers of universal civilization, for more than thirty centuries. Thus prepared, take the prediction,—“Japheth shall dwell in the tents of Shem.”—The Japhetic and Shemitic races, with the exception of a part of Africa, occupied by the Cushite family of Ham, have peopled the world. The ancient kingdoms of Egypt, Ethiopia, Meroe, Nubia, Abyssinia, as also Carthage, Fez, Morocco, Tunis, Algiers—are all of

Shemitic origin; and have, in every stage of their history, exhibited physiologically, the true Oriental, rather than the African or Negro type. History has set down for ages, the Japhetic and Shemitic races,—the one, as Northern and Western; the other, Eastern and Southern. In the one, we have the old oriental nations, and civilization; and in the other, what is usually called the Western. Both had their origin, and were cradled in the primeval seats of empire,—ancient Asia, and Upper Egypt—the Ethiopia of the Bible, and of Herodotus, the father of classic history. The Eastern civilization first ripened, in nations descended from Shem; and the fortunes of Japheth were more or less influenced by its seeds and elements. But becoming stationary and immobile, in Southern and Eastern Asia, and its African possessions, it remained for the Japhetic race, not only to people and give character to Europe and the Western continent, but, to a great extent, to mould and color the destinies of the great Shemitic family:—such as the Chinese and the nations of Japan, of which the Mogul dynasty in Asia is also an example. Among the children of Japheth, we find the ancient Pelasgi of history, the Scythian and Celtic races: also the Thracian, the Slavonic, the Goth, and the Turk. And now we reach, in the progress of expansion, the great European family, which divides itself into three great branches—the Latin, the Teutonic, and the Slavonian. The first, found in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, and afterward in South and Central America. The second, in all the ancient Celtic, Germanic, Saxon, and later Anglo-Saxon races of Europe, and subsequently, of North America. The third is found in Russia, and the great Northern Peninsula of Scandinavia. These three classes of nations hold the balance of the world: and among these some are stronger, and some weaker. In physical force, intellectual prowess, and moral vigor, the Teutonic nations are incomparably superior to the others, and already hold the balance

of power upon two continents; and are rapidly gaining it upon a third, among all these races. With the exception of Russia, and a few unimportant states, the Latin and Teutonic nations divide Europe and America; and as a very general rule, these races are diverse in civilization, religion, policy, habits, and manners. The former division is found in the South, on both continents; and, taking the mass of the people, they are in a ruder, and much less cultivated state, with incomparably less public spirit, and productive energy. France, to some extent, is an exception; but the French are more than half Celtic and Teutonic, and constantly becoming more so, although claimed by the Latin family. A similar distinction obtains with regard to religion. In the South of both continents, the Roman Catholic faith prevails; and in the North, throughout the Teutonic nations, with perhaps the single exception of Austria and Ireland—and these but in part, the Protestant religion prevails. Indeed, the exceptions here may be balanced, as there is about as much Protestantism in the Latin, as Papal Catholicism in the Teutonic. For example, in France, the popular religious feeling is Papal; but the literature, philosophy, policy, legislation, diplomacy, and social tactics, are rapidly becoming more and more Protestant; and may be received as an offset against the Papal divisions of Austria and Ireland.

We now ask your attention to the influence the more enlightened and powerful of the Teutonic nations, are exerting upon the destinies of the old Shemitic family, and especially in the farther East. English influence alone, in the old oriental world, is, in directness and extent, beyond that of all other nations put together; and yet, this influence is Teutonic—that of the rugged Gothic mind; and gradually subversive of the rival Latin influence. Look at the same influence, not merely rolling back the tide of a refined, yet vigorous civilization to the Eastern world, but giving birth to empire upon

this, and the new Australian continent; and also, whether British or American, in the innumerable islands of the sea. Add to this, the incontestable fact, that the old Roman and Latin mind, viewed collectively, is gradually becoming more or less enfeebled and effete, in Italy, in Spain, in Portugal, and in Spanish America, both South and Central, and that the superiority of the more elastic Teutonic mind, is everywhere visible in its triumphs, in letters, in philosophy, religion, and economics; and thus, you will be able to form some idea of its probable destinies in every quarter of the world. The Greek character too, also found in the Japhetic family, still maintains a portion of its unique individuality; and is more inclined to symbolize with the North, than the South, of Europe and America: and the same is true of all the Slavonic races. In a word, Teutonic Europe and America, are now coloring the civilization of the world. Throw a glance too, at the Shemitic races—the Jews and Arabians. Both come in, providentially, as the means of intercourse and final alliance, between the children of Japheth, and the tents of Shem.

But it is time to show you what further, and special use, we would make of these facts. Return then to the text of this digression,—“and Japheth shall dwell in the tents of Shem.” This is a prediction of Revelation, at a time when the world was young: 2347 years before the Christian era; now, forty-three centuries since; and yet we have seen how literally, and variously it has been fulfilled; and may we not add, how irrefutably it proves the truth of revelation? And yet, this proof has only reached us by means of letters; and so far as we can see, its truth or falsehood would have precluded historical verification for ever, but for the existence and agency of letters, and literary enterprise, furnishing the facts and data on which we have based our reasoning. And permit us to add, that all the predictions of prophecy, as

found in the Bible, and all the miracles of its history, are precisely in the same category; and but for letters, or some equivalent mechanism, of which we can form no conception, never could have commanded belief.

To letters, therefore, as a providential medium, we are indebted for the very existence of Christianity; and their neglect or abuse, becomes, by consequence, so far as we are concerned, the dishonor alike of both God and man! Indeed, such neglect or abuse, is the essential characteristic of barbarism; and the voluntary agent in the premises, is, to all intents and purposes, a barbarian, and both Heaven and earth must deal with him as such. Christianity, to have existed at all without letters, would have required a constant, a daily succession of revelation and miracles; and even then, so far as we can see, would have been imperfect, and ineffective. Man's religious, are his strongest feelings; and it is morally certain, that the most effective auxiliaries would be appealed to; and accordingly, we find the literature of every country intimately connected with its religion; and the true friends of that religion, the truest friends of general literary education. The marriage of letters and religion took place long before the world had reached the meridian of its present age. The first public library in Egypt, for example, was dedicated to the gods, in a magnificent temple, bearing the inscription,—“The nourishment of mind.” Other, and earlier facts, to the same effect, we have already noticed.

But we will vary the induction, by a further appeal to facts. How much valuable information has been added to literature, by the mere inscriptions found upon coins buried with the ancients, to defray, as mythology taught, the expense of passage over the infernal rivers, Styx, Acheron, and Cocytus! The practice of thus depositing coins with the dead, obtained for at least thirty-six generations, over an extent of territory, whose population, during the whole term, averaged not less

than thirty millions of persons. And of the coins thus buried with, perhaps, some ten thousand millions of persons, the number recovered by accident or otherwise, in comparatively modern times, is almost innumerable. These inscriptions, relating to persons, dates, countries, ages, and events, and in most instances, readily decipherable, have thrown material, and otherwise unattainable light, upon various topics and interests, of no little importance to the student of human nature, in every age. Inscriptions too, found upon pillars, columns, altars, tombs, tablets, vases, statues, temples, and edifices, of almost every kind, have, in like manner, contributed immensely, to correct and enlarge our knowledge of both classic and Christian antiquity.

Again, take sacred and profane antiquity, and how meagre would be our knowledge of the one without the other! Apart from sacred literature, what idea could we have of the world's history, before the age of Herodotus? All is dream and fable! And taking even the period of Christian antiquity, how exceedingly defective would all history be, but for *its* contributions! Sacred and ecclesiastical, are therefore substantive parts of general literature; and for the last two hundred years, have been cultivated, as essentially classic; and regarded as continental divisions of the world of letters. So likewise, all the different eras and schools of literature, are essentially related. The fabulous, the poetic, Athenian, Alexandrian, Roman, Byzantine, continuing, in all, about 2700 years; then, the Tuscan; and finally, the modern Gothic, dating back only to about 1450; since which time, however, it has accomplished infinitely more than all the rest. These all connect with sacred literature, as before noticed; and mutually contain and illustrate each other. Look at the conflict between Paganism and Christianity, which continued during a period of five centuries; until finally, the decaying energies of heathenism rallied beneath the imperial standard,

and as a last expiring effort, appealed to the majesty, rather than intelligence of Rome, for the extirpation of Christianity! One of the principal means of resistance and triumph, on the part of Christianity, was, the manner in which she made the varied history and philosophy of letters, which had been gradually accumulating in the dark void of ages, inservient to her purposes in this fearful struggle. And but for such means of resistance, it is but too probable, history had never celebrated the funeral of Paganism, in idolatrous Europe! The last flame that was seen flickering upon the altars of Jupiter and Mars, was extinguished by the pens of Christian writers! It is equally true that the progress of *all*, even *physical* science, tended to the overthrow of polytheism; which by personification, fable, and allegory, had multiplied its gods and miracles to infinity. This resulted inevitably from the fact, that by means of science, effects were naturally and satisfactorily accounted for, without the deification of their causes. Paganism was compelled, from time to time, to make concessions to the spirit of the age. Instance, the character and tendency of the opinions and writings of Socrates, Plato, and others, in Greece; and Cicero, Horace, and Seneca, particularly, in Rome. During the whole period from Socrates to Seneca, the convictions of the times were unintentionally undermining the polytheistic creeds of the heathen world. The strong tendency of intelligence and feeling, was, to withdraw the mind of the age from polytheism, and give it a direction towards theism,—the belief and worship of *one* supreme God. The universal religious want and vacillation of the times, desiderated, without fully declaring the great truth of the Jewish religion,—the unity of God. Thus, when Christianity appeared, it was directly supported, on the one hand, by the revelations of Judaism, and negatively, on the other, by the questionable claims of Paganism. Since its introduction, through the medium of letters, Christianity has

everywhere received a vernacular existence; and become interwrought into the very structure of civilization. Its interests have, in fact, always been guarded and vigilled by letters. By the steady, unobtrusive instrumentality of letters, its truths have been silently fermenting in the mass of mind for ages. The contribution of evidence to the truth of Christianity, by general literature, may be resembled to the noiseless, unseen, and yet, rapid and effective masonry of the coral worm, throwing up islands in the bosom of the ocean!

As we cannot be expected to seize and apply *all* the facts and incidents connected with our subject, allow us to waive chronological order; and taking things as we find them in motion along the stream of time, *shoot flying*. Glance, then, at a few isolated, lofty minds in fallen Italy; separate alike from the church and the schools, avenging the injury and wrong of time and man, by giving to truth and posterity the elements of history, for a thousand years; and this in the very centre of the civilized world; and despite the example of the schools, and the ban of the Papal autocracy, which went together, and were *one*, in influence, on this subject. And thus, while all else was lost to Italy, letters survived the degeneration, as the only principle of renovation, and patent of immortality.* Antiquity was revived, and restored to Europe and the world; and literature, thus bequeathed by the Latin to the Teutonic family, became the *punctum saliens* of a new and more effective civilization. Ever and anon, distant and outlying provinces of human interest and action, were discovered, and added to the conquests of letters; while truth and mystery were everywhere seen unfolding upon the expanding horizon of knowledge and vision! Who does not perceive, that *thus*, and gradually, letters prepared the way for the great moral revolution of the sixteenth century, when the trumpet-tones of the Reformation fell upon the ear of Europe, and dead nations were everywhere seen starting into

life! Without letters, to what purpose had Bacon defined the limits—lighted up the paths—and reduced to order and beauty the chaos of preëxisting science!—to what purpose had Newton determined the laws, and opposing vision to distance and darkness, extended its reach to the utmost limits of the universe! So strongly convinced was Julian the apostate of the powerful weapons furnished Christianity, by the learning of her numerous apologists, that he closed the higher schools of the empire against all Christians, by an imperial edict; and everywhere prohibited private instruction, to the same effect; expressly declaring, that with the advantage of letters, Christianity would never be suppressed! Its whole history shows, that Christianity commenced its spread in towns, cities, and capitals,—the seats of learning and social polish. Witness Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, Athens, Corinth, Rome, Milan, and Ravenna. The reason is obvious: it was found in the nature of things. It was the ordination of God, that it should succeed principally by means of letters, as the common instrumentality of all improvement, and especially, intellectual and moral renovation. It is the evidence of all history, that God and man have fixed upon the one, as the condition of the manifestation of the other.

Unaided by science, how tame are all our conceptions of the works of God! With the natural eye, for example, we see much to admire;—the sun of heaven; the moon and stars, gemming the brow of night; but look at the unbounded extension of magnitude and relation, when viewed in the field of the Herschellian telescope! It is *then*, we count them by millions; and these, perhaps, the mere watch-fires and guard-lamps, lighting up, it may be, but a single section, or frontier province of the dominions of Godhead! The vast and various landscape of being spreads out before us! We revel and exuberate, amid all that is delightful in nature, or bright beyond, and when existing worlds are exhausted, we imagine new!

How illimitable the field for the expansion of intellect!—the apocalyptic range of thought and feeling in all their boundless enlargement! Even while we pause to breathe, let us remind ourselves, that a single manuscript, page, paragraph, or sentence even, is often worth more than a province! But for letters, had we ever heard the lips of prophecy, pouring its thunder-tones upon the ear of Judea; or listened to the dying hymn of the temple, floating over Kedron and Jehoshaphat? How intensely, in poring over the Homeric page, do we sympathize with the princes and heroes of Ilium; and yet time, which could not destroy the page of Homer, has not even spared us the ruins of Priam's capital! Want of letters has given to oblivion the character and fortunes of the once mighty nations, whose monuments are still visible over the immense north-western and southern divisions of the American continent! Let the savage wander over the seats of ancient Babylon, Persepolis, and Tyre,—all is dark, silent, and obscure; but visited by the man of letters, the whole drama of the early, gigantic civilization of the East reappears before him, in all its gorgeous splendor! Who can gaze on the pyramids of Egypt, outliving by ages the sympathies which gave them birth; or climb the acclivities, and seat himself amid the vacated thrones of the gods of Olympus, without feeling his indebtedness to letters! The night of forgotten things is revived, and turned into day! The very grave is endued with vitality, and oblivion itself becomes sublime! In reading Homer, whose *Iliad* is the Bible of polytheism, we have restored to us the whole popular mind and religion of Greece; and in Plato, we have the philosophy, and higher, moral aptitudes of that intellectual people. It was not the smoke, the thunder, and the mountain-theatre, quaking with the burden of its revelations, but mind and thought, engraved upon the dead tablet of stone, that poured the tide of emotion through the hearts of trembling thousands, at the base

of Horeb! Look at the tri-lingual inscription upon the cross, in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin—"This is Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews." Jerusalem is no more—Judea is not—the cross itself is mingled with the dust—the spot on which it stood is unknown; and more than fifty generations, descendants it may be, at least in part, of those who crucified him, are now contemporaries in the grave, and yet, that inscription is upon the lips of millions every day! A brief and simple form of prayer was given, *vivâ voce*, to a group of humble followers, in a desert of Judea, eighteen hundred years ago, and yet, that prayer, every day, stirs the lips of millions, in more than two hundred different languages! Who can visit the valley of the Rhone, where it was intersected by the ruthless Maximian, in the invasion of Gaul, and reflect upon the martyrdom of the Theban legion—the execution of six thousand Christian soldiers, for refusing to unite in a pagan celebration, without imbibing inspiration from the scene!

But for letters, what could the indomitable, dissenting monk of Saxony have accomplished, grappling with the wrath of the pontificate, and the thunders of the Vatican! A single production of his—his translation of the Bible, laid the foundation of classic high German, as now cultivated throughout the world, and constituted him the Homer of the north of Europe! Some two hundred years ago, an English earl transported from Greece to England a collection of marble blocks and slabs, covered with inscriptions, and this, apparently, unimportant circumstance, has thrown no inconsiderable light upon the literature, history, and especially, chronology of Greece, for at least thirteen centuries,—information too, not to be had from any other known source; and hence, the only, and yet priceless value of the Arundelian marbles—created solely by letters! What would the Anglo-Americans of this country have been, but for letters'

The curse of the blind, and the bonds of the base, had blended them, long since, with the aboriginal savage they had never been able to expel, but for science! Who can read Tacitus, with his depth of thought, and energy of expression, upon the greatness of Rome, without feeling the *memory* of that greatness to be equal to its *presence*!

It was this power of letters, had in view by the sagacious Wolsey, when he said to his master, the Head of the Latin Church, before the English Reformation, "Suppress printing, or printing will suppress you!" But for letters, a thousand provinces of thought, and grounds and reasons of conviction and action, would have been lost to man for ever. This applies alike to our physical and moral interests. Let us again instance the Christian revelation. Literature has been of infinite service to Christianity, even unintentionally, and in the hands of its enemies. Let one or two examples explain a thousand. Ancient historians had mentioned by name an Egyptian monarch, who, as a mighty conqueror at the head of an immense army, had ravaged the whole coast of Palestine; and subjected almost innumerable nations to the Egyptian sceptre. Of this, there is no mention in the Scriptures; and it was long thought, by many, that the omission, presumptively, discredited the Mosaic history; as this invasion of Palestine, the only country of the Israelities, took place *after* their exodus from Egypt; and the difficulty, for a long time, was felt to be a serious one. But more recently, it has been shown, that Egypt had two monarchs of the same name. One of them, founding the nineteenth dynasty of Egyptian kings, and conducting this very expedition, soon after; and as the Israelities left Egypt, confessedly at the close, and during the last reign of the eighteenth dynasty, the expedition in question took place during the forty years' journeyings of the children of Israel in the wilderness, and not in any way affecting their fortunes, there is no reason why this in-

vasion should have been mentioned by Moses ; and thus, this once formidable objection loses all its force.

Again, among the literary monuments of Egypt, obtained by the military expedition under Napoleon, were the celebrated astronomical tables, known as the Zodiacs of Esneh and Dendera. These, by Volney and others, were made to date back, as early as the creation of the world, according to Moses ; and thus, utterly destroy his credit as a historian. The difficulty, however, led to more minute observation ; and the result was, the monuments had *Greek* inscriptions upon them, as well as Egyptian hieroglyphics, and were undoubtedly of the Roman epoch in Egypt, and about the time of Nero, after the Christian era. And in this way, by means of a ripe, and ever-watchful literature, the friends of Christianity are demolishing, one after another, the strongholds of unbelief, with regard to its historical verity. The truth of revelation is borne aloft, and most convincingly illustrated, by the disclosures of letters and science ; and at every step in the inquiry, we find their agreement and coünity gradually acquiring the force of demonstration.

In 1572, a star appeared in the constellation of cassiopeia, and continued, in apparent size and splendor, equal to Jupiter, for some sixteen months, and then exhibiting strong and conclusive evidence of sudden dissolution, by combustion or fire, without at all changing its primary position in the heavens, disappeared for ever ! Now, let the scientific infidel, who laughs at the idea of the dissolution of our planet by fire, turn to this conflagration of a planet incomparably larger than the earth, and connecting with it the demonstrations of the chemical laboratory,—that the solid contents of our globe are reducible to an essentially gaseous state, by the mere dissolution of existing combinations, and he will stand before you, confounded by the analogies of science urged by himself, as adverse to the truth of revelation !

Look at the Asiatic prince, rejecting the mission, and expelling from his dominions the Christian missionary, for casually affirming the existence, in his own country, of solidified water, in the state of ice. Now, had the missionary been a good practical chemist, he could, by a well-known process, have produced *ice* before the indignant chief in twenty minutes; and not only silenced his cavilling for ever, but been the means perhaps of Christianizing the whole population! Thus, the history and philosophy of letters, are seen developing the reciprocal analogies of nature and revelation; and the agency of literature, in the moral government of God with regard to man, is felt to be as *direct*, as it is immense and important. The triumph of mind—of truth—of good, over ignorance, error, and evil, may be regarded as the final cause of man's creation. And this is obviously achieved, in great degree at least, not *by*, it is true, but still, *through* the medium of letters. Literary education stands related to all the different masses of mind, as the atmosphere does to the earth—it is the medium of all genial influences. It is the point of conflux, in which all causes, and religion preëminently, unite in the exertion of influence;—a focus, in which the rays of intelligence, unite and converge to a common centre of a single mind. It is an exhibition of the imperishable vigor of mind, in all time, and including all its changes! Here alone, the moral manifestations of society for ages, are brought together, and classified. We trace the modifying influence of coëxisting and successive causes, with the best of the past! We better understand the philosophy of duty and conscience; and their modification by circumstances, especially where personal, and even public conviction and opinion, are crushed within the serpent-folds of a vicious system. So guided and trained, the mind cannot fail to acquire stimulus and warrant. Prejudice and prepossession are held in a state of solution. We live under the correcting influence of other times, and distant

places; and taking the whole area of humanity, (as varied in action as in aspect,) we are always prepared for our proper position and *status* in the social system, in whatever section of it we may be called to act our part.

An additional reason for the estimate we place upon letters is found in the fact, that human life is not conclusive of the entire destiny of man. It is but the probatory part of his being, giving character to his final destiny. In this life especially, man, by the intention of the Creator, lives to think and feel; and as thought and feeling are the direct sources of action, and are always, more or less, influenced by the various forms of literature, whether elementary or conventional, the whole history of letters, thus becomes a providential moral drama, connected with the husbandry and tillage of the entire field of ethics, as known to man. The instrumentalities of literature, do not terminate in a knowledge of the specific nature of man, but include, also, his enlarged destinies. It exists, a grand proto-phenomenon, giving birth to other developments, in which Heaven and earth have the deepest interest! It is *here* we must look for the lofty investigations of gifted intelligence! It is *here* we meet with mind in its higher developments, and bowed beneath the weight of its mighty spoil! *Here*, mind consorts with mind, in all the generous freedom of primal brotherhood! *Here*, we meet with the germs and rudiments of a nobler era before us! *Here*, thought kindles at thought, circling "infinite around," and gradually unrolling the apocalypse of nature and of mind!

Even the incidental and unintended uses and tendencies of literature, are important, beyond all ordinary conception. In this way, incidentally, and without purpose, light is often thrown upon a thousand distant and unrelated facts and occurrences. To explain our meaning—we would read what is left us by the poets Aratus and Epimenides, if only to find the quotations from them, in the New Testament by St. Paul:—

the one applied to the Athenians, and the other to the Cretans ; for it shows us, that St. Paul appealed to the Greeks, with the confidence of one versed in their literature. We would read the odes of Anacreon, and even the buffoonery of Aristophenes, for we find allusions in them to most important facts, distinctly recognized in the Christian Scriptures ; and so far, we press them into the service of the truth of Christianity. We read Horace, much as he is abused, and although we know his favorite gods—Bacchus and Venus, meant only good wine and pretty women ! And why ? Because this very fact throws discredit upon the whole system of Paganism ; and so far as Horace is concerned, furnishes an argument for a better ! The veriest folly, in sooth, may, in this way, teach us wisdom. Take even the hot-house supplies, the delicious morceaux, making up the sum of the dainty literature of the modern fashionable parlor, in the shape of poem, tale, and stanza, and without which, the elegant extracts—the élite of society, would hardly be able to live or die in good taste ! Are *these* without instruction ? Far from it. The enchanter, in that poem dirging the apparition of a dead rainbow—the witching limner, in that admired tale, who is seen weeping over the bier of a defunct fairy, saw his mother die of want, without a tear ; and refused to rear and educate her children, without a pang ! Sad truth, but full of instruction ! And we ask, who can help fearing a victim—a similar abuse of virtue and immortality, in the reader ! Even *such* instances show our literature to be rich in its suggestive influences.

Again, a single name throws its shadow over an empire, and along the whole line of history—witness Aristotle and Plato. A single author holds the world in fixed entrancement—witness Milton, amid the delights of his “Paradise ;” and Dante, in the abysses of his “Inferno !” Few, very few, can wield the thunder, but millions of minds have been lit up with the ardor of Demosthenes ! Who can estimate the ex-

tent to which Bacon, the great chancellor of human nature, enriched with new and enlarged combinations the literature of the world! Owing to the suggestive power of letters, and the electric sympathies of mind, it has often happened, that the pith of a proverb, or the sting of an epigram, has wrecked creeds and kingdoms! In barbarian lands, how often have tyrants and masters been made *men* by their lettered slaves! At this very moment, the outcasts of serfhood and helotism, are regenerating the common mind of Russia, and modern Greece! How often has the heart of a mighty nation been chained to the genius of a single man, by the simple instrumentality of letters! And if the thoughts of a single pre-scient mind, may thus become the seed-fields of events, affecting the destinies of millions, what may not be looked for, in connection with those grand nurseries of mind—those olympic schools of genius and mental progress, of every grade, in the shape of academic, collegiate, and university foundations, together with philosophical, scientific, and eclectic institutes and associations, which are everywhere contributing, so unceasingly, to the fulfilment of the great mission of science and letters!

One word of warning, with regard to the misdirection and abuse of letters, and we have done. Intellectual nations, by means of letters, possess, beyond all doubt, a vast moral supremacy for good or evil. If there be truth in history,—if we may confide in the teachings of experience, a reach of thought—a depth of endowment—an olympic vigor of intellect, have always been found in connection with lettered training, looked for in vain, in the absence of such discipline. *Here* only, the infinite capabilities of mind find ample verge for dilation, as the vast merges into the vaster, illimitably; and each visible horizon is seen enlarging into more distant regions! Such distinction and advantage, however, may be abused; and the depravity and mischief of a portion of our literature, are too

well known to be questioned. These evils, however, are contingent, not necessary. Prostituted to unworthy purposes, the vicious elements, and baser accompaniments, to which we allude, are productive of the most serious detriment to the ordinary, general tendency of lettered attainment. The evils in question, result from various causes, beside depravity of purpose; and must be met and corrected, as we meet and correct other evils; by resisting abuse and misdirection, and constantly appealing to the influence and counteraction of other causes. We shall find general literature an orb of light, notwithstanding these nebulosities.

We may safely regard the literature of a country, as the true thermometer of its real character; but in doing so, its whole literature should be taken, and especially, in its higher and outline phases and aspects. Were a foreigner, for example, to judge the collective people of the United States, by a portion of the periodical press here, he would look upon the country of Washington and Franklin, as the great fermenting vat of political blackguardism, whose bastard patriotism is the fit text of a world's derision! Quackery,—the showy, vaporizing insolence of unfounded, literary pretension, is, preëminently, the “original sin” of modern literature. What a sterile, inane exuberance have we, as it regards authorship! Productions, in number, numberless; but amid all this pomp of words, the veriest penury of thought—words—words—mere words, and nothing but words, with the understanding always, that it makes no difference how they are arranged! Clinging to their grovelling standards,—crowding prig, pedagogue, and pretender, side by side,—the barriers of mediocrity,—armed *cap-a-pie*, in the technicalities of literary coul and mannerism; this class of authors are found, one moment, courting the vulgar herd, by *ad captandum* artifice, and the next, humbly suing for distinction at the bureau of public opinion! The prolific vaticinations of these

literary chafferers, are not without their influence and admirers; and whether in the shape of a foppish, finical virtuosity,—fine by defect, and beautifully weak, or a more degraded literary sansculottism—whether it be the obstreperous bravadoes of *pseudo-scholarship*—the small-ware dealers in *learned sophics*, or the more welcome visitor, in the shape of a sickly, puling tale-monger, “wheresoever the carcase is, there will the (vultures) be gathered together,” ready to discuss the picnic with becoming zest!

But, turning away from this limbo of literary abortions and inanity, let us not forget, that all this counterfeit show is but a distorted shadow of the real, and that the exceptions to it, only prove the truth of our general position. The great objection, outweighing all others, to such portions of our literature, is, that God and nature, truth and duty, if found in them at all, are only found in parenthesis! The grand instrumentality of letters, is laid under contribution to the ever-engrossing purposes of present gratification, or promised utility; instead of being appealed to as one of the great germinant plans of providence, for the welfare of the world. Whereas, such application alone, can impress our literature with a high character, and give it a safe direction. Our literature should always consult the more elevated wants of human nature. It should be made its vocation, to see that the lightening energies, and current aptitudes of mind, are governed and directed by integrity and unity of purpose. And thus, when literature, in rich and deep distilment, is found mixed up and contempered with the universal mind, living in every age and belonging to every nation, although liable to abuse and misdirection, it shall, in its better elements and tendencies, always be appealed to, as type of the eternal and the true; and shall continue to flourish triumphant over the works and laws of time. God of thought! in the universe of intelligence and conscience, what, but the friendship

of Heaven, can be more important! Who can measure the reach and maximum of its influence! And as the human heart, in all time, beats upon the same eternal spring, and the same living embers are there, ready to glow upon its hearth-stone, the continued and final result glanced at, may be looked forward to, with the greatest moral certainty. We have before us, the lessons of nature and providence—of time and experience; by which we are enabled to seize and apply, all that is valuable in the records of ages and nations. The ideal world before us is peopled and vivified by the image of the past, rising a pharos upon our opening pilgrimage, and throwing its beacon-light far into the future! Nor, while we appeal to it, as means only, conducive to the most important ends, need we ever distrust it. It has stood the induction of time. It has stood the discipline of the sterner faculties, as we have traced the immortal powers of mind, pressing forward in infinite progression!

And thus, we reach the conclusion, that progressive advancement is the law of letters. The goal of yesterday is the resting-place of to-day; and will be the point of departure in the next movement forward. Say that the world is now in the equinox of time, judging from the past, what may not be accomplished before the close of the drama! Look at what is now being accomplished, by a union of effort, on the part of coëxisting mankind; and take into account, the influence of letters, in regular and sequent succession, as one generation succeeds another, and what may we not expect, as the final result!

We only add, let Christianity, as the supreme good of humanity,—the *one thing* most needful, but make a proper and effective use of letters, and the world's renewal in the image of God, shall steadily advance, like the changeless movements of the planetary system! But if Christianity be faithless to the trust confided to her, *that* betrayal will fore-

shadow a doom, it would raise the dead to hear! While, therefore, we cling, with immortal yearning, to the supernatural warrant of Christianity, let us not neglect the God-chosen means of its diffusion! And thus, having accomplished our intended destiny upon earth, as the sun of existence dips, in declining lustre, behind the visible horizon,—the remotest hills of earthly vision, it shall be seen rising and culminating, not as *here* and *now*, but in another and nobler hemisphere, in all the livery of undying splendor!

THE END.

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